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ABSTRACT
Democratic Infelicity: Speech, Authority, and Disbelief in Malian Politics
Natalia Mendoza Rockwell
This dissertation presents a contribution to the ethnographic study of institutional politics in 
postcolonial societies, in this case, contemporary Mali. It examines the ways in which transitions 
to democracy have transformed everyday politics not only through the creation of new 
institutional arrangements, but through the promotion of new understandings of social and 
political authority. In particular, this research examines the expectations that democratic 
institutions place on political deliberation and public speech, as well as the multiple ways in 
which democratic political speech has failed to fulfill those expectations. To address these 
questions, it combines Linguistic and Political Anthropology in the analysis of everyday 
discussions that took place in institutions of political representation in contemporary Mali—from 
the National Assembly to local councils and party meetings. This linguistic evidence was 
collected during fifteen months of fieldwork in Bamako and Kita, Mali, in 2010, 2011, and 2012. 
 Each chapter is centered on one of the various categories that mediate the relationship 
between political speech and action—such as authority, representation, and sincerity. My 
analyses of discursive patterns within the specific political context of Mali lays bare an 
oscillation between a serious engagement with democratic political discussion on the one hand, 
and its rejection through expressions of suspicion and disbelief on the other. Drawing on J. L. 
Austin’s speech act theory, I argue that democratic political speech suffers “infelicity,” or a 
recurrent difficulty in authenticating formal political speech and investing it with added 
performative force.
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Introduction 
This dissertation is an ethnographic analysis of political speech in Mali. It looks closely at formal 
political meetings—from parliamentary debates to village party meetings—as entry points to 
examine the status of language in new democracies. I believe that the “transition to democracy” 
in Mali—as in many other countries—was in itself an era, much like the Belle Époque. I say 
“was” because even though democratic institutions are still standing and will continue to 
transform social and political relations for a long time, the earnest enthusiasm of those first 
decades has faded. 
 Liberal democracy offered a set of political procedures and rules—of which the two most 
significant ones for Mali were “clean and competitive” elections and freedom of speech. 
However, democracy promised much more. It promised, to all those willing to participate, the 
opportunity to shape the course of events. In Arendt’s terms we would say that it offered 
“authorship,” or the possibility to take part in the discursive creation of a common world 
(Arendt, 1958). Liberal democracy established a line linking public discussion to political action. 
This dissertation is about the fortunes and misfortunes of that link. 
  In Austin’s theory of performative language, speech acts are utterances that do 
something; they differ from “statements” in that they are not “true” or “false,” but “felicitous” or 
“infelicitous.” Infelicity is speech ineffectiveness or the inability of speech to become act. 
Austin’s investigation begins with rather extraordinary examples of speech acts, such as 
marriages and baptisms. However, it progressively incorporates most quotidian acts, like 
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promises, truth claims, greetings and commands. Speech acts abound in politics, from peace 
agreements to the adoption of new laws and campaign promises. It would be possible to create a 
typology of political styles by looking at their most emblematic speech acts: promises are to 
liberal democracy what commands are to authoritarianism. 
 In Austin’s theory, however, felicity and infelicity appear as universal features of 
language. That is, even though he places the relationship between speech and context at the core 
of his understanding of language, he does not examine the possible relations of infelicity with 
broader social, political or historical circumstances. That is, for him felicity is an analytical 
problem, not a socio-historical one. Austin convincingly argues that the validity of speech acts 
requires not only the utterance of a linguistic formula, but also an “appropriate” relation between 
speech and context. For instance, if a priest correctly performs a marriage between two chairs, 
the context would be “inappropriate” and the act infelicitous. The question that interests us here 
would be: do “inappropriate” speech acts—i.e. invalid marriages—become more widespread 
under certain circumstances? (Austin, 1962). 
 Austin asks: how widespread is infelicity? Such formulation calls for a answer of 
universal scope. Conversely, this dissertation is based on the premise that felicity has an uneven 
distribution across time and space. That is, it cannot be assumed, it needs to be researched case 
by case. Felicity also has a history, which is inseparable from that of secularization of language. 
Austin’s idea of speech acts, as conventional formulae that achieve something, emerged in a 
world in which it had already been stated that language, other than “representing,” does not do 
anything—that spells, prayers, and curses, for instance, are ineffective. An anthropological 
inquiry into felicity needs to ask how entire realms of language loose or gain efficacy, and how 
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felicity relates to other processes, from state-formation to the coexistence of multiple regimes of 
language (Kroskrity, 1999). It is said that during the colonial period in Mexico, indigenous 
people would hide representations of their “idols” inside the hollow figures of Catholic saints 
and in such manner address their prayers to both simultaneously. Something similar happens in 
Malian political discussions. 
Speech acts can be divided in those that derive their felicity from the correct repetition of 
a well established formula—e.g. marriages, degree conferrals, the voting in of new laws at the 
parliament—and those that need to at least partly inaugurate or create their own conditions of 
felicity. In the realm of politics, this distinction can be mapped onto that between 
“administrative” and “constitutional” politics. That is why the question of felicity leads to that of 
sovereignty. Many speech acts, especially of the kind found in politics, have a legal status; they 
appeal to the State as ultimate enforcer. Moreover, the ability to produce a self-sufficient speech 
act, one that inaugurates it own felicity and responds only to itself, is the emblematic sovereign 
act. Following Schmitt, I here understand sovereignty as “the capacity to decide on 
exception” (Schmitt, 1988). The clearest example is the foundational or constitutional act, the act 
that inaugurates a social order.1 However, this is not the only one, the legislators and local 
council members that are the protagonists of this story find themselves “deciding on the 
exception” of perhaps trivial matters on daily basis. As such, they are recurrently confronted with 
the (in) efficacy of their speech acts.     
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1 In the philosophies of the “social contract” this original speech acts is one that transfers sovereignty 
from the people towards a “man or assembly of men” who represent them. Consider for instance the 
following passage from Leviathan: “This is more than consent, or concord; it is the real unity of them all, 
in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, as if every man should say 
to every man, ‘I authorize and give my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, 
on this condition that thou give up your right to him, and authorize all his actions in such manner’....This 
is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, of that Mortal God, to which we owe, under the 
Immortal God, our peace and defense.”[Hobbes, 114] [My emphasis]
 Felicity is the point where language and sovereignty meet. Following this definition, I 
argue here that institutional political speech in Mali suffers from infelicity. By infelicity I do not 
mean discontent or dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. I mean recurrent difficulty in 
authenticating formal political speech and investing it with performative force. Unkept promises, 
invalid marriages, unheeded commands, broken agreements, unratified laws, are some of the 
examples of infelicity that appear in this dissertation. Infelicity has multiple causes and 
manifestations; some point towards State (in)capacity, some towards the regimentation of 
language per se. As an analytical tool, infelicity helps me underscore a feature shared by 
seemingly unrelated phenomena. In particular, it allows me to see political mendacity, the “crisis 
of authority,” and “crisis of trust,”—all of which were recurrent themes in my fieldwork—as 
different aspects of the larger question regarding the relationship between speech and acts. 
 Infelicity is broad, widespread, and it incorporates many things. For that reason, each 
chapter of this dissertation turns loosely around a category addressing one particular aspect of the 
relationship between political speech and action. These are authority, representation, conflict, 
intention, and speculation. The list is not exhaustive and is rather arbitrary, as it was partly 
dictated by my own theoretical interest and partly by the questions that emanated from my 
ethnographic material. Within each chapter, there is a miscellaneous combination of “internal” 
and “external” analytic categories—which some anthropologists used to call “emic” and “etic.” 
To justify this methodological choice, I can only say that using one language to explain another 
language is one of the practices the protagonists of this story and I share. 
 Each chapter is centered on one main event, such as a meeting, a conference, or a 
parliamentary debate. I alternated between examples from the national political scene in 
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Bamako, the capital, and political discussions at the level of the cercle or county, in Kita. The 
events I describe show the coexistence not only of multiple languages—French, Bambara, 
Malinke, and Arabic—but also of multiple regimes of language. That is, diverse understandings 
of the proper ways to do things with words. Malian political speech is formed by layers of 
extremely complex language regimes that to abbreviate we could qualify as Mande, Islamic, and 
French. I tried, to the extent of my ability, to account for this diversity as the analysis of my 
material demanded it and without aspiring or aiming to reconstruct a cohesive cultural system. 
The reader will notice that I did not try to delimit traditions or ascribe a cultural affiliation to the 
different practices I saw. This was to me the best way of showing how politicians move 
constantly between these different regimes, not only through spontaneous “code switching,” but 
through more complex theories and meta-pragmatic arguments of what is best done in which 
way. In so doing, they draw from a repertoire of practices that cuts across any bounded notion of 
“language” or “regime.” 
 Even though my inquiry was largely driven by an interest in language and 
communication per se, attending political meetings proved to be also a productive way to 
investigate political practices more broadly. The themes addressed in meetings range from the 
most apparently trivial matters—e.g. how many liters of gasoline should each party member get
—to the most far-reaching questions concerning, for instance, democracy, authority, and 
personhood. What I found most fascinating about working with linguistic evidence from these 
meetings was that themes emerge as points of contention rather than as the cohesive assertions 
that tend to predominate in interviews.   
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  Discussions in meetings also index the institutional and spatial configuration within 
which they take place. One question that runs through this dissertation is how democracy and 
decentralization have shaped the political relations between Bamako, the capital, a regional 
center like Kita, and the rural areas. This spatial configuration can be traced through by the 
physical movement of politicians between these different points, which I was at times able to 
reconstruct from the accounts. The movement of information and messages through face-to-face 
reported speech, personal phone calls, and the media also can also be partially traced from 
political debates. In almost every meting, attendants deliver, contrast and verify information from 
different sources. A large portion of the time in party meetings is spent establishing the truth 
about who went where and what was said by whom to whom.
 Different grounds of political authority and prestige also become visible in these 
meetings. With time in the field, one begins to notice how diverse conceptions of the craft of 
politics correspond to different political personae. The notion of political persona refers to 
something larger than the “socio-cultural profile” of politicians, because it includes the conscious 
fashioning of the public self. The techniques of the self that participating in politics involves are 
particularly explicit among the youth; young politicians talk more openly and devote more time 
to thinking about the personal qualities that may foster their political careers. A large portion of 
the ethnographic material that I gathered among the politically engaged youth unfortunately fell 
outside the scope of this dissertation. However, the descriptions of the relation between political 
activity and personhood scattered across this dissertation rely strongly on those conversations. 
 Malian politicians often function as intermediaries of one sort or the other; they depend 
on their ability to distribute or allocate material benefits. These come from diverse sources, from 
6
international development aid to the personal fortunes of party leaders. Some of the discussions 
that I describe in this dissertation turn around resources, more specifically, around money and 
land. Tracing the form, direction, and temporality of the material exchanges that electoral 
democracy fosters proved highly fruitful, and I believe that an anthropological understanding of 
democracy cannot do without a detailed analysis of the sort of exchange cycles linked to politics. 
However, a full account would have required a different kind of fieldwork; here I limit myself to 
examining the indirect evidence of such material exchanges, as my ethnographic material is 
filtered by politicians’ judgments of what they considered appropriate to discuss in public 
meetings.
 One of my methodological premises was, from the beginning, to look at so-called formal, 
institutional politics. In this case, this refers to politics that take place either among elected 
politicians or among those who seek to get elected. As I will discuss in more detail below, 
anthropological approaches to democracy have tended to privilege “social movements” and 
“civil society” (Paley, 2002). In so doing, I believe, they have partaken of the generalized 
discredit of institutional politics, rather than taking such discredit as a question in itself. 
 Political anthropology has also tended to privileged “the informal” and the “margins,” 
terms that are used to point at the set of political practices and transactions that hold an 
ambiguous position vis-a-vis public norms, political aspirations, and sometimes the law. This sort  
of “semi-conscious” realm in many cases constitutes the most solid base of political power, and 
even though it is known by everyone, it is considered that it must remain below the line of public 
representations. In Africa, as in Latin America, “informality,” or the gap between real political 
practices and those that fit the norms, produces a sort of national embarrassment, and it is an 
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object of permanent complaints of reformist intellectuals. My own previous research about drug-
trafficking in Northern Mexico emanated from a similar desire to unveil real politics.  
 This was not the case with this dissertation, which asks how institutional politics attempts 
to establish its own dignity: what it leaves out, what it incorporates, and on what grounds. Here, 
my interest was to understand how suspicion, accusations of deceit and corruption, and the 
generalized transfer of real politics to an invisible realm fulfill pragmatic functions in everyday, 
visible, and business-as-usual politics. How, for instance, are conspiracies and other forms of 
“anti-publics” attributed all the felicity that visible, public politics lacks. In other words, how the 
idea emerges that politicians do not respect their public engagements because they respect their 
secret engagements too much.
! In sum, this dissertation is about the everyday struggles of elected politicians as they 
attempt to do things with words. 
Anthropology of democracy
 The Republic of Mali, writes Gregory Mann, “became an independent nation in 1960 
with the break-up of the Mali Federation and the socialist option of September 22nd. And again 
in 1961, with the expulsion of French troops from military bases on its territory. And again in 
1962, with the creation of the Malian franc” (Mann, 2015:15). Something similar can be said 
about democracy, the Republic of Mali became democratic in 1960, in 1977, in 1992, in 2012, 
and in 2013. 
 Democracy and decentralization, with those names, were part of the political project that 
the socialist government of Modibo Keita and the US-RDA party pursued after independence 
(Mann, 2015; Hopkins, 1965). In 1968, a military coup overthrew Modibo Keita’s regime and 
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brought to power a junta, the Comité Militaire pour la Libération National (CMLN), with 
Moussa Traore as Head of State. Political activity was banned. By 1974, however, the military 
regime proposed a new constitution, and its adoption through a popular referendum marked the 
beginning of the Second Republic of Mali. Gradual political liberalization led in 1977 to the 
creation of the UDPM party and the organization of presidential and legislative elections. 
Moussa Traore remained in power, and all parties besides the UDPM were considered illegal. 
However, the transition to civilian rule, the reemergence of political competition within the party, 
and the organization of elections were at the time referred to as an era of “politics,” and in 
official documents as a “transition to democracy” (Fay, 1995).  
  In the late eighties, labor organizations, students associations, and progressive 
intellectuals came together in a clandestine struggle against the corruption of the Traore regime 
and for democracy—understood this time by Malian intellectuals as a multi-party system with 
“clean” elections and political rights (Fay, 1995). In March 22nd 1991, thousands of 
demonstrators met the violent repression of the army and hundreds died. In March 26th, Lt. 
Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré launched a coup d’état and apprehended Moussa Traore. 
Despite being a military officer, Toumani Touré promptly set the conditions for a transition to 
civilian, democratic rule. The organization of the National Conference in the summer of 1991 
proved an impressive process of consultation and social dialogue. In 1991, the Constitution 
elaborated by the National Conference was adopted and marked the beginning of the Third 
Republic of Mali. Political parties, civil associations and independent mediated proliferated. 
 Ten years later, in 2002, Amadou Toumani Touré, the same officer who had led the coup 
against Moussa Traoré in 1991, won the presidential elections as an “independent candidate” and 
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leader of a “citizens’ movement” [Fr. Mouvement Citoyen]. He was reelected in 2007 forming a 
massive alliance that incorporated all parties with representation at the National Assembly except 
three. By 2011, only one party, SADI, was in the opposition. Toumani Touré’s second 
presidential term would have ended in June 2012. However, a military coup led by captain 
Amadou Haya Sanogo overthrew Touré’s regime in March 22nd, 2012. The two explicit reasons 
for the coup were Touré’s inability to act against the Touareg rebellion in the North of the 
country and his alleged intentions to remain in power. Interestingly, the governmental organ 
established by captain Sanogo in 2012 was called Committee for the Recovery of Democracy 
and the Restoration of the State [Fr. Comité pour le redressement de la démocratie et la 
restauration de l'état]. In other words, the army suspended a constitutional government in the 
name of another, truer, deeper, form of democracy. This sentiment was shared by the pro-coup 
organization, in particular, those regrouping the kin of soldiers in Kati. 
 International pressure against the military regime took effect quickly. By April 1st, 
captain Sanogo announced the restoration of the constitutional order. However, elections were 
conditioned upon the recovery of the territory. The three largest regions of the North—Kidal, 
Timbuktu, and Gao—were at the time controlled by a volatile combination of separatist and 
jihadist groups. In January 2013, at the request of the Malian interim government, the French 
army intervened in the North and regained most of the territory. After the signature of a peace 
agreement, presidential elections were organized in July 2013 and marked the restoration of 
democratic, constitutional order, for the forth or fifth time.     
 This absurdly succinct account of more than fifty years of political history has the mere 
purpose of situating the 1991 transition to democracy in a longer history of institutional efforts, 
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many of which measured themselves against the democratic ideal. Democracy is one of the most 
indisputable concepts of modern politics, to the extent of having become almost synonymous 
with political legitimacy. For that reason, I use the term in this dissertation strictly as an 
historical, “local” category, rather than as a transhistorical value that humanity must pursue. In 
other words, the purpose of this dissertation is by no means to judge how “democratic” Mali is, 
under any definition of the term. I will not try to asses how close Mali has gotten to realizing the 
government of the people, how “clean and competitive” its elections are, how “healthy” Malian 
civil society is, or anything of the sort. I do not have any “recommendations” to make either. To 
me, the purpose of an anthropology of democracy is to understand how different democratic 
institutional experiments and the democratic ideal per se shape social, economic and political 
relations, and transform political values and aspirations. 
 In this case, I’m interested in one of those many democratic projects, the one that towards 
the end of the twentieth century came to stand for democracy as a whole. To differentiate it from 
previous democratic experiments, we can call this one liberal, representative, plural, or electoral. 
Tilly classifies definitions of democracy as “constitutional,” “substantive,” “procedural” and 
“process-oriented” (Tilly, 2007). The set of principles and institutions that spread during the 
nineties fall roughly within the two latter types. Procedures, primarily “clean and competitive 
elections,” were the indispensable requirement, and in many cases, they remained the only 
noticeable difference between the “authoritarian” and “democratic” regimes. However, more 
expansive definitions of democracy gave their fullest signification to electoral procedures; 
democracy was as continuous process: “a series of regularized interactions among citizens and 
officials” (Tilly, 2007:10). A number of features—“freedom of expression,” “alternative sources 
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of information,” “associational autonomy,” and “inclusive citizenship”—determine the 
democratic character of such relationships (Dahl, 1998:85). 
 Pluralism is central to the definition of democracy that became popular in the nineties. 
The government of the people can only be authenticated if it results from the confrontation, or 
“dialogue,” between divergent opinions and interests. This is a definition of democracy that 
emerged in the sixties in opposition to the notion of totalitarianism. Anything unitary is 
suspicious of being “undemocratic.” Perhaps the most consequential application of this principle 
was the idea—first formulated by Raymond Aron in Democracy and Totalitarianism—that 
political regimes are best differentiated by the number of parties they have. Democracies can 
only be “multi-party” regimes (Aron, 1965). 
 Millennial transitions to democracy were presented primarily as a negative process, that 
is, as the removal of obstacles to the free political expression of citizens. True enough, in Mali, 
the transition did allowed political organizations and parties to emerge to the surface, so to speak, 
after years of political repression. However, this emphasis on the negative aspects of transitions 
shifted attention away from the positive ways in which democratic institutions shaped political 
and social relations. In contrast with cold-war “ideologies,” liberal democracy appeared as a set 
of non-ideological, self-evident procedures that could easily travel from one context to another; a 
sort of container that would be filled with particular, plural, voices (Lilla, 2014).
 This dissertation, conversely, looks at liberal democracy as a set of converging 
institutions and ideologies that not only allow the expression of a plurality of opinions and 
interests, but shape social relations and the most basic beliefs concerning legitimacy, 
personhood, and language. Alexis de Tocqueville was the first one to understand democracy as 
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much more than a political regime, that is, as a comprehensive social system. Democracy in 
America, which I consider the first ethnography of democracy, includes topics such as how 
democratic institutions “tend to raise the cost and shorten the length of leases,” or how they 
affect “American manners” (Tocqueville, 2003). 
 Liberal democracy established a procedure for deciding who governs. Citizens, all 
national adults, cast a secret ballot every fixed number of years. In Mali this is done by placing a 
piece of paper with the selected option inside a box; each one of those pieces of paper is in 
French called a “voice” [Fr. voix]. The Malian electoral system combines a two-round majority 
system, used for presidential elections, and proportional electoral system at the local level. The 
government thus formed is called “representative.” To be legitimate, this procedure must fulfill a 
number of requirements, some easier to verify than others. For instance, there must be multiple 
party choices on the ballot; individuals should make their political choice autonomously, free 
from external coercion, and even free from their most basic material needs; and the counting of 
ballots must be accurate. Elections fulfilling these requirements are called “competitive,” 
“clean,” and “transparent.” This procedure must also lead to the succession of different parties in 
power, which authenticates a regime as “democratic.” In French (and Spanish) there is a term for 
it, “alternance democratique.” 
 Even in this description of the most basic procedures and rules of electoral democracy it 
is easy to see a number of peculiar but naturalized assumptions. The list includes the secrecy of 
the vote, the opposition between a majority and a minority, the notion of political representation, 
the idea that exchanging votes for material benefits is illegitimate, and the idea that political 
power expires at the end of a strictly defined term. Anthropologists working in “transitional” 
13
regimes have been interested in understanding how this set of ideas and practices interact with 
local ideas about political legitimacy. Those working in Africa have paid particular attention to 
the play of secrecy and publicity in elections (West,1994; Ferme,1999; Apter,1999), and to 
democratic politics and the occult more broadly (Ashforth, 2005; Geschiere, 1997). Another 
theme that has concerned African intellectuals in particular is the opposition between the alleged 
African tradition of consensus and the principle of majority rule, which is seen as the cause of 
widespread post-electoral violence (Sy, 2009). 
 In Mali, as in many other African countries, the emergence of liberal democracy is one 
among a number distinct but related processes that include the adoption of neoliberal economic 
reforms, human rights, gender equality, decentralization, and non-governmentality (Mann, 2015). 
Each one of these ideologies and processes has its own logic and temporality, and they all extend 
back in time at least a couple of decades if not half a century. The bulk of neoliberal reforms in 
Mali, for instance, took place before the transition to a multiparty regime. Despite their 
differences, these processes represent a cohesive and mutually reinforcing set of transformations 
in social and political relations. For instance, it is not rare to see NGO’s operating in Mali 
devoted to the “promotion of democratic values” designate women and children as their main 
beneficiaries. The ideological proximity between these processes is such that it is not rare for 
social actors and analysts to collapse the distinction between democracy, which establishes 
political rights for citizens, and human rights more broadly, which are based on the idea of 
universal human dignity and enable different forms of international intervention. 
 Interestingly, of all the above-cited processes, formal politics is the one that has received 
least attention from anthropologists working in Africa, particularly from the American academy. 
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There are very rich and interesting ethnographies of borders, taxes, informality, extractive 
economies, refugee camps, humanitarian aid, social movements, human rights, witchcraft, and 
civil society. However, I found very few of political parties, parliaments, local assemblies, 
governmental organs, the foreign service, elections or any other aspect of everyday, institutional 
politics in new democracies. It seems that a tacit disciplinary division of labor has assigned the 
study of politics and politicians to Political Science, History and Sociology. This dissertation was 
conceived as a contribution to the ethnographic understanding of democratic politics; in 
particular, of the expectations it places on dialogue, public debate, and speech more broadly. 
 All understandings of democracy—from the narrowest, strictly electoral definitions to 
those that see it as a comprehensive social project—rely on a set of beliefs about language. Some 
of these are explicit principles with a legal status, such as freedom of speech. Some are implicit 
assumptions built in the institutional and ideological edifice of liberal democracy, such as the 
belief that the confrontation of divergent ideas is productive or that abundant public discussion 
signals a “healthy” civil society. Beyond these broad underlying notions, there are countless 
everyday ways in which democratic institutions shape political speech almost inadvertently. 
Examples of the latter go from the adoption of particular ways of running meetings, to the use 
new vocabulary, to the transformation of publics and the circuits through which information 
circulates. 
A note on the study of political speech
 Meetings, as a sort of platonic form, lie quietly in the depths of modern political ideas. 
Their felicities and infelicities are rarely examined directly, but the idea that sovereignty and 
legitimacy emanate from an original gathering of men runs across political philosophy; it is 
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central to the republican, democratic, parliamentary and constitutional traditions. Consider as an 
example Hannah Arendt’ definition of power, which she opposed to violence and force:  
Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its 
legitimacy from the original getting together rather than from any action that may then 
follow. (Arendt, 1970:52)
 The “original getting together,” however, is just presupposed, not discussed. A large 
portion of the constitutional and republican traditions, influenced by the experience of the 
thirteen American colonies, saw in a real or imagined assembly of men the natural source of 
political legitimacy.2 According to Arendt, every political gathering partakes of the legitimacy of 
an original foundational act; each meeting contains the seeds of new foundations and is capable 
of emitting sovereign decisions replicating the original one. It would be impossible to retell 
modern history or explain political institutions without assuming the common knowledge of 
things like assemblies, congresses, conventions, committees, parties, and conferences. Modern 
political magic happens in meetings of one sort or the other; and modern political routine 
happens in meetings as well. Both the countless hours of “empty” speech and the exceptional 
“beginnings” that take place in meetings deserve more attention. 
  Yet, little has been written about meetings themselves. Studies on political language, 
from Cicero onwards, have privileged speeches, which are monological addresses relatively 
isolated from their circumstances of enunciation. Political speeches are emblematic of the 
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2 The following passage from Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is a good illustration: “who will 
not agree that the beginnings of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and 
independent of one another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection. And if 
Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us that in many part of America there was no government 
at all.[…] So that their political societies all began from a voluntary union and the mutual agreement of 
men freely acting in the choice of there governors and forms of government.” (Locke, p. 58)
political figure that Arendt called “the hero” or “the initiator,” the subject who momentarily 
occupies the place of “author” in the author-less human history (Arendt, 1958). We remember 
great orators, but rarely great meetings. 
 Political speech fulfills the two-fold purpose of delivering a message and revealing the 
subjectivity of the speaker in front of an audience. The message is not delivered but “inhabited,” 
and style is the bridge between message and subjectivity. “Style is the substance” (Silverstein, 
2003). That is why studies on the history of political communication are often concerned with 
identifying and interpreting the rhetorical patterns characteristic of an epoch. Debates about style 
are revealing of the ways in which authority and political subjectivity are conceived, and provide 
an entry point to the analysis of major social transformations. For instance, the transition from 
neoclassical forms of political rhetoric to “popular speech” in nineteenth-century America can be 
seen as the effect of mass democracy. The neoclassical standard provided a measure to 
differentiate “the few” from “the many;” conversely, “attacking gentlemanly decorum meant that 
you did not necessarily have to be refined to have your words count” (Cmiel, 1990:15). 
 Meetings as an object of linguistic analysis are slightly different. They can be 
decomposed into a number of individual orations, but the whole is larger than the sum of its 
parts. Not every form of dialogue or collective discussion is a meeting. Meetings are more like 
speech acts, and as such, they require a particular form and a degree of faith. There is usually a 
procedure to mark the transition from “everyday speech” to “meeting speech,” which often 
includes strong shifts in register. Duranti’s analysis of the Samoan fono, the meetings of a village 
council, shows interesting contrasts between the grammatical patterns used in fono speech and 
those of “everyday speech.” Grammatical patterns used in fono, he argues, emphasize agents as 
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they distribute “praise” and “blame;” so that in each meeting one can see a “moral flow” 
occurring side-by-side with the “information flow.” This means that in meetings the standing of 
individuals in a community is made explicit and sometimes redefined (Duranti, 1994).
 Anthropologists of politics and law have also been interested in meetings as forums in 
which a repertoire of rules and norms becomes visible and in many cases contested. Many of the 
most detailed ethnographies of meetings resulted from an interest in disputes and conflicts 
(Gluckman, 1940; Turner, 1957). Meetings encapsulate in one cohesive act the negotiation 
between what classic legal anthropology called “rules” and “processes.” That is, the negotiation 
between a repertoire of relatively explicit rules and their invocation in an irreducibly contingent 
historical circumstance lived by specific individuals (Comaroff and Roberts, 1981). It is 
precisely in that undetermined space between “rules” and “processes,” or what others have called 
“structure” and “agency,” that politics takes place. Because it is in that space that people 
deliberately fashion their world. 
 This dissertation takes to heart the idea, initially formulated by Malinowski and later 
reiterated by Maurice Bloch, that the object of anthropological study is “a long conversation 
taking place among the people with whom we live during field-work and in which we inevitably 
join” (Bloch,1977). What follows is my own version of what was said where by whom to whom 





 The question of Authority, writes Arendt, can only be asked in the past tense: what was 
Authority? Authority, she argues, has vanished from the Western world together with the other 
two elements of the trinity: religion and tradition. For her, however, Authority means a very 
specific thing, different from coercion and from persuasion; “against the egalitarian order of 
persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical” (Arendt, 1954). She is 
not the only one to have announced the end or the crisis of Authority. Many have forecasted it, at 
many different times and places; some with enthusiasm and some with nostalgia. Authority has 
been vanishing for a long time. If mourning means “to let go,” then Authority remains 
unmourned; every time someone announces its end, a bit of its past glory comes back to life.  
 The word “democracy” in rural Mali is often used to name such crises of Authority and 
the slow but unmistakable dissolution of social hierarchy and seniority privileges. As we will see 
in this chapter, elders in Kita talk about the ruin of “respect” and “education,” and contrast the 
hardships they suffered with the youth’s lack of rigor. They blame democracy and the West more 
broadly. 
 The crisis of authority always presents itself as a novelty. However, concerns about the 
relaxation of social norms and the moral decadence of the youth are not a new thing in Mali. In a 
beautiful ethnography of youth associations in Bamako during the sixties, Claude Meillassoux 
noticed that in “clubs,” the novelty of the time, seniority and family values were rejected. 
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Instead, their young members embraced money, ballroom dances, French slang, and 
monogamous love. Political authorities at the time were not less concerned by urban social 
decomposition and used the Youth Section of the party as a tool to promote discipline and 
uprightness among the youth (Meillassoux, 1968). 
 Claiming the end of Authority seems to be an integral, cyclical part of generational 
conflict. Yet, it is perhaps also true that Authority has slowly faded and that the ideology of 
democracy is implicated in that process. To make such an argument, I need to differentiate 
between Authority and authority. The first one is a comprehensive ideology of the social order 
inseparable from social and domestic hierarchy, it is an ideology that posits obedience and 
hierarchical respect as core virtues. The second one is a general function—not limited to any 
particular social order—that provides “the conditions of possibility for a command to be 
obeyed” (Weber, 1978: 212). The notion of “command” can be extended to mean much more 
than “order;” it can include all sorts of collective or individual, tacit or explicit, arbitrary or 
justified, indications of a course of action to be followed in the future. A command can be both 
an obligation imposed by an external agent perceived as authoritative or a self-imposed 
conviction. The force of such a command, the extent to which, given its form, content, or source, 
it compels us to follow it despite its possible contradictions with other commands or desires 
signals its deontic authority. 
 There is another aspect of authority that is not fully accounted for in Weber’s definition: 
the force of truth claims, the degree of acceptance with which they are received. If we talked 
about the “unquestionable authority of Western medicine,” for instance, we would not be 
referring to the force of its commands but of its truth claims. Truth claims range from the most 
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simple forms of reported speech or accounted experience, to different forms of deductions, 
inferences and predictions about past and future events, to the extremely complex bodies of 
knowledge of different sciences, religions and philosophies. To differentiate forms of authority, I 
will call this one epistemic authority, as opposed to the deontic authority of commands. 
 Linguistic Anthropology has been for a while interested in understanding the ways in 
which epistemic authority relates to linguistic patterns. It has looked for instance at how 
particular ways of speaking are more likely to be taken as authoritative, or how evidence and 
commitment to the truth content of an utterance are indexed in speech3 (Hill & Irvine, 1992). 
Different linguistic patterns correspond to different grounds of authority, from having first hand 
evidence to holding university degrees. 
 To recapitulate, my argument is that gaining analytical clarity on the question of “the 
crisis of authority” calls for a distinction between Authority, a hierarchical ideology of the social 
order, deontic authority, the conditions of probability for commands to be obeyed, and epistemic 
authority, the degree of acceptance of truth claims. As the examples below will hopefully 
illustrate, liberal democracy acts against Authority, but it does not eliminate authority. As any 
other kind of hegemonic discourse, liberal democracy establishes its own irrefutable truths and 
universal claims, but it does so in peculiar ways. It promotes linguistic patterns that to gain 
epistemic authority need to differentiate themselves from the ideology of Authority. Patterns, for 
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3 This definition of authority is close to Kockelman’s definition of “residential agency” as “the degree 
to which one can control the expression of a sign, compose a sign-object relation, and commit to an 
interpretant of this object relation” (Kockelman, 2007). 
instance, that authoritatively affirm the end of hierarchy, the importance of dialogue and 
consultation, the right to disagreement, opposition and dissent, and so on.4 
 In this chapter, I will analyze a large conference that took place in Kita, in April 2011, 
which brought together representatives of all major political institutions and social authorities. 
Experts and deputies travelled from Bamako to meet with the locals, among which there were 
elected politicians, traditional chiefs, imams, police officers, representatives of the “civil 
society,” griots and others. This conference was one of the most exceptional discussions I 
witnessed during my time in Mali. It offered an opportunity to hear dissonant voices coming 
from a large number of institutional “compartments” confront each other. During my time in 
Kita, I attended numerous meetings of diverse groups or institutions—from political parties, to 
youth associations, to the communal council, to NGO’s, and the Catholic women’s association. I 
was therefore relatively well prepared to identify in this conference “samples” of some of the 
recurrent arguments and styles that I had heard in other circumstances.
 It is easy to see in the discussions I refer to here the clash between “global” and “local” 
understanding of political legitimacy and authority. Here the notion of scaling, in the 
sociolinguistics’ sense, becomes useful. Grounds are not equivalent but stratified, and not all 
actors can move between them with the same ease. Every linguistic interaction implies various 
layers of indexical orders attached to immediate and remote contexts. By context, I mean the 
larger agglomerates of norms, institutions, and assumptions, which constitute the ground or the 
environment in which commands or truth claims acquire their authority or felicity. Large portions 
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4 To give an example, consider how the spread of a “participative culture” in the US education system has 
promoted the proliferation of disclaimers which enhance the epistemic authority of a statement precisely 
by denying its authoritative character: “I don’t know but...,” “It is my opinion that...,”Personally...,” and 
so on. 
of these grounds exist only indexically, that is, they are the effect produced by the sum of 
iterations that point at them and invoke them. The notion of scaling helps to convey the 
hierarchical stratification of these multiple grounds or contexts (Blommaert, 2006). As such, it is 
a helpful analytical tool to trace the linguistic mechanisms through which hegemonic discourses 
claim the place of “the universal” and create compliance. 
 However, seen from within this conference, scaling is much more unstable. In other 
words, it was not obvious that the experts from Bamako represented a more authoritative, global 
voice than the Kitan elders. It was clear, however, that they were appealing to diverse grounds, 
sometimes simultaneously, to make claims about the best way of ruling political and social 
affairs. In this confrontation between forms of authority, none of the parties managed to fully 
seize or fix the ground or context of authority. 
The mirror of translation
 In the second floor of the National Assembly of Mali there is a peculiar office, it is 
composed of only two rooms, one for the secretary and one for the director, but it is equipped 
with a fancy coffee machine, air conditioning and an up-to-date computer. It hosts the RECAN, 
the Office for Capacity Building of the National Assembly, a sui generis agency that is neither 
part of the permanent administrative staff of the National Assembly, nor an elected body. This 
office functions independently and reports directly to the Royal Embassy of Denmark and the 
United Nations Program for Development, which fund the RECAN as part of their efforts to 
“build the capacities of the Malian Parliament in the context of Democratic Governance and the 
Rule of Law.” To that end, the RECAN designs and manages a number of simultaneous 
“projects” for the most part oriented at furnishing the Assembly, training its staff and elected 
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representatives, and “promoting dialogue and debate.” When I told the director that I was 
observing political meetings, he invited me to attend a big conference that the RECAN had 
organized.  
 The conference took place in April 2011 in Kita, a medium size town of approximately 
50,000 inhabitants in southwestern Mali. It was called “Inter-Institutional Seminar: 
Strengthening Republican Institutions and Promoting Dialogue with the Communities and the 
Civil Society.” The project’s “Terms of Reference” described its main goal as: “…to create an 
environment of understanding and agreement [Fr. entente], and promote dialogue between the 
population and public servants,” and included an allusion to the series of riots that had taken 
place in Kita in the past decade confronting the local population and state agents. The most 
violent of these riots took place in 2009 when a police officer shot dead a driver’s apprentice, 
and the Kitan youth came out and burnt all state offices in town. As a result, more than thirty 
students and other youth were taken to prison in Kayes, and in 2011, when the conference took 
place, some of them still had not been released.  
 The RECAN, however, organized this conference not to discuss these events directly, but 
as a kind of pedagogical tool to “inform” the people of Kita and the local authorities about their 
rights and responsibilities in the context of democracy and decentralization.5 To that end, 
national representatives or deputies [Fr. députés], the General Attorney [Fr. Procureur général], 
and “experts” had travelled 120 miles from Bamako, to meet the local authorities from Kita and 
surrounding villages. Every local public figure was present: the mayor of Kita, the president of 
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5 Nicholas S. Hopkins recalls that public “information meetings” were common in 1964 during the 
Modibo Keita regime. He noticed that even though these meetings were different from others in so far as 
they were not called “in order to make a decision” but simply “to facilitate the dissemination of 
information to the townspeople,” participants, nevertheless spoke as “if it were something in their power 
to decide” (Hopkins 1972:162). 
the Kita Cercle Council [Fr. Conseil de Cercle], the president of the Regional Assembly of 
Kayes, the traditional neighborhood and village chiefs [Bam. dugutigiw], the head of the griots, 
representatives of the “civil society,” representatives of the veterans association, imams, priests, 
army officers, gendarmes, police officers, customs's agents [Fr. douanes], and representatives 
from the “Waters and Forests” local office [Fr. Bureau d’eaux et forets], among others. The 
experts from Bamako lectured on topics such as “Peace Culture,” “The Role of the Civil 
Society” and “Democratic Mediation,” and were followed by a vigorous, and rather unrelated, 
debate. Each major social organization—from the traditional chiefs, to the youth associations, 
and the imams—had a chance to raise concerns and demonstrate their public oratory skills.
 The first thing to notice about the organization of the conference was that the name of the 
RECAN was not mentioned or written anywhere. As far as the Kitan audience was concerned, 
this meeting had been organized and called by the National Assembly of Mali. Like any other 
public meetings in Kita, it had two masters of ceremony and it began with the formula: “We 
spent the night in peace, may God allow us to spend the day in peace.” After which, the masters 
of ceremony explained: “we will first listen to three lectures and then we will open the floor for 
debate. Your attention, please.” 
 The two masters of ceremony in charge that day carried a griot family name, Kuyaté. The 
younger one is a professional griot who specializes in political events, I had seen him animate 
campaign acts and party ceremonies a couple of times before this conference; he can switch from 
Bambara to French seamlessly, using proverbs and ornate rhetoric in both languages. The older 
one is a high school teacher who sometimes accepts to function as master of ceremony, more in 
his capacity as teacher than as griot; in this occasion, he was also in charge of providing a 
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Bambara summary of the lectures delivered in French. “We spent the night in peace, may God 
allow us to spend the day in peace” is a common morning blessing, often used also to mark the 
transition from regular speech into a formal public meeting. It is a sentence with two faces, one 
looks to the past with gratitude, the other one acknowledges future uncertainty and asks God for 
peace.  
 Attendants took their time to gain their seats. We were in a big hall with a tin roof that had 
been recently built in the property of the Catholic Mission of Kita, one of the few venues in town 
that can host as many people. Mamadou Diakité was the first lecturer and the title of his 
presentation was “The Culture of Peace.” He spoke in French and after him the translator 
summarized a half hour lecture in five minutes. Diakité’s lecture followed very closely the UN 
“Declaration on a Culture of Peace” adopted by the General Assembly in 1999. He began by 
recalling the origin of the term “Peace Culture” which was coined in Yamassoukro, Ivory Coast 
in 1989 during a UNESCO Congress. The particularity of the UN definition of “Culture of 
Peace,” he explained, is that it moved from a restricted, negative definition—peace as “the 
absence of conflict’—to a larger, positive one: “A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, 
traditions, modes of behavior and ways of life.” After defining the term, Diakité enumerated the 
principles that ground “Peace Culture.” The list he gave was a comprehensive reiteration of the 
liberal canon in its “purest form,” ranging from gender equality to democracy and development:  
[1.1] [Fr.] The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally linked to: 1) Promoting 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, mutual respect and understanding and international 
cooperation; 2) Compliance with international obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and international law; 3) Promoting democracy, development and universal respect 
for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; 4) Enabling people at all 
levels to develop skills of dialogue, negotiation, consensus building and peaceful resolution 
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of differences; 5) Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full participation in the 
development process; 6) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing inequalities within 
and among nations; 7) Promoting sustainable economic and social development; 8) 
Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women through their empowerment and 
equal representation at all levels of decision-making; 9) Ensuring respect for and promotion 
and protection of the rights of children; 10) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels and 
enhancing access thereto; 11) Increasing transparency and accountability in governance…
 
 When I transcribed the lecture, I realized that Diakité had read verbatim articles 2 and 3 
of the UN declaration on a “Culture of Peace.” It was a clear instance of “authoritative 
discourse” in the sense that Bakhtin gave to the term: an impermeable voice coming from 
elsewhere and maintaining its form through each iteration, allowing “no play with the context 
framing it, no play with its borders, no gradual and flexible transitions, no spontaneously creative 
stylizing variants on it” (Bakhtin, 1981: 343). Large segments of Diakité’s lecture fit this 
description. He did not change the phrasing, nor did he add much commentary; he animated a 
compact string of words the authority of which emanated from a distant source. The closest 
comparison would be an orthodox mass or the recitation of Quranic verses. 
  In Bakhtin’s understanding, authority stands for lack of critical, dialogic engagement; 
authoritative discourse does not converse. In this, Bakhtin partakes of the Enlightenment 
tradition, particularly the philosophies of science and knowledge that in the Sixteenth Century 
opposed reason to authority.6 Bakhtin’s authority is Authority. Paradoxically, in Diakité’s lecture, 
a passage from a UN declaration valorizing “dialogue,” “participation,” “free flow of 
information,” and “cultural diversity” behaved formally as any other established form of 
authoritative discourse: from a mass  to soviet propaganda. That is, in Bakhtin’s terms, it took the 
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6 The writings of Kant and Bacon provide the most famous examples of this opposition of Reason and 
Authority.
form of a bounded, impermeable speech demanding formal adherence. This points to one of the 
most distinctive characteristics global liberal democratic discourse. It presents itself as a purely 
negative form of authority having no content of its own; a sort of formal container, transparent 
and ready to be filled with the voices that shall emerge at the end of Authority.  
 The spread of liberal discourses obeys of course material and geopolitical reasons, but it 
also entails linguistic and textual crafting. The UN “Declaration on a Culture of Peace” cited 
above lends itself very easily to be replicated verbatim in all sorts of contexts; it is already 
packed and ready to travel, to say it metaphorically. In the terms of Urban and Silverstein, we 
would say that it is highly “entextualized,” that is, it is an instance of discourse with very little 
attachment to a particular context (Silverstein & Urban 1996: 21). There are many ways in which 
entextualization is achieved, mere repetition is one of them; but in this case, the original 
document deliberately pursues freedom from context. It contains no indexicals or shifters—such 
as pronouns or terms like “here” or “there”—the only proper noun it includes is “Charter of the 
United Nations,” and it states general principles with alleged universal validity.
 In the second part of the lecture, Diakité shifted from the UN declaration to what he 
called its “application to the local context.” He said that there are “positive traditional values” 
which could ground this “Peace Culture” in Mali. He cited a book on traditional mechanisms of 
conflict resolution in Mali from which he drew a list of traditional values:   
[1.2] [Fr.]What are positive traditional values? I insist on the term “positive” because there 
can also be negative traditional values. You know those positive traditional values: sharing 
happiness, harmony, good living together, tolerance, the respect of the given word and of the 
decision made under the “deliberation tree,” hospitality, and humanism, all of which are 
firmly anchored in our societies since times immemorial. 
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Interestingly, the traditional values that he listed are also a very standard set of qualities 
commonly attributed to traditional, rural, communitarian life not only in Mali but in many other 
African countries too. The list that Diakité provided—in particular the term “humanism”—are 
common French translations of the Bambara word mogoya, which has acquired a sense 
somewhat similar to that of the Zulu term ubuntu in post-Apartheid South Africa, even though in 
Mali it never acquired the same political and cultural preeminence.7 Mogoya, like ubuntu, has the 
same components as the word “humanity” (“human”+prefix for abstract nouns), but its meaning 
is closer to personhood or human kindness, because it does not refer to the quality of being a 
member of the human species, but, on the contrary, to the acquired capacity to live among 
people. Children do not have mogoya, they have to develop it (Brett-Smith, 1983: 47).  The 
French word “humanism” is an odd translation of the Bambara term mogoya, and Bailleul’s 
translation as “politeness” and “savoir-vivre” seems more accurate (Bailleul, 2000). 
 To a much lesser extent than ubuntu, mogoya figures in the repertoire of terms used to 
“africanize” liberal democracy; it “kills two birds with one stone” as it fulfills the purpose of 
authenticating political doctrines but it does so through a concept that fits easily within 
liberalism, or as Diakité said, it is a “positive traditional value.” Resorting to tradition to 
authenticate political norms and principles has been a very common resource for the 
establishment of political authority in Africa, the African socialist doctrines also presented 
African traditional life as socialism avant la lettre. Regardless of the degree of accuracy that we 
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7 Literature about Ubuntu is abundant and it ranges from philosophy to business management, self-help 
and political theory. Christian Gade has traced the historical development of the use of the word in written 
documents since the late nineteen century. He argues that in the sources prior to 1950, ubuntu refers “to a 
human quality,” during the second half of the Twentieth century the word began be used to refer to 
“African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, and as a worldview.” Furthermore, it was only in 1993 that 
the proverb “a person is a person through other persons” that is often used to illustrate the meaning of 
ubuntu began was used for the first time in writing (Gade, 2011). 
attribute to these renditions of African traditional life, it is interesting to notice that Diakité’s 
attempt to explain “the application to the local context” of the UN declaration resorts to an 
“entextualized” account of “African tradition.” In particular, one resulting from a process of 
selection, presentation, and writing marked by the influence of the “Western” political 
philosophy to which it is supposed to be an African alternative. In other words, African tradition 
here is a mirror in which liberal democracy sees itself. 
 So far, we have examined Diakité’s formal adherence to the UN Declaration and his 
resource to codified African traditional values. The first one was an example of “authoritative 
discourse” defined by its fixed form, or incapacity to merge with other voices or the new context. 
The second example shows how the process of grounding such “authoritative discourse” in the 
“local context” is a translation loop, as it requires establishing equivalences with a rendition of 
“tradition” that incorporates the demands of the “authoritative discourse” in the process of its 
own “entextualization.” However, to follow my own definition of authority, which privileges 
pragmatic over textual analysis, I need to ask: did the audience of this meeting in Kita accept the 
truth claims made by Diakité—or perhaps I should say: “made by the UN through Diakité’s 
voice”? It is hard to know, but I have at least one important sign of how it was interpreted: the 
way it was translated into Bambara. 
 The older of the two Kuyaté griots, the high-school teacher, summarized Diakité’s lecture 
in ten minutes. After greeting the audience, “men and women,” “elders and youth,” he listed the 
persons to whom Diakité had addressed his greetings. Diakité had mentioned that his family is 
originally from Kita; Kuyaté emphasized that fact and did not omit the name of the 
neighborhood where Diakité’s kinfolk live. Then he explained that the talk was about “how to 
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maintain peace,” “not only in Africa” but also in the “countries of the white” and said that the 
leaders of all nations had a big meeting in Ivory Coast and saw a path or a method to maintain 
peace. He summarized the conclusions of such meeting, that is the UN Declaration on Peace 
Culture, in the following terms: 
[1.3] [Bam] People need to change. We need to educate humans. How does one educate 
humans? That begins in the direct family [Bam. gwa], the man and his wife, then in the 
extended family, all the members of the big family [Bam. lu] need to guide and correct 
children, and if the child goes out to the street, people in the street should be responsible 
to correct all children, even if they are not their own. If the child studies something, 
whether it is the Islam or white people’s education, we need to add something to that 
education...
 The first thing to notice about this translation is how loose it is, in fact it is barely a 
translation. Looseness itself indicates a relationship with the original contrary to the one that 
Bakhtin described; here, there is no attempt to preserve some original form carrying authority.   
The school teacher gave his own interpretation of social order, one with an emphasis on good 
upbringing, parental authority and generational respect, which, as we will see below, fits very 
well that of the Kitan notables. Then he talked about the ways in which peace was maintained in 
Africa traditionally, he talked about the importance of marriage, which “used to be an alliance 
between two families, and not two individuals,” and he added “these are the paths that worked 
yesterday and they could work today.” He did not use the word mogoya, nor did he mention the 
“deliberation tree.” In other words, he made both the UN Declaration and his rendition of the 
“African ways” confirm the understanding of good social order of the local notables. If Diakité 
made “African tradition” agree with the UN Declaration, Kuyaté made the UN Declaration 
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confirm the local understanding of peace and order. All this, while expressing respect and 
admiration for the Bamako intellectual. 
  The second lecturer was Amidou Diabaté, a lawyer, Member of Parliament, ex-minister, 
and Secretary General of the PARENA party. Diabaté was born in Kita and even though he is a 
very well educated lawyer and had been a minister, people in his hometown sometimes refer to 
him as a griot because Diabaté is a typically griot last name.8 He carries this genealogy with 
pride, and told me once to go see “his older brother,” referring to the head of the griots in Kita. 
He was part of the group of intellectuals that had taken part in the struggle for democracy in 
1991, and had been close to the government since then. I had the opportunity to follow him 
around in his visits to party meetings in some of the rural communes near Kita and witnessed his 
humble, pedagogical style. On one occasion, as we were sitting inside a small hut receiving the 
food that the spouses of party members had cooked in the village of Sebekoro, he told me: 
“People say that the PARENA is a party of intellectuals, but I have always said that peasants are 
the real force of the PARENA.”  “This is the PARENA,” he insisted, as he pointed to the rows of 
men and women sitting under the thatch roof, many of whom had travelled a considerable 
distance from their villages to attend the party meeting. 
The category of “intellectual” has an ambiguous place in Malian politics; a large portion of 
the Bamako political class would be considered “intellectuals,” because the category includes 
everyone with a university degree who speaks French well including, among others, appointed 
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8 Members of the Diabaté and Kuyaté griot lineages have been part of the Kitan political scene at least 
since the sixties. Nicholas S. Hopkins mentions Makan Kuyaté, a memebr of a jeli family who became a 
doctor, and served many years in Guinea. After the independence of Guinea, Kouyaté returned to Kita and 
was in charge of the hospital. In 1959, Kouyaté was elected representative at the National Assembly by 
the USRDA (Hopkins, 1972:129).  
professors.9 “Being intellectual” is of course associated with a certain kind of epistemic 
authority. Many times in the villages around Kita I heard peasant renounce to the authority of 
their own words by saying: “We don’t know, we are not intellectuals.” At the same time, as 
Diabaté’s claim that the PARENA is a “party of peasants” indicates, peasants are attributed 
precisely the cultural authenticity and political dignity that intellectuals are accused of having 
lost. Therefore, Diabaté and other “intellectuals” engaged in politics are caught in the dilemma of 
having to “change” or “educate” the peasants they seek and claim to represent.
Diabaté’s lecture at the meeting in Kita was a product of such a dilemma. It was titled “New 
citizens and their responsibilities in the context of democracy” and it described the legal 
mechanisms of conflict resolution and mediation that the transition to democracy and the 
decentralization reforms established. He spoke in Bambara interspersed with French and began 
by explaining the basic rules of democratic politics: 
[1.4] [Bam.] Democratic power says that everyone must vote, and that everyone is equal 
according to the rules of voting. Everyone: it is universal, everyone is included, everyone 
must vote, nobody is excluded. Everyone’s vote is equal. One person’s vote is not worth more 
than another person’s vote. Men’s votes are not worth more than women’s votes. 
Nobles’ [horon] votes are not worth more than slaves’ [jon] votes. All votes are worth the 
same.  
 He used the terms “vote” and “voting” in French, since there is no easy equivalent in 
Bambara. The Bambara pedagogical rhetoric that Diabaté uses in Kita and surroundings is very 
different from his French orations at the National Assembly, for example he uses repetition much 
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9 The most famous example is Diouncounda Traore, at the time president of the National Assembly who is 
a professor of mathematics, but examples of politicians who are also intellectuals or academics abound: 
Ali Nouhoun Diallo, Issaka Bagayoko, Cheik Oumar Diarra, Brehima Beridogo.  
more when speaking Bambara.10  Affirming that everyone’s vote is equal is not a trivial matter in 
Kita. It is precisely the dissolution of social hierarchies—much more than elections, multi-party-
ism or any other strictly political procedure—that Kitan notables associate with democracy, often 
considering it equivalent to contemporary social disorder and moral decadence. The affirmation 
of equality, however, is not new at all, it was a prominent aspect of the ways in which Kitans 
understood the ideology of the socialist regime of Modibo Keita in the sixties, which also aspired 
to democracy (Hopkins, 1972). In Diabaté’s explanation of democracy, the dissolution of 
hierarchies is not only implicit in the norm that all votes are equal, it is also secured by the 
secrecy of the vote, which, as Diabité explained, places “the new citizen” beyond the reach of the 
authority or influence of those around her. He said: 
[1.5] [Bam] Everyone should vote, and when you vote you go into a secret “hut.” No one is 
going to look at you and tell you “do like this.” You are going to do what you want. No one is 
going to put pressure on you so that you tell yourself: “Ah, I’m afraid of this person.” There 
is none of that. If we asked people to raise their hands in front of everybody, people might get 
mistrustful or embarrassed, or maybe they would be afraid. They might raise their hands, but 
not following their own will. But voting is done in a secret room; that is what is good.
 While the validity of the vote, as a genuinely autonomous act, is granted by its secrecy, the 
legitimacy of the State is linked to transparency and publicity.11 Diabaté spent time describing 
the ways in which citizens can hold the State accountable. According to the law, he said, all 
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10 Barbara Johnstone argued about Arabic rhetoric: “In contrast with Western modes of argument, which 
are based on a syllogistic model of proof and made linguistically cohesive via subordination and 
hypotaxis, Arabic argumentation is essentially paratactic, abductive and analogical. It persuades by 
making its argumentative claims linguistically present: by repeating them, paraphrasing them, and 
clothing them in recurring structural cadences” (Johnstone, 1983). 
11 Harry West described a similar tension between the “visibility” and “legibility” of voter-registration 
cards and the “secrecy” of the electoral process as it figured in the Northern region of Pemba, 
Mozambique during the 1994 elections. (West, 2003) 
citizens have the right to receive information from all State offices, and even though “there are 
exceptions and limits” nothing should be a “secret” for the citizens; everyone has the right to 
visit a State office and receive guidance. By law, he continued, every public office in Mali needs 
to have a written sign in front of the door with the message: “You are welcome [Bam. I 
bismillah];” elders and people with disabilities are the only ones with the privilege of skipping 
the waiting line. As I transcribed Diabaté’s lecture with the help of the Malian historian Oumou 
Sidibé, she commented: “He is talking about another country, that is not how things work in 
Mali.” 
 Diabaté spoke mostly as an expert in Malian Law, but as a Member of Parliament and party 
leader, he was able to leave his position as “lecturer” and address the more practical concerns of 
the locals. He emphasized his current role in advocating for the release of the Kitan youth in 
prison, and demanding the State to bring tree logging under control. Kitans were very receptive 
to that part and directed their questions to those issues. In that way, perhaps, the discomfort that 
his initial statements might have produced among certain members of the audience was diluted 
by his practical efficacy in the second part. 
 The lectures of Diakité and Diabaté were different; the first one used global discourses to 
talk about the principles that should ideally rule social relations in a “culture of peace,” the 
second described in detail the rights and responsibilities established by Malian legislation after 
the transition to democracy. However, both talked about how things should be, and not about 
how things are, assuming the role of intellectual as shaper of social aspirations. Some members 
of the audience, especially a couple of representatives of the youth, seemed inspired by their 
ideas. However, the large majority seemed indifferent. Disregarding the ideological content of 
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political speeches, not contradicting them overtly, and centering on the efficacy of a politician as 
mediator are old practices in Kitan politics (Hopkins, 1972). The discussion that followed the 
lectures made evident the layered understandings of authority that intersected in this conference, 
it also showed that the Kitan audience was more concerned with explaining the root causes of the 
riots and confrontation with the State. 
Founders, foreigners and impostors
 After the lectures, the griots asked each major social group—traditional chiefs, civil 
society, imams, youth, etc.—to choose an orator. The floor was first given to Bobo Tounkara, the 
spokesman of the retired Members of Parliament of Kita, and member of one of the four original 
families of Kita; he is considered a senior but not an elder. His oration included some of the 
compositional elements characteristic of public speech in Kita: an opening short prayer, greetings 
and expressions of gratitude, asking for permission to speak, recalling Kitan epic past, using 
proverbs to express controversial opinions, and closing by asking for forgiveness. This is how he 
began, in Bambara:   
[1.6] [Bam.] I want to begin my remarks by thanking Nare Famakan. You are older than I. 
You were a deputy [Fr. député] before me. It is only because of trust that you have allowed 
me to speak on your behalf.  I accept your trust. I would not refuse this honor. I thank you. I 
also pay my respects to the traditional chiefs: I come from you; I couldn’t be anyone without 
your acquiescence.   
 Even though Tounkara spoke on behalf of retired deputies, his speech resembled those of 
local notables more than those of current national representatives and experts, not only in its 
style and composition, but more significantly because he began by situating himself within a 
local network of hierarchies and personal relations. A characteristic of Kitan public speech is that 
speakers make explicit references to their position according to criteria of authority “external” to 
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language—most commonly age, seniority, and origin. Public speech does not occur in a neutral 
arena where distinctions are suspended; quite the opposite, the capacity to acknowledge and 
respect the social order is a crucial aspect of oratory skills. Tounkara began by stating his own 
humble position within seniority-based hierarchies, the role of spokesman would correspond to 
his senior, Nare Famakan, but trust justified the suspension of such hierarchies. Arguably, his 
capacity to show humbleness and respect for his seniors works as an indication of his own 
dignity and reinforces his authority. He continued: 
[1.7] [Bam.] I would also like to pay my respects to the presidium, in particular to the 
deputies here. Deputies, you are the spokesmen and the messengers [Bam. cidenw] of the 
people. You are the ones who express the concerns and worries of the people. If you become 
a congressman somewhere, you need to know that, as the Bambara say: “The foal does not 
fetch a good price when he is born.”
 Tounkara placed himself under the traditional chiefs’ jurisdiction, but addressed the 
legislators from Bamako as his juniors by giving them advice. Even the proverb he used to warn 
junior deputies of the office’s ingratitude, placed the rewards at the end of a long road, 
underlying the importance of experience and perseverance (age). In addressing the deputies and 
exalting their social role, he translated the function of political representation accorded to 
members of the National Assembly to a well-known figure in Bambara, ciden, the messenger, 
which is sometimes used to refer to griots. Other speakers addressed the notable guests from 
Bamako as ñemogow, a general term referring to all kinds of leaders or people in positions of 
power. However, by using the word ciden, Tounkara emphasized the fact that legislators were 
commissioned by their constituencies, which could be interpreted as a way of lowering their 
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rank, especially in comparison to the traditional chiefs. He then offered a highly stylized account 
of Kitan politics to the Bamako elites:  
[1.8] [Bam] Kita has been part of the Manden since 1237. The rules established by the 
Kurukan Fuga Constitution govern Kita up to today. The original rules concerning social, 
economic, and political affairs have governed Kita up to today. You will never have problems 
with the people of Kita, if you follow those rules, only if you forget those rules. Your visit is 
a pleasure for us, may God pay you back. May God allow you to return to your homes safely. 
The respect that you have showed us, may God make that same respect be shown to you. 
 Experts travelled from Bamako to explain to Kitans what the new domestic and 
international legal regimes say about the relationship between State and citizens. Conversely, this 
retired deputy reacted by evoking a prior legal order to which Kitans are supposed to have a 
privileged relationship and which, he implied, is being disrupted by State representatives in the 
locality. Kitans derive great pride from having been one of the towns of the Manden, the Empire 
of Mali (c.1230 to c.1600), which is said to have established the Kurukan Fuga or “Mande 
Chart,” an oral agreement regulating social relations, around 1236. The current inscription of the 
Chart is the result of a series of NGO-funded workshops that in the late nineties sought to 
promote democracy and human rights. As Mann convincingly argues, the inscription of the Chart 
is a product of its time and circumstance, as it offered “a way out of the zero-sum logic that in 
earlier decades had seemed to oppose human rights and African sovereignty”, by opening a way 
for human rights discourse to “provoke precolonial pride” (Mann, 2015: 240). Politicians and 
intellectuals from Bamako often talk about the Kurukan Fuga constitution and invest it with 
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great moral authority for different reasons: for its authentic African character and for being an 
example of primordial democracy and tolerance.12 
 It is extremely rare to hear Kitan elders talk about the Kurukan Fuga Chart. They talk 
about prior social norms often, but refer to those as Kita’s own foundational agreement [Bam. 
Kita sigi benkan], or the original rules of the Manden more broadly. Moreover, the allusion to 
prior norms by Kitan elders serves as completely different purpose. It either comes as they 
lament the decline of authority, hierarchy, and “respect” in modern times, or to frame an issue as 
question of “hospitality,” pertaining to the relationship between Kitans and foreigners. 
Tounkara’s mention of the Chart in this conference served a similar purpose: it framed the 
problems between Kitans (natives) and State agents (foreigners) as a problem of hospitality and 
respect for the hosts. If one of the two parts transgressed ancient norms, he seemed to imply, it 
was not Kitans. His interpretation of the riots followed this logic:  
[1.9] [Bam.] Having said that, let us not avoid the real problem. You are here in Kita because 
of what happened here… You came to explain to us certain things, the ignorance of which 
allowed this conflict to happen in the first place… But it was the lack of respect that caused 
the conflict in Kita. The lack of respect. If you make someone suffer, and you do it, and you 
do it, and you do it, there is going to be a moment in which you won’t be able to control him 
any longer. 
 He first placed himself among the people who “ignore” the things that the experts are 
explaining, but right away he switched back into a position of authority and pointed at the real 
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12 An interesting example of the symbolic power of the Kurukan Fuga constitution in contemporary 
Malian politics was the launch ceremony of the CARE, a new political party created by the son of the ex-
dictator Moussa Traoré, in April 2011. Cheick Boucadry Traoré, the party’s president and presidential 
candidate, had just returned to Mali after a long stay in the US and was surrounded by English-speaking 
advisers. The ceremony took place in the town where the Kurukan Fuga constitution was first adopted in 
1236, and the president of the party read a new Kurukan Fuga Chart in an attempt to bring together 
cultural authenticity and liberal democratic principles. 
cause of social conflict. He indicated the problem, “lack of respect,” but left the agent undefined. 
Understanding who he claimed was being disrespectful required reading between the lines. He 
seemed to be referring to the police agents that had been bothering the locals until they became 
unmanageable. He reiterated the authority of the traditional chiefs and excused them for having 
been unable to prevent the damages that the local youth caused to the state offices: 
[1.10] [Bam.] I cannot believe that something can happen in Kita without the knowledge of 
the traditional chiefs. […] But if you see that something has escaped them, the Bambara say: 
“The dog and his master cannot both be gluttons.” Also, the lack of authority is not always a 
bad thing; for an animal to have no master is not something necessarily bad, but for a person 
to have no master is really bad. Human beings with no master got involved in this affair and 
ruined it. 
 
 The proverb he used states the impossibility for a master and his subordinate to share 
privileges and ambitions, and relies on the self-evidence of natural hierarchy—the animal and his 
owner—to defend the preservation of social hierarchies. However, here it was even less evident 
who was he implying was the master and who the dog, and in which way the interruption of such 
order figured in the Kitan conflicts and riots. He could have meant that local state 
representatives, who had been “disrespecting” the local population, should comply with the 
limits that the Manden order imposed on “guests,” since, after all, they were living in the town of 
Kita as “foreigners” and were occupying the land of the local chiefs. Even though they represent 
“the State,” they still need to respect local notables as hosts and masters. However, when he 
talked about the people “with no master,” he could have been referring not to the state security 
forces but to the youth who rioted in Kita. Furthermore, those two groups—state security forces 
and young radicals—can be consolidated under the category of youth in general. In other words, 
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there are at least three axes of conflict, youth versus elders, natives versus foreigners, and State 
versus civilians. Furthermore, they overlap—state security forces, for instance, also happen to be 
for the most part “foreigners” (non-Kitans) and youth. 
 Youth, state agents, or foreigners, what is clear from Tounkara’s speech is that social 
conflict is the direct result of the transgression of hierarchies: “the dog and his master cannot 
both be gluttons” “human beings with no master ruined the matter.”  The model for authority is 
domestic and therefore hierarchical. Bringing peace to town requires, according to Tounkara, 
recalling that we are all members of a family: 
[1.11] [Bam.]Look around you: every person in this hall, from the prefect to the forestry 
agent, comes from a family, and there is education in each one of those families. … What 
happened in Kita is shameful for all of us. But I repeat: “The dog and his master cannot both 
be gluttons.”…I am a child; there are people here of whom I am a grand-child, or even a 
great-grand child. Let us do everything to preserve the good name of Kita. When you return 
to your homes, be at ease, what happened in Kita is not going to happen again, I promise you 
that. 
 
 Diabaté gave a lecture on the legal resources available to citizens to hold state agents 
accountable. Tounkara put forward a different form of accountability. Everyone, including the 
police officer, belongs to a family and that means that they can recognize and respect social 
hierarchies. Furthermore, each person represents a lineage, carries a family name, and is 
responsible for preserving and honoring a genealogy; such should be, according to Bobo 
Tounkara, the most effective mechanism of social control. He closed his remarks with another 
affirmation about his lower status reaffirming his capacity to recognize hierarchies, unlike the 
masterless people that he derides. Next to such humbleness before his seniors, or perhaps 
because of it, he also placed himself as someone who can “promise” to the people from Bamako 
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that the regrettable events won’t happen again, someone who can guide and keep under control 
the Kitan people.  
  After Tounkara’s speech, Namaké Keita, the oldest man in Kita and surrounding villages, 
spoke on behalf of traditional chiefs, and in a mixture of Malinke and Bambara, he said: 
[1.12] [Malk/Bam.] My Muslim brothers, good morning. I greet you, and I greet you also on 
behalf of the other chiefs. The National Assembly has called this meeting. We greet the 
Assembly, and we give it our blessing. May God allow you to remain strong and 
prosperous…
 Blessings and authority are intimately linked, not only because the direction in which 
blessings flow often indicates a relationship of seniority, but because one of the most serious 
consequences of disregarding authority is loosing the blessings of one’s parents. Blessings and 
curses are one of the most effective resources at the disposal of elders to produce compliance and 
obligation. If your mother curses you, nothing will work for you ever after. A friend in Bamako 
told me once: “Never give money to a woman begging on the street, she surely has been cursed 
by her parents.” Interestingly, among all the infelicitous speech acts that I traced, which we will 
examine in Chapter 5, I never heard anyone say that a curse was inoperative or infelicitous. 
Curses are so felicitous, so effective, that even if your mother curses you in a moment of rage, 
there is little she can do to undo the harm; the words work by themselves. 
 After the formulaic greetings and benedictions, and in agreement with Tounkara’s speech, 
the old man reminded the audience that hospitality and the respectful treatment of “foreigners” 
were part of Kita’s foundational agreement: 
[1.13] [Bamb/Mal] If you hear the name of Kita, people say many things about Kita, but they  
are not true. People come here to attack us, but we don’t attack anyone. The agreement on 
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which Kita was constituted says that we the natives we don’t make foreigners cry, we don’t 
bother them. If you come to our place as a guest we will offer you our bed.  
  Unlike ex-congressman Bobo Tounkara, Namaké did not talk about the Kurukan Fuga 
Chart, but about Kita’s own “founding word” [Bam. Kita sigi benkan]. The foundation of Kita as 
a social unit, a polis if you will, is also the act in which the distinction between “natives” and 
“foreigners” gets established. Hospitality, which regiments the relation between the inside and 
the outside of such polis, is as old as the foundation. If we follow J.L. Amselle’s interpretation of 
the figure of the “foreigner” in Manding social organization, and its coincidences with Ancient 
Greece, that relationship of alterity and hospitality is the basic blueprint of social relations more 
broadly. This, Amselle argues, is true not only in a structural sense, but also in a historical one. 
The political history of the territory of the Ancient Mande is one in which “guests” becomes 
“hosts,” as the original owners of the land are conquered and subordinated by a new ruling 
family. The relationship is sometimes reflected in the existence of a ritual “joking 
relationship” [Bam. sinankuya]. Moreover, nobles [Bam. horon] are designated as the hosts or 
patrons [Bam. jiatigiw] of the associated lineages of “castes” [Bam. nyamakalaw], typically 
griots and blacksmiths. That the relationship between Kitans and State agents is to be understood 
as one between “hosts” and “guests” respectively is perfectly logical (Amselle, 1996).  Like ex-
congressman Bobo Tounkara, the old chief Namaké Keita framed the recent events in Kita as 
another proof of the world’s social decomposition and moral decline. He went even further and 
referred to the present times as “the end of the world.” He said: 
[1.14] [Bamb] However, now, with the end of the world, everything has been ruined. Fraud 
and intrigue conducted by people of low character ruined the world. Fraud and intrigue are 
the source of all conflict.
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 Even though both Tounkara and Namaké coincided in their understanding of social change 
as a regressive movement away from tradition and authority, they underlined slightly different 
causes. For Tounkara the problem is the dissolution of social hierarchies, for Namaké fraud the 
biggest problem. He used the Bambara word nanfigiya which  usually describes the actions of 
conmen, of people who do not honor their engagements, and of people who spread rumors to 
incite conflicts. Nanfigiya is duplicity, deceit, self-interest and lack of honor, and it is a strong 
accusation, particularly among the Malinke nobles who praise themselves of consistency and 
determination. The old man’s words resonated with comments I recorded among the political 
elite in Bamako, about a current “crisis of trust” in Malian politics, a recurrent difficulty to 
authenticate one’s words and divert the generalized accusation of mendacity. For the old man, 
however, it is not the intrigues and lies among the politicians that brought disorder, but the 
conflict among the four founding families of Kita and the inability of their griots to bring peace 
among them: 
[1.15] [Bam.] The conflict that exists in Kita today… The four original family names of Kita 
are Tounkara, Camara, Keita and Cissé. If the four families don’t fight among themselves, 
nothing is ruined in Kita. But if they fight, nothing will be well afterwards. And that is 
precisely what is happening in Kita today… Heed my words! The difficulties that we are 
having nowadays are because there is no harmony among the Tounkara, Camara, Keita, and 
Cissé! If there is no harmony among the founders of the town, how could there be peace 
among the people? You need to understand this, you need to write it down. 
 Namaké did not alternate his imperious statements with humble considerations, he 
occupied his place as the oldest chief to the fullest and distributed commands accordingly. Many 
of his sentences are imperatives: “Heed my words!” “Find a solution!” “Bring agreement and 
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concord!” and “Write it down!” Bobo Tounkara had alluded to the conflict between youth and 
elders, State and civil society, and natives and outsiders, but Namaké shifted from these 
antagonisms, to the “horizontal” rivalry between the four original names of Kita. According to 
his logic, social harmony can only be guaranteed by an agreement among the elites. He spoke as 
member of one of those four families, the Keita, and from such position he asked deputies to 
bring peace among the founding names. Such task is usually the griots’ responsibility but 
Namaké interestingly transferred it to the political class as he launched into a fierce attack 
against griots: 
[1.16] [Bam] If you [deputies] want to bring us to an agreement, do it, because there is no 
peace in Kita. …We have asked our griots. As you know, in Kita we don’t need to go 
elsewhere in search of words, we have griots everywhere here. The house of speech is here in 
Kita. We have asked our griots to talk with us, but griots fear loosing their profits. The 
griots’ chief is present. Griots feared loosing their profit! Find a solution [to the 
congressmen]! Bring agreement and concord! You have to first bring peace among these four. 
If they don’t get along, there will never be peace in Kita. Have you understood that? I’m 
telling you, these four have to be as one. It used to be like that. Today we are divided, today 
there is division. Do something to bring peace among us.
 
 Namaké placed himself and the ruling families as those who either look for words or 
receive them, but not as the sources of those words. The figure of the speechless sovereign is a 
recurrent theme in the anthropology of the Manden. According to some interpretations, there was 
a traditional division of realms in which action and reticence corresponded to rulers, and speech 
and eloquence to griots (Conrad &Frank, 1995; Wright, 1989; Bazin, 1986). The opposition 
between sovereignty and speech would also emanate from the fact that producing agreement 
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among discording parts requires ambiguity and flexibility contrary to the solidity and resolution 
of political authority. 
 Kita is “the capital of griots,” for that reason, people say that Kitans do not need to “look 
for words” elsewhere. However, according to Namaké, griots have lost their capacity to create 
harmony among the noble families because they give priority to their own financial interest. This 
infelicity in griots’ speech is another sign of social decline. Griots are a common target of social 
critique in contemporary Mali; in fact, calling someone a “griot” or saying that someone speaks 
“like a griot” nowadays in Kita usually implies lack of sincerity, excessive flattery, and the 
search of material benefits (Schulz, 2001). 
 The audience did not react well to Namaké’s mention of a possible conflict among the four 
families in a meeting devoted to peace and in particular in front of people from outside Kita. It 
was considered quite ungraceful. People remained relatively silent as the old man spoke, even 
though, as my recording confirms, people were expressing timid dissatisfaction about the old 
man’s belligerent intervention. By the time Namake’s closing remark came, however, all 
solemnity was lost. He said: 
[1.17] [Bam.]The second thing that I’m going to add…it is not really the Assembly’s 
business…this topic shouldn’t be brought up here, but as people say: “every thing finds its 
path.” Now, the question of the traditional chiefs’ salary! Since last year, we have been 
waiting…They haven’t told us anything. The salary question! The salary question! The salary 
question! Write it down and go show it to the leaders, the question of the traditional chiefs’ 
salaries. Find a solution! 
 The same man who had just denounced griots’ financial concerns, went straight into a plea 
for his own salary. Traditional chiefs are functionaries, they receive a public compensation for 
their services, and as many other public servants in Mali, they have to deal with recurrent delays 
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in payment. The old man’s speech was so infelicitous, that the following speaker, another elder 
sitting close to Namaké, tried to redress the situation by asking the presidium for forgiveness and 
understanding. Interestingly, this elder spoke as “representative of the civil society.” He said in 
Bambara:     
[1.18] [Bam.] May God give you health and longevity... The representative of the traditional 
chiefs who just spoke was enrolled in school in 1921. Look at his age, and know that it is a 
person of great importance who has just spoken. He is more than ninety years old. So…what 
he just said, you need to understand… the mission that brought you here…there are other 
things that have been added to that because of his age.  Don’t be angry with us…There is not 
conflict among us here. There is no conflict among the Keita, the Tounkara, the Camara and 
the Cissé. We share the same problems. 
Voice from the audience: Solve the old man’s salary problem! 
 
 As it is often the case with statements that seek conciliation, this attempt to redress 
Namaké’s belligerent statement was ambivalent. It reaffirmed the authority of elders at the same 
time that it subtly asked the audience to dismiss Namaké’s statements as distortions brought by 
age, the very ground of their authority. A voice from the audience completed the task of 
undermining Namaké’s words by implying that the old man’s lack of salary made him speak with 
anger and desperation. Laughter filled the hall. This fact is important because it suggests that the 
authority of elders and chiefs is also unstable, despite the attempts of speakers who, like Bobo 
Tounkara, presented it as monolithic and unchanging. The old chief’s words were not taken 
seriously either. 
 However, not all the attendants were willing to dismiss Namaké’s words that easily. The 
Head Griot, clearly insulted by Namaké’s calling the griots “frauds,” defended himself and the 
honor of all griots. I cite him at length to preserve the texture of his speech, which as that of a 
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local specialist in public oratory. Kuyaté interwove a large number of formulas, or standard 
phrases that griots repeat across contexts (regular font), with a few context-specific reactions to 
the old man’s words (italics). In the middle of which he managed to accuse the founding families 
of being impostors (underlined). He said: 
[1.19] [Bam.] Head Griot: Brothers, the world didn’t begin today and will not end today 
either. The way in which these four families cannot understand each other is the same way in 
which humans have disagreed with each other since the beginning of the world. What I say 
has a deeper meaning. This is the house of peace today, this is the house of compassion 
today, this is the house of unity today, this is the house of marriage alliances today, this is the 
house of hope today. If this hope and this truth are as clear as water, and they are recognized 
by the imams, by the Christians and by the possessors of the sacred objects, we ask God to 
help this cause. 
Something was said today that hurt us, but when something hurts you it is because there is 
truth in it. The griots of Kita! The griots of Kita left the Manden! Passed by Naani! Passed by 
the Jeni Hill! Tounkara and Camara were there with Dangarantuma, and came here to 
establish this hill. When people are stingy with themselves, they cannot be generous with 
others. Those who founded Kita are not living in Kita any longer, the real founding fathers 
are living elsewhere. They came together, they settled down together. Tradition did not get 
ruined on griots’ hands. You need to know the Malinke language, we say: “If the hunting 
dog’s trainer is wary of the quarry, the dog’s owner will be mistrustful too.” People are 
saying that we the Griots of Kita were afraid, and that we created conflict.
Senior master of ceremony. Hey! Don’t talk about conflict, there is not conflict among 
these families!
Head Griot: That hurt us. We have been speaking with every family, money has been offered 
to us, but we rejected it. We ask God that until the end of the world, we shall not be 
responsible for Kita’s sorrow. The griots of Kita are not frauds [Bam. nanfigiw]. 
 
 The boundaries that I traced between the different compositional elements of this passage
—formulas, reactions to Namaké’s words, and criticism—are of course excessively schematic. 
They are only an analytical device to present graphically the rhetorical strategy Kuyaté used to 
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affirm and undermine the chief’s authority simultaneously.13 The parts of this passage written in 
regular font are known formulae used by griots to recall social values—compassion, peace, 
marriage, etc.—endorsed, as he said, by all religious leaders. Recalling the trajectory followed by 
Sundiata and his allies before reaching Kita, and the mythical foundation of the town also served 
to reiterate the ideal of political legitimacy. In the middle of such normative discourse, however, 
he slipped a harsh criticism: Kitan chiefs are “impostors” (underlined).  Kuyaté did not criticize 
the principles grounding chieftaincy or “traditional” authority more broadly, he simply said that 
legitimate chiefs “live elsewhere.” His accusation is symmetrical to Namaké’s, who accused 
griots of being frauds [Bam. nanfiguiw].  
 In 1985, the American anthropologist Barbara G. Hoffman, who was trained as griot, 
attended a major meeting in Kita celebrating the installation of a new Head Griot [Bam. jeli 
kuntigi]. The meeting became the arena for a big confrontation between two prominent griot 
lineages, the Kuyaté and the Diabaté. Hoffman argues that the manipulation of polysemy, or the 
multiplicity of meanings, was a major rhetorical strategy in achieving the conciliation. The 
professional achievement of griots, she writes, “depends upon sensitivity to and skilled use of the 
social ambiguities that discrepancies of time and place make possible” (Hoffman, 2000: 21). The 
Head Griot’s speech in the 2011 meeting that I attended also provides a good example of the 
ability to produce polysemy. Holding the knowledge of genealogies and the power to interpret 
them is not a small thing in a place where “traditional” authority is directly linked to the claim of 
descending from original founders of the town. By slipping his critiques in between praises the 
Head Griot managed to accuse Kitan nobles of inauthenticity.    
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13 This movement between these different components maps onto an oscillation between self-effacing and 
self-enhancing speech; the sentence “the world didn’t begin today and will not end today either” would be 
an example of the former, and “that hurt us” an example of the latter.
 However, the Head Griot made the same mistake as the old chief Namaké: he spoke of 
conflict in front of outsiders and at a meeting devoted to peace. The moment he mentioned the 
word “conflict” and expressed his resentment against Namaké, the senior master of ceremony, 
the high school teacher with a griot last name, asked him to drop the matter. A senior police 
officer [Fr. commandant de police] spoke after him, and he too tried to redress the situation, this 
time, by denying the existence of any conflict, either between the four founding families or 
between State officers and civilians.  He said, in an intricate combination of French and 
Bambara:   
[1.20] [Bam./Fr] Namake touched on a topic... I’m going to make a special request to the 
journalists present here…Actually, today here in Kita, frankly speaking, there is no problem. 
There is no problem at all in Kita today. What Namake wanted to say...between Keita, 
Tounkara...In every town of Mali we find the same situation, those who came first and 
cleared the brush, and those who came later... I’m from Sikasso, it was the Diamuntenes who 
cleared the brush there, but today at Sikasso, inside the big Tata wall, family after family, no 
one even calls the Diamuntenes. That is how evolution goes...in my opinion, it’s going to be 
fine. […] So, Head Griot, don’t bother to say that you were hurt, drop the matter. 
 By giving the example of his own town, Sikasso, he implied that substitution, imposture 
and conflict are part of “traditional” authorities everywhere, and dismissed the whole debate 
casually with the French expression: “It’s going to be fine” [Fr. ça va aller]. Interestingly, of all 
the public figures present in the hall, he was the only one who made an explicit allusion to the 
press, and the need to curate their account of the meeting, surely because he had the added 
interest of proving that he was doing a good job. He, who is not from Kita and who, in the terms 
of the local elders, would be considered “foreigner,” defended “local privacy.” The sense of 
locality that he put forward, however, is not that of the four founding families and their original 
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agreements, it is one constituted by the fraternity of state officers and the local population. About 
which he also said: “There is not a problem between the state security officers and the population 
in Kita, the proof is that we celebrated January 20th here, the police and the gendarmerie went to 
the streets to collect money for the celebration. They were able to collect one and a half million. 
A party like the one we had this January had not taken place in Kita before!” People clapped, and 
the senior police officer received praises that day, someone from the audience stood up to say 
that if “it wasn’t for this young man, there would be no peace in Kita today.”  
 The effect of the chief’s tempestuous statements about Kita’s internal war, fraud, and the 
end of the world were slowly dissipated; and the griots had to put their hurt pride aside. In the 
discussion between the chief and the griot, however, the ideal hierarchical order presented by the 
retired deputy Tounkara revealed its fragility. The initial distinction between founders, foreigners 
and impostors became progressively unclear, and was closed by the police officer’s casual 
statement: “it’s the same everywhere,” “that’s how evolution goes,” “it’s going to be fine.” 
The End of Authority
 Once the main authorities spoke, the floor was open to the general audience. The masters 
of ceremony wrote down the name of some twenty speakers and gave each person three minutes 
for short questions and comments. One of the speakers complained about the restriction of 
speech time: “This conference is so big, but its organization is flawed, because in a town like 
Kita, which is the town of speech, to say that you have to stop your speech somewhere because 
your time is over, that is difficult. That’s what you do at the National Assembly…” This 
statement introduced a long speech, he prayed for Kita’s land to “cool down” and for Kitans to 
“speak with the same tongue.” He explained that it was the state authorities who were not 
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respecting the limits of their function and abusing the population of Kita, but before he could 
end, the griots suspended his speech abruptly because he had exceeded his three minutes. His 
complaint against such a strict regulation of speech time signaled the differences in the 
regimentation of public speech opposing Kita, as ‘the town of speech,’ to national institutions of 
representation, in which people restrict speech time.  
 Among the speakers there was not a single woman. Furthermore, only two of the male 
speakers presented themselves as “representatives of the youth.” The style and composition of 
their orations contrasted sharply with those of the elders. The first one spoke in very formal 
French, pronouncing “r’s” the way is done in France. He said: 
[1.21] [Fr.] I’d like to congratulate the speakers for their brilliant presentations. I am a 
member of the civil society, and in my capacity as leader of an association I’d like to ask a 
question to Dr. Diakité concerning the role of the organizations of the civil society. I noted 
down that we have an important role in guiding and raising awareness among the population, 
also in defending the rights of the population. I’d like to ask Dr. Diakité to specify the main 
axes of these guidance and awareness campaigns.  
 
 I chose this oration as an example of the speech style of a relatively new class of young 
politicians trained in the world of non-governmental organizations and development projects. 
This style is recognizable in the lexicon—words such as “guidance [encadrement],” 
“awareness” [sensibilization], “axis,” “mission,” “leadership,” and “capacity building,” among 
others, appear frequently. This vocabulary is part of an approach to politics and social action 
centered on project management, and comes associated with the learning of specific practices— 
particular ways of running meetings, designing of timetables with “short term” and “long term” 
objectives, identifying “indicators” to “evaluate” outcomes etc. Of all those who spoke, he was 
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the only to refer to Diakité’s lecture. I was sitting next to him and was able to see the neat notes 
about the lecture that he written down in a small notebook. 
 For these young politicians, cultivating these skills can translate into obtaining and 
managing international resources or jobs in the non-governmental industry, which almost 
automatically places them financially above their seniors. International non-governmental 
organizations offer an alternative ground of authority, or we can say an alternative context, in 
which the local disadvantages of age or gender can be turned into assets provided one learns how 
to translate them and operationalize them (Englund, 2006). This class of “young leaders,” as they  
are sometimes referred to in the NGO jargon, occupies an ambivalent position in respect to both 
the rural population that development projects target and the political authorities from Bamako, 
which they accuse of corruption and of having deviated from the original values of the transition 
to democracy. 
 The other “representative of the youth” had a very different style. He was the president of 
one of the many youth associations registered in Mali which, even though they self-identify as 
“non-political,” usually function as “schools for politicians.” These associations offer community 
services, from cleaning public spaces and organizing football matches, to more ambitious project 
like giving “anti-corruption awards” or surveying electoral processes. They often become 
“clients” of senior politicians who sponsor some of their activities, in exchange for visibility and 
electoral support. In this occasion, the young speaker made a very concise point concerning the 
fulfillment of promises. He said in a mix of French and Bambara: 
[1.22] [Fr/Bam] Good afternoon. My question is addressed to politicians. Since 2007 we 
were told that they were going to build a municipal stadium in Kita. Every cercle now has a 
stadium, in Kita; however our demands have not succeeded.  
 
53
 The young man addressed national representatives and other guests from Bamako jointly as 
“politicians,” placing their function as mediators and managers of public funds above the formal 
definition of their posts. The distribution of benefits, as public works, international development 
aid, or campaign expenditure, is central to the construction of a politician’s prestige and electoral 
success. Interestingly, this form of mediation does not always translate into authority, epistemic 
or deontic. On the contrary, it seems that elected politicians are always “borrowing” authority 
from the future by making promises, and lagging behind in their capacity to fulfill them. This 
peculiar, future-oriented logic of electoral democracy makes of the correspondence between 
verbal commitments and future actions the central political virtue. However, given the inflation 
of electoral promises, such virtue is never fully attained.  
 In contrast with that of elected politicians, the authority of the faama, a general term used 
in Bambara to refer to different kinds of powerful and rich people, emanates from the past and is 
verifiable in the present. Consider the statement of Abdoulaye Sissoko, the second oldest man in 
the region, who spoke after the two young speakers finished and recalled a completely different 
version of the relationship between political authority and material benefits:  
[1.23] [Bam/Malinke] I am Abdoulaye Sissoko of Kita. I am the leader of the Camara 
[lineage]. In the entire region there is only one person who is older than me, and that is 
Namaké. I greet the delegation. There are things in this life about which not everyone has the 
right to talk. As a leader [Bam.faama], if you come to address an issue in Kita, if you arrive 
in the evening and it rains, whatever you came to do here, God is going to solve that for you, 
God is going to give you the exact thing that you came to find. That is an incontestable truth. 
 In different regions of Mali there are slightly different versions of this theme, which is that 
the capacity of a leader to bring rain with him indicates the power and blessings that he carries. 
In some places people used to refer to president Toumani Touré as “the rain maker.” In 
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Abdoulaye Sissoko’s formulation, it is not the leader who brings rain to the land he visits; rather 
the land of Kita receives with rain those people whose missions and goals are blessed. In other 
words, rain is an index of a blessed leadership. It rained on the night the delegation from Bamako 
arrived to Kita; Abdoulaye Sissoko recounted that he noticed it and exchanged comments about 
it with an old Tounkara, another member of the four families. Those are the types of signs that 
the elders of the founding families can identify and interpret. Not everyone knows those truths, 
not everyone can talk about them, he says. After reassuring the deputies of the good omens of 
their arrival, Sissoko provided an interpretation of the ills of contemporary society, which 
reiterated the arguments previously given by the elders. He said:
[1.24] [Bam] All the difficulties that we see today are because education was ruined long ago. 
We are already living in that reality. I am 94 years old; thanks to the blessings of my father 
and my mother... We are worried about youth because we have given them too much 
independence. If you give children too much independence, they’ll do whatever they want. 
Nowadays, if you beat a child and leave a mark, the police will tell you that you shouldn’t 
beat a child.  
 The English word “education” does not fully convey the sense of the Bambara word 
“maara,” which refers to good upbringing and good manners reflected in people’s capacity to 
recognize and honor seniority and other hierarchies. A well-educated child, for instance, knows 
that after having eaten he has to thank every family member to whom he is a junior. Moreover, 
“maara” is also often translated into French as “government” or “administration;” the 
relationship between state agents and the inhabitants of a place, for instance, is one of “maara.” 
In that sense, Sissoko’s example about the police obstructing a family chief’s capacity to educate 
and punish his child is an example of State “maara” interfering with domestic “maara.”  
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  Statements about the dissolution of domestic hierarchies and its pernicious social effect are 
ubiquitous, not only in Mali or Africa, but in many contexts. In 1937, the anthropologist Monica 
Wilson recorded the following statement among the Nyakyusa, in present day Zambia: “Since 
European custom has been established we have joined our children, we eat with them. Boys, both 
Christian and pagan, greet their fathers without stopping down; in the old days a boy would not 
dare to go near the place where his fathers were eating” (Wilson, 1977: 92). 
 This type of statement can be understood as a mere pragmatical resource for elders to 
affirm their authority at the moment of speaking. Whereas, in 1937, the loosening of relations 
among generations was attributed to the adoption of European customs; in 2011 in Kita, the same 
type of arguments was used to discredit democracy. However, this pragmatic dimension of the 
argument does not necessarily invalidate it as an accurate description of the difficulties that these 
elders face. The next speaker, who introduced himself as representative of the association of 
army veterans, added some interesting elements to the argument about the dissolution of 
education and respect. He said:   
[1.25] [Bam.] We are elders, we are veterans. We thank you. Wherever you are, call us, we 
will complete your arguments. We can testify to the truth of your ideas. We are accusing each 
other of the things that are happening nowadays. Education shows its leaves wherever it 
goes. You brought a law to Mali that made the task of governing [Bam. maara] people more 
difficult. I am talking about democracy. 
 This was the most direct criticism addressed at the politicians from Bamako in this 
conference. While other local notables talked about “the ruin of education” in abstract and 
impersonal terms, this army veteran pointed directly at them: “you brought a law to Mali...” By 
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“democracy” he meant something very specific: the dissolution of social hierarchies. He 
continued: 
[1.26] [Bam.] People have taken democracy too far, they say that you no longer need to 
recognize your mother and your father. It is not true, it shouldn’t be like that. That made our 
task more difficult. Your wife will tell you: “you met me in the servitude of marriage, but 
now I don’t recognize you any longer, we are equal.” That is what made our task difficult. 
The same thing happened within the army, the recruitment methods are not what they used to 
be. I spent thirty years in the army, and I can tell you that it is not what it used to be. 
 Interestingly, the examples that he gave to prove that democracy had “made the task of 
governing people more difficult” came from the family and the army. That is, his examples cut 
across the distinction between the administration of the State and that of the household. For him, 
the diagnosis of the problem applied to both realms equally: if women, youth and soldiers do not 
learn to recognize and respect hierarchy, how can the chiefs of households accomplish the task of 
governing, educating people, and maintaining social order? To translate it into my own terms, I 
would say: if hierarchy disappears, what can guarantee the felicity of commands? 
 The element missing in this conundrum is the State, or government more broadly. The 
dissolution of social hierarchies in the West, as this veteran suggested, are part of what we call “a 
democratizing process.” However, they are the flip side of the progressive growth of the State’s 
administrative capacity; and thus of the slow eradication of all intermediate authorities and 
privileges mediating between “citizens” and “State.” Let me recapitulate.   
 As odd as it seems nowadays, the parallel between the family and the army is not 
completely foreign to Western states. Many have argued that the family provided the model for 
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government and hierarchical authority in the West.14 Foucault argues that the emergence of 
“governmentality” was enabled by a transition in the subject and unit of power from “family” to 
“population”: 
In other words, prior to the emergence of population, it was impossible to conceive the art 
of government except on the model of the family, in terms of economy conceived as the 
management of a family. From the moment when, on the contrary, population appears 
absolutely irreducible to the family, the latter becomes of secondary importance 
compared to population as an element internal to population: that is no longer a model, 
but a segment” (Foucault, 2000: 216).
 Similarly, Norbert Elias argues that the relaxation of domestic norms and the “civilizing of 
parents” in the West correspond with the progressive accumulation of force in the State (Elias, 
1998). In this way, hierarchical authority— which initially characterized domestic and private 
relations—came to be relegated to armies and bureaucracies, in which the obedience of 
commands is vital. At the same time, hierarchy slowly came to be considered inappropriate as a 
form of regimenting social and domestic relations, including their most “natural” environments, 
such as schools and families. Any assertion of a hierarchical differentiation between citizens, 
nobles and slaves, for instance, is considered anti-democratic on principle. 
 In Foucault’s historical account, governmentality emerged when “the family” lost the status 
of model of government and became just “a segment.” Interestingly, as we will see in detail in 
next chapter, it is the family as such that has been one of the most visible objects of 
governmental intervention in Mali. No parliamentary debate has received more attention that the 
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14 In 1954, for instance, Arendt wrote: “The most significant symptom of the crisis, indicating its depth 
and seriousness, is that it has spread to such pre-political areas as child-rearing and education, where 
authority in the widest sense has always been accepted as a natural necessity” (Arendt, 1954).
discussions of the Family Code that took place in 1962, in 2009, and in 2011. Each time, the core 
of the controversy was precisely the preservation or elimination of domestic hierarchies. 
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Chapter 2. Representation
La Saison des pièges, a novel by the Malian writer Seydou Badian, depicts a debate among a 
crowd of demonstrating students in Bamako. A student shouts: “See! They imposed multiparty 
democracy, fashionable in their societies. Pluralism? We have the record: one million inhabitants 
and sixty political parties”[My translation] (Badian, 2008:177). The statement is not accurate, but 
is not farfetched either: Mali has 15 million inhabitants and 125 registered political parties. Of 
those 125 parties, 16 had representation at the National Assembly in the 2007-2012 legislature, 
and only 3, with a small number of seats, did not join the governmental alliance and were 
therefore the only formal opposition. That is, in all practical senses, the National Assembly 
operated as it would have in a single-party regime: all governmental initiatives were approved 
virtually unanimously. This peculiar functioning of the party system in which division amounts 
to consensus prompts a number of questions. What is a political party in Mali? Why do parties 
split and proliferate? Does the presence of 16 parties at the National Assembly affect the form 
and content, if not the outcome, of parliamentary debates? In which ways does a member of the 
Malian National Assembly “represent” his or her constituents? 
 In this chapter, I will first discuss some rather formal aspects of the Malian party system. I 
will then analyze and contrast two parliamentary debates on the same topic but from two 
different eras, the adoption of the first Malian Family Code in 1962, and the attempt to reform it 
in 2009. In so doing, I seek to use the debates themselves as evidence of the transformations in 
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the understandings and practices of political representation that took place in those fifty years. 
On both occasions, deputies referred directly to their functions as “representatives of the people.” 
Looking at how deputies talk about their constituents is also a way to see how they exercised 
their role as representatives.  
 I chose the Family Code not only because it was doubtless one of the most controversial 
issues of Touré’s presidency (2002-2012), but especially because, given the very nature of the 
topics under discussion, crucial issues regarding social organization, government, and the 
individual become manifest; these two discussions of kinship are also, I argue, discussions of 
citizenship and representation. Moreover, the social unrest that the adoption of an allegedly 
“anti-Islamic” Family Code triggered in 2009 was largely aimed at deputies, who, according to 
this argument, had failed to “represent” the cultural and religious convictions of the majority of 
Malians. The Code was thus seen as the result of a failure in the mechanisms of political 
representation not in a single-party, authoritarian regime, but right in the democratic era, when 
the number of parties and associations had never been larger.  
The large tree of Malian political parties
 Malian journalists and other commentators of politics, just like the student in the opening 
quote, often point to the large number of political parties as a sign of politicians’ indiscipline and 
of democracy’s absurdity more broadly.15 However, the existence of 125 parties is not 
necessarily an oddity in itself. More puzzling to me is how little parties’ public rhetoric and 
political programs vary, and especially how enthusiastic is the participation of the educated youth 
in party politics. One of the most reliable principles of political science, first formulated by the 
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15 To give just one example of such arguments, in his essay on Malian democracy, Ali Cissé affirms: 
“With the proliferation of political parties we have indisputably lost in quality what he won in 
quantity” (Cissé, 2006:48) [My translation]. 
French sociologist Maurice Duverger,16 suggests that plurality electoral institutions, also know as 
the “winner takes all” method, tend to favor two-party systems, whereas proportional 
representation fosters the proliferation of parties. France, for instance, has 285 registered 
political parties, of which around 50 qualify for public funding every year; in Tunisia, 150 parties 
have been registered only since the 2011 transition to a multi-party regime.
 This observed general tendency coincides with the reasons that Malian politicians give to 
explain the existence of many parties. According to the explanation I heard, small parties, even if 
they do not attain the majority of votes, can obtain one or two posts in communal elections, 
which sometimes gives them a significant power to negotiate with bigger parties, form alliances, 
and shift the balance in tight elections. Moreover, once a political party attains a minimum 
number of votes, even if it has not won a single election, it is entitled to receive public funds, 
which constitute a non-negligible incentive.
  The advantage of small parties, I was told, is that even though they might have fewer 
resources, the cost for a candidate to get a good slot on electoral lists is smaller. In Mali, slots in 
electoral lists are often sold by the party; the larger the party, the more expensive the slot. A 
student seeking to build a political career quickly, for instance, has a better chance of becoming a 
candidate in a local election if he is running for a small party. Since voters shift their loyalties 
often, and even big parties such as ADEMA cannot count on a strong percentage of reliable 
voters, especially in local elections, small parties can aspire to win posts in the short term.  
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16 Duverger presented this argument in a series of articles published during the 1950s, and developed it 
his book, Political Parties. Against the explanations that attributed America’s two-party system to 
national character, he said: “The influence of such national factors is certainly very considerable; but we 
should not in their favor underestimate the effect of one general factor of a technical kind, the electoral 
system. Its effect can be expressed in the following formula: the single-ballot majority system favors the 
two-party system. Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches perhaps the 
most nearly to a true sociological law.” (Duverger, 1954: 217). 
 I also heard more personal reasons for party splitting. Once a politician has gained some 
prominence, he might prefer to “take his people with him” and form his own party instead of 
waiting in the long lines of the larger parties. Every “big man” wants to try his chance and test 
his popularity, or as I was told: “everybody wants to be a candidate.” Personal rivalry plays a big 
role: a proud young leader who has not obtained a candidacy might be tempted to switch to 
another party or create his own if he has the means. Parties that come into existence in this way 
are usually referred to as “the younger brothers” and the ensemble of parties as “the big family of 
political parties.” 
 The image below is a (poor) photograph of a mural at the headquarters of the CMDID, a 
NGO devoted to “the promotion of democratic values in Mali.” This mural depicts the history of 
party formation in Mali since 1991 as a large tree with a solid trunk and numerous healthy 
branches emerging and splitting. The caption reads: “Malian political parties genealogy tree.” 
Behind the tree there is a map of the Nation. As depicted here, political division emerges from a 
unitary trunk which grounds and gives coherence to an otherwise scattered whole. Furthermore, 
political parties are connected to each other like lineages with relationships of kinship and 
seniority mediating between them.  
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  Kinship metaphors and genealogy trees have also the effect of presenting political 
antagonism as the result of relative positions within a whole rather than of irreconcilable 
differences in substance. Indeed, the proliferation of political parties in Mali does not result from 
the need to voice differences in public policy orientations, perspectives on particular social issues 
or political platforms more broadly; those disagreements exist and sometimes find their way into 
parliamentary debates, but are simply not organized along party lines. The notions of "Right" and 
"Left," which are the central coordinates of the French political tradition, have no relevance 
whatsoever in the Malian political scene, and almost no one uses ideological labels such as 
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“liberalism,” “socialism,” and so on. Many Malian political parties have nominal ideological 
alignments. ADEMA and RPM, for instance, are members of the Socialist International, the PCR 
is a member of the Liberal International. However, these terms are never deployed in everyday 
discussions: neither in the press, nor in the parliament, or in party meetings, nor can those 
affiliations for the most part be inferred from the party’s approach to specific issues. Malian 
party politics is not organized along ethnic, regional or religious distinctions either. A party may 
of course have a particularly extended presence in one region, often in the birthplace of its 
leaders, but such presence is rarely reflected on its rhetoric or agenda.17 Malian party politics are 
strikingly secular; besides the prayers and benedictions framing some parliamentary orations and 
the punctuation of regular office activities by praying duties, the entire parliamentary ritual, in its 
symbols and rhetoric, instantiates “the republic” as understood in the French tradition.  
 Rather than representing different opinions or approaches, Malian political parties function 
as networks of exchange and loyalty in which the most important currencies are votes, jobs, 
personal connections with influential people, and funding—domestic or international. In the 
following chapter, we will look closely at how this distribution takes place in the cercle of Kita.  
Most of the accounts about joining a party that I heard among junior politicians reflected this 
pattern: they knew someone, commonly an uncle or a professor, who already had a good position 
in a party and invited them to adhere; their decision to stay in a party often entailed a 
compromise between the electoral success of the party, their expectations for candidacies or jobs, 
and their personal loyalty to party leaders. Besides the members of the SADI, a party 
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17 It is noteworthy that the participation of leaders from the Northern regions in Malian national politics 
was for the most part channelled by the ADEMA, the largest party with the most widespread presence in 
the entire territory. Between 2007-2013, all northern deputies at the National Assembly were ADEMA 
members. 
recognizable as “leftist” for its emphasis on social injustice and strong anti-imperialist rhetoric, I 
did not hear anyone mention the party’s program or ideological line as the reason for their 
adherence.18 
 If ideological or programmatic differences among the parties are difficult to trace in their 
everyday activities and speeches outside the parliament, they are even less apparent inside the 
National Assembly, where they form inter-party alliances. A multi-party parliament is a good 
example of what classic British anthropology called “segmentary systems,” in the sense that 
opposed or complementary terms at one scale are merged when opposed to a third in a higher 
scale or under a different form of aggregation (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). 
 In the case of the Malian National Assembly that merging process results in virtual 
consensus. At the most basic level of the Malian parliament between 2007-2012, there were 
sixteen political parties, each one of which could in theory represent a different segment of 
society or a different ideological tendency. Those sixteen factions associate themselves to form 
ten parliamentary groups and then, at another level of aggregation, become a binary and largely 
asymmetrical system: parties in the government versus parties in the opposition. The fact that 
president Touré won the elections as an “independent” candidate facilitated the process of 
aggregation on the governmental side. However, some analysts argue that this consensual 
government did not translate for Touré into political strength, but that, on the contrary, it made 
him vulnerable to the demands of the large parties which exchanged their support for access to 
State resources (Chauzal & Baudais, 2006). 
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18 Malian intellectuals and journalists often comment on this lack of “ideological clarity” among parties, 
and lament the fact that personal charisma and loyalty have substituted “conviction” and “principles” in 
democratic politics. Ali Cissé sums of this frustration in a short and clear way: “The aren’t 103 ‘social 
projects’ [...] there are rather 103 variations of the same ‘social project’ which is reiterated over and over 
to the public” (Cissé, 2006: 48). 
  In segmentary systems, oppositions are relative rather than substantial, which means that 
different party systems can be contrasted according to where and how they trace the boundaries 
of possible aggregations or where they place “substantiality.” Alliances between “the Right” and 
“the Left” in Mexico, for instance, exist but are considered highly impure; Communist parties all 
over the world often prioritized the transnational alliance with parties of the same affiliation 
rather than national alliances with “bourgeois” parties, and were thus outside the segmentary 
system, as the concept of “the fifth column” suggests. In Mali, even the SADI, the leftist party 
that attributes the most “substantiality” to ideological differences, has accepted to become part of 
the governmental alliance. 
 The peculiar functioning of the Malian party system and National Assembly—the large 
number of parties, the blur of ideological distinctions, the absence of significant opposition—is 
sometimes interpreted by Malian and foreign analysts as a sign of “political immaturity.” For 
example, on April 26th 2011, Les Echos, a Malian national newspaper, published an article titled 
“ATT’s Mali: The political bubble” in which the author states that: 
[2.1] [French] One of the fundamental differences between Western democracies and 
ours, which are called by some analysts, a minority coming from our own countries, 
“banana-democracies” or “peanut-democracies”, resides in the fact that our versions of 
democracy don’t assign any official place to the opposition parties. 
 In “real” democracies, the article goes on, the status of opposition allows those who have 
lost the elections to participate in political life and not “die of hunger” while the other side 
governs. Contrary to what happens in Mali, he continues, where: 
[2.2] [French]...after a few years of opposition and exclusion, our politicians become 
absurdly convinced of the uselessness of political struggles and thus develop the idea of 
collaborating with the authorities in office which they attempt to seduce, forgetting that 
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yesterday they used to call them impostors. The big political and philosophical ideas that 
sustain political action are abandoned for the sake of personal comfort and the social 
advance of one’s own people. [My emphases]
 
 The first thing to notice about this newspaper article is that it is very critical and 
oppositional, that is, it provides a good counter-example to the situation that it argues pervades in 
Mali. Besides L’Essor, which is the official newspaper, most daily publications (and radio 
stations) do provide a space to voice dissent. Interestingly, such criticism often involves 
contrasting Malian politics, the “peanut democracy,” with a model of politics supposedly 
operative in “the West.” Consequently, most criticism is addressed at political practices and not 
at political principles. Furthermore, this article presents the “abandonment” of the ideas that 
“sustain political action” as a sacrifice that results from material constrains, not as a feature of 
party politics in Mali more generally.19 The betrayal of ideas for the sake of interests often 
appears in the Malian newspapers and personal conversations as a perversion of the democratic 
multi-party regime, as the distortion of a purer form of politics, which is assumed to be the 
natural starting point. According to this argument, the Malian reality is too precarious for 
normative principles to survive; “hunger” imposes itself and private commitments interfere with 
public ideals.  
   The absence of significant opposition and debate at the heart of the Malian National 
Assembly turns the institution into a sort of theater in the eyes of intellectuals and journalists.  
Another newspaper article titled “When the National Assembly dozes,” published on December 
10th 2010 in the InfoMatin, provides a good example of the suspicion produced by the lack of 
correspondence between the ideal of the parliament and its Malian reality:
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19 As I wrote this chapter, in March 2015, the Malian National Assembly approved a new code to regulate 
the activities of political parties and facilitate the existence of a “real opposition.”  
 [2.3] [French] Does parliamentary opposition have a real existence? Even if it exists, it, 
however, does not play more than a figured role, since it has not been able to properly play its 
role of catalyzer of the democratic debate. Nobody doubts the role of the real opposition in a 
democracy. What happens under our sky resembles a comedy [...] It is as if here, the fear of 
receiving the curses of the omnipotent executive power prevented us from fulfilling our role. 
[...] Maybe the representatives, or at least a large number of them in a large number of 
localities, owe their posts to the generosity of the regime and not to the people. What follows, 
as we see, is the kingdom of the undivided thought installed in our country. The independent 
president of the republic doesn’t allow for the existence of any opposition either within his 
field or amongst the supposed opponents. For a real grounding of democracy in our country, 
everything has to be remade. 
!
! The Malian parliament is thus portrayed as a uniform, somnolent body that barely wakes 
up to ratify presidential initiatives and cash monthly checks and gasoline bonuses. The author 
talks about parliamentary activity as not real, he uses metaphors drawn from theater to describe 
it, such as “comedy” or “figured role.” The parliament cannot authenticate itself as “catalyzer of 
democratic debate;” for it to be authenticated it would have to present “a plurality of opinions,” 
and what we find instead is the “kingdom of the undivided thought,” the automatic repetition of 
the president’s unified voice. Importantly, the reason that the author gives for such state of affairs 
is that national representatives “owe their posts to the generosity of the regime and not to the 
people.” In other words, unanimity indicates a flaw in the mechanisms of political representation. 
 As the notion of representation came to be associated with that of democratic government 
in the West, it was operationalized into sets of rules and institutions, which historically have 
varied greatly depending on the specific understanding of representation at play (Pitkin, 1967). 
The question of what constitutes evidence of effective political representation can have many 
answers. A parliament can be considered representative because of the mode of selection of its 
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members, but also for what they say or how they say it,20 to which social categories its members 
belong, how long they have occupied their positions, how accountable they are to their 
constituents, and so on. The particular understanding of representative democracy that became 
prominent towards the end of the twentieth century places great importance on pluralism as the 
ultimate sign of effective representation, both in party politics and publics more generally.21 
Society is conceived as an assemblage of groups with conflicting opinions and interests, and thus 
the ideal democratic public is constituted by a multiplicity of dissonant voices. The institution of 
the parliament, to different degrees depending on the particular political tradition, is conceived as 
a sort of scale drawing of such a society.22 
 John Adams, for instance, argued that a representative legislature “should be an exact 
portrait of the people at large, as it should feel, think, reason, and act like them” (“Letter to John 
Penn,” cited in Pitkin,1952:60). To give an example drawn from the French tradition, Mirabeau 
stated that: “a representative body is for the nation what a map drawn to scale is for the physical 
configuration of its land” (cited in Pitkin,1952:62 ) Although the understanding of political 
representation associated to the third wave democratization processes in the nineties was much 
more “procedural” than “descriptive,” it still retains some of the same conviction, insofar as it 
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20 In Democratic Eloquence: The Fight over Popular Speech in Nineteenth Century America, Kenneth 
Cmiel traces the displacement of the older, neoclassical forms of public rhetoric and the construction of 
“popular” style that was better suited for a democratic nation. 
21 One of the first theoretical moves in this direction is found in the courses that Raymond Aron imparted 
at the Sorbonne between 1955 and 1958—which have been published as a book under the title 
Democracy and Totalitarianism—he chose the number of parties as the central criterion for distinguishing 
between political systems: “Quant au critère de discrimination, je choisirai, par une décision qui se 
justifiera a la suite de l’analyse, la distinction entre partis multiples et parti unique” (Aron, p.74).
22 This type of argument is particularly prominent in the tradition of “descriptive representative” which is 
at the base of the argument for proportional electoral systems. 
sees multi-party regimes as more representative by definition: pluralism authenticates political 
representation.  
 During the 2007-2012 Malian legislative term, concerns about political representation 
merged and became explicit around one controversial issue; unsurprisingly, it was the Family 
Code. The Malian Family Code—following the French tradition of Civil Law—is a compilation 
of more than a hundred articles regulating all aspects of personhood and kinship: from names 
and birth certificates, to marriage, domestic life, death and inheritance. Two years after 
independence, the Republic of Mali voted in a new Family Code to substitute and compile the 
legislation that the French colonial government had left in place. The Code approved by the 
National Assembly in 1962 was radical in many respects but it was only superficially enforced. 
Reforming the Family Code was part of the political agenda at least since the 1991 transition to 
democracy, but it was not until 2009 that the government sent a new version of the Code to the 
National Assembly. 
 Legislators discussed and enacted this new Family Code in 2009, even though it contained 
some highly controversial and arguably anti-Islamic points. For instance, it defined marriage as a 
civic act (which the 1962 had done too), it stated that children born outside marriage were 
entitled to inheritance rights, and it substituted the sentence “a wife owes obedience to her 
husband” by “the spouses owe each other respect.” Protests and demonstrations against the Code 
were so tumultuous that president Touré, using a constitutional prerogative that had never been 
exercised before, sent the law back to the Assembly for a “second reading.” This presidential 
concession to the High Islamic Council and its numerous followers left the members of the 
National Assembly in the awkward situation of having to revise a law they had just approved. 
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Even though the Code was a presidential initiative, legislators had to assume most of the political 
cost: they became the scapegoat of journalists and the general public for having voted a Code 
that contradicted the "religion and culture of Malians." By 2011 a new version of the Family 
Code, with significant concessions to the High Islamic Council in every controversial point—in 
particular, it retained the word “obedience” rather than “respect”—was again voted in almost 
unanimously by the National Assembly. That is, the same legislature approved almost 
consensually two very different versions of the same Code within two years. 
 The failure of political parties at the National Assembly to voice the strong opinions of the 
electorate, both against and for the Code, left the institution of political representation in a very 
precarious place: what is the role of political parties and representatives if the president is the 
ultimate interpreter of a unitary “will of the people”? Some national representatives were vocal 
opponents of the Code outside of the parliament, and yet gave their approving vote. Out of 147, 
there were 5 votes against and 4 abstentions, but I have only been able to locate one of the 
deputies who voted against. Was unanimity at the parliament related at all to how the issue had 
been debated or was it only the result of political discipline and party loyalty? 
 Through a series of coincidences that I can only apprehend as the doings of “archive 
demons,” I was able to obtain the integral transcription [Fr. Procès Verbal or PV] of the 
parliamentary debates on the Family Code from 1962 and 2009. I was not present at the 
parliamentary debate in 2009, but having attended many sessions in 2010 and 2011, I heard 
many of the same legislators speak and knew their party affiliations, which I hope helps ground 
my textual analysis of the discussions. I read these texts looking for indicators of how 
representatives understood and exercised their role as mediators between the government and the 
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electorate, as well as for evidence of the passage from a single-party regime to a multi-party one 
in the discussion itself. Even though the outcome of the debate was the consensual approval of 
the Code, many representatives expressed their dissent, and conflicting understandings of social 
organization were definitely at stake in the debate. 
Family and Progress in 1962
 The Family Code that the single-party government of socialist inspiration voted in 
unanimously in 1962 was radical in many respects. It defined marriage as a civil act, fixed a 
minimum age for marriage, limited the value of dowry to discourage what at the time was 
referred to as “marriage speculation,” banned divorce by repudiation, among other things.
  The first legislature of the National Assembly was at the time composed of 52 [?] deputies, 
all of which were also members of the US-RDA party. The president of the National Assembly 
was Mahamane Allasane Haidara, a school teacher from the region of Timbuktu with a long 
parliamentary career.  Before becoming president of the National Assembly of Mali, he had been 
elected as senator in the French Fourth Republic from 1948 to 1958 [Fr. Conseil de la 
République]. The day of the plenary debate, neither Modibo Keita, the president of Mali, nor 
Madeira Keita, the minister of the interior, were present. Jean Maria-Kone, the minister of 
Justice, was in charge of defending the proposed law in front of the National Assembly. 
 In 1962, Aoua Keita was the only female member of the National Assembly. She was a 
midwife trained in Dakar, and famously assisted a woman in labor while surveying the 1951 
elections in the northern town of Gao. She was an engaged militant of various labor and 
women’s organizations and was the first woman to be elected to the National Political Bureau of 
the US-RDA in 1958. At the discussion of the Family Code in 1962, Aoua Keita was the first one 
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to speak once the parliamentary commissions had presented their reports and the floor was 
opened for individual speeches. 
 Aoua Keita began her speech with a reference to the international context in which Mali 
was trying to assert its new place. She said she was proud to notice in the international 
conferences she attended, that Mali was one of the few African nations where women enjoyed all 
political rights. She listed the “concrete realizations” that proved the commitment of the new 
regime to improve the situation of women: kindergardens, nurseries, family allowances funds 
[Fr. Caisse d’allocations familiales], and radio campaigns to educate women. These are all, she 
said, “the irrefutable proofs of your will to make of Malian women the equals of the women from 
progressive countries” (PV, 1962, 18).  Aoua Keita spoke on behalf of all Malian women and 
thanked the government and the members of the Assembly for the new law: 
[2.4] [French] All these deeds prove your deep understanding, and all the value that you 
assign to the emancipation of your sisters. Malian women are delighted with all these 
positive achievements and ask you to believe in their sincere appreciation. (P.V., 1962, p.18)
  She presented herself as messenger by using indirect reported speech: “the women of Mali 
are delighted with these positive achievements and ask you to believe in their sincere 
appreciation.” She represented women and brought their words, they received the Family Code 
as a gift, and women thanked the government and the parliament for it. It is significant that she 
referred to the rest of women as “your sisters.” In Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF), the 
enfranchisement of mothers of two or more children became a law in 1951, five years before 
universal suffrage, in the last decade of colonial rule (Mann, 2015). Women entered the political 
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scene first as “mothers,” but here Aoua referred to them as “sisters,” which perhaps suggest a 
more egalitarian relationship. 
 Aoua Keita made an interesting comment enhancing her role as advocate of a larger 
coalition of female political organizations. She mentioned that the Women’s Executive 
Committee of Bamako—a female branch of the party—in coalition with other female 
organizations “had conducted a serious examination of the Code” submitted to the National 
Assembly and had agreed with all of its dispositions (PV, 1962, 18). 
 From her oration, it was clear that Aoua Keita, at least on this occasion, saw herself as a 
representative of women, whom she presented as a cohesive social group with unconditional and 
total support for the new Code. Conversely, the oration of most male representatives were more 
ambivalent; they sought to conciliate their support for the government and their concerns with 
the popular unrest that the new Code could trigger. 
 The transcription of the 1962 parliamentary debate includes the two Reports that were read. 
The first one seems to have been elaborated by the government to present the project to the 
National Assembly, and the second was elaborated by the Commission of Justice. Both frame the 
pursuit of gender equality as one of the obligations that the Republic of Mali, “now a sovereign 
State,” acquired by subscribing to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even 
though both Reports celebrate “emancipation” and “social progress,” there are interesting 
differences among them. 
 The governmental Report is harsher in its condemnation of the “millenary traditions” that 
ruled marriage and family affairs in Mali. For example, in the second paragraph it states that 
“gender equality is the objective of a struggle—in the name of human dignity—between the 
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factors of progress against the deeply rooted force of millenary traditions based on male 
supremacy (PV, 1962, 3).” This adherence to the universal principle of gender equality is 
followed by a list of all the social ills caused by “the problem of marriage” in a “country where 
people are still ruled by a retrograde private law” (PV, 1962, 3).  Of all the signs of “moral 
degradation” that the Report lists, dowry speculation is presented with the most urgency and 
gravity. The dowry, explains the report, has become the “price of a woman” rather than a proof 
of two families’ commitment; a list of dispositions to take against speculation follow and are 
presented as the main contribution of the new law. 
 Despite its confident reformist tone, the Report also conveys the government’s concern 
with the contradictions between the new law, and two other forms of authority, “African 
traditions” and Islam. To conciliate these three systems, the Report introduces the scientific 
notions of “evolution” and the “social development of populations”: 
[2.5] [French] In order to attain these goals, the effort of renewal has to draw its inspiration 
from traditions, from Muslim law, and from Western law, because to evolve doesn’t 
necessarily mean to become Western or Eastern, it is above all to purify traditions, to clean 
them of all barbaric content, to harmonize them with the social development of populations 
(PV, 1962, 4). 
 
 This passage is striking for a contemporary reader because of its earnest belief in the 
universality of notions like “social development, “renewal,” “evolution.” It is also striking 
because it does not hesitate to call traditions “barbaric” or affirm that they should be “purified.” 
At the same time, the very formulation of the argument, the fact that the Government included 
such a “disclaimer” in the Report shows an awareness of the social resistance that the Code could 
engender. It is a preemptive reaction to the accusation of “Westernization.” 
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 The Report elaborated by the Commission of Justice reveals an even greater concern with 
popular resistance against the new law. It begins by saying that the new Code “has aroused many 
hopes among certain social strata23 [Fr. couches], and lots of apprehension among other” (PV, 
1962, 13). The Report of the Commission takes pains to subscribe all the principles cited by the 
government—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, progress, emancipation, gender 
equality, etc. However, it also requests from the government “a degree of flexibility in its 
application” (PV, 1962, 14). All along the debate, legislators struggled to conciliate their support 
of the governmental initiative with their worries about the social resistance the Code was 
engendering even before its adoption. 
 In 1962—as in 2009—legislators knew that the Family Code was a very delicate issue and 
one of the few parliamentary affairs significant to the “people on the street.” The initiative to 
regulate and modify marriage and inheritance must have triggered many comments and concerns 
among the people, as the speeches of some representatives at the parliament refer to such 
ongoing public conversation:  
[2.6] [French]Never before has a bill prompted so many comments in the cities as well as in 
the villages. Never has a bill been examined with so much interest and detail by Malian men 
and women. Never has a bill been so well known by the man on the street before being voted 
by the National Assembly. We must admit that some of our fellow countrymen—who are 
concerned by current transformations and protective, perhaps rightly so, of the good old 
African mores, and are nostalgic of the good practices of their youth—some of our elders, I 
say, speak of this code with a lot of apprehension. Youths and women sigh and wonder with 
anxiety if some evil genie is not going to prevent or delay the adoption of this law, which is, 
in their eyes, the concretization of equality between men and women. (PV, 1962, p.20). 
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23 The use of the term “strata” [Fr. couches] instead of “class” is not insignificant. Gregory Mann argues 
that US-RDA party members, in particular Madeira Keita and Seydou Badian, saw in the term “couches” 
an alternative to “class,” which was considered an inaccurate analytical tool to describe African, “class-
less” societies (Mann, 2015: 37). 
 The social categories that Kamaté lists appear recurrently in both 1962 and 2009 debates: 
urban and rural population, men and women, politicians or intellectuals and laypersons, and 
elders and youth. Kamaté strives to voice diverse opinions on the Family Code and even slips in 
an oblique critique of the government: some of our fellow countrymen are concerned, “and 
perhaps rightly so,” by current transformations. The list in interesting because it provides a 
“portrait” of the Malian society as the legislators perceived it. This portrait emphasizes 
differences and tensions among categories of people. Despite the official use of a rhetoric that 
extols the progress and evolution of the Nation as unity, legislators were highly aware of the 
underlying social conflicts. They did not talk about “class,” but they did bring to the parliament 
some evidence of social conflict: elders are apprehensive about the degradation of the good old 
African morals while women and youth look forward to the possibility of an equal relationship. 
  Government and legislators opted for a pedagogical approach to the issue. People had 
to be educated for this new Code; “barbaric” costumes and traditional practices had to be 
purified to meet international standards and, above all, the demands of a newly independent 
Nation. Deputies were asked to interpret the new law to the population and “awareness 
campaigns” were launched. L’Essor, the gouvernmental newspaper, published an article on 
March 19th, 1962 figuring a long interview with Jean-Marie Kone, the minister of Justice. He 
explained the most significant aspects of the new Code and described it as the “codification of 
the traditions that have always regulated these issues in our country;” again we see a politician 
and public servant “modulating” the regime’s revolutionary efforts before the people (l’Essor, 
March 19th, 1962 p.12). Next to the article, a photograph shows a group of women sitting on 
mats attending an “awareness workshop.” There is a brief caption underneath the picture: 
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“Explanatory conferences have already begun and, as this picture shows, women attended 
massively to the Party’s call.”
  The members of the National Assembly, however, also perceived the limits in the 
government’s capacity to enforce this Code. On repeated occasions during the debate, they asked 
the government to give the population some time to adopt these new practices that contradict “a 
millennium-old tradition.” They expressed their approval of the new law on principle but 
expected a good degree of tolerance on its application. Deputy Monzon Traore, who spoke after 
Aoua Keita, addressed the minister in the following terms: 
[2.7] [French] That is why, Mister president, I share the commission’s hope that, during the 
first stage, the government will ask from its agents a lot of flexibility in the application of this 
law to prevent possible frictions. In my opinion, this law which we approve should be a 
source of progress, justice, and hopefully a source of social peace, not of troubles (PV, 1962, 
p.20).
 Representatives’ request for tolerance makes evident the split between written law and 
practical reality. Their job consists precisely in bringing these two terms closer together, or 
rather, in negotiating the existence of an acceptable gap between the two. On the one hand, they 
advocate for the people by asking of the government a degree of tolerance in the application of 
the written law. On the other one, they represent the government in front of the people by voting 
in unpopular laws for the sake of a higher end or an adduced value.24 The existence of an 
international authoritative discourse on progress and development, by which the government 
abides, liberated them from having to comply with “domestic public opinion.” In this case, 
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24 This position of the representatives as “modulators” of governmental initiatives had very clear political 
motivations too; Modibo Keita’s regime was far from being strongly established and its revolutionary 
policies created social resistance. As Nicholas Hopkins points out “The success of such revolution 
depended on its success in rural Mali, and this in turn depended on the ability of the government to 
mobilize the people. Mali leaders recognized this, and emphasized the importance of participation of the 
entire population in this projects” (Hopkins, 1969: 457).
epistemic authority—that is, having access to a truth unavailable for the population– and the 
mandate to represent the people acted as opposite forces. Legislators know what is good for the 
development of the population better than the population itself. 
 One of the clearest examples of the representatives' mediation between governmental 
directives and social practices occurred when legislators debated which forms of identification 
would be allowed in civil marriage. Legislators managed to pass an amendment, against the 
government’s opinion, allowing family certificates [Fr. Carnet de famille] to be as valid as birth 
certificates as personal identifications. This concession was passed in the name of the 
countryside: “Practically, in the bush, we only know family certificates as ID” (PV, 2nd part, p. 
3). 
 To this day, when representatives in the National Assembly request governmental 
tolerance, they often formulate the petition in the name of peasants and villages—using the 
French expression en brousse, in the bush. As we see in the excerpt above, legislators do not 
contradict the new law on principle, they accept it and even celebrate it, but at the same time, 
they manage to voice conservative resistance, perhaps partly their own, by presenting it as 
consideration for people in "the bush." It is not exactly a “two-level negotiation”—which would 
imply that representatives negotiate simultaneously on two fronts and are accountable to their 
electoral districts for what they vote at the National Assembly. Rather, here representatives are 
able to ask the government for flexibility in the application of the law by animating a message 
but not committing to its truth content. In Goffman’s terms, we would say that representatives 
are not only the “animators” of a message of which peasants are “authors,”which is what the 
definition of representation as “speaking on behalf” would imply. In this case, representatives are 
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both “animators” and “authors” of the message, and rather are making of peasants the ultimate 
“principal” or accountable unit for such “backward” arguments and practices.
  In 1962, the most intense part of the parliamentary debate turned around article 35, which 
stated that in polygamous marriages every wife should be considered as a separate household. If 
one of the wives has a profession other than that of her husband she should contribute to the 
household expenses. However, a husband should not use the income of one of his wives to 
support the others. The debate around this article unfolded in two directions. 
 In the first part of the debate, the commission suggested an amendment to remove the word 
“separate” and leave “every wife should be considered a household.” The legislators’ argument 
was that the word “separate” would undermine family cohesion and the "traditional sense of 
conviviality between the wives." The minister defended the government’s original phrasing by 
saying that: “What we need to eradicate in a Republic is that in certain regions, husbands place 
two or three women in the same room by giving them separate mats” (PV, 1962. 2nd Part, p. 10). 
The government sees as its duty to correct the most intimate aspects of citizens’ life to make 
them correspond to the expectation of a newly formed republic. However, the legislators vote in 
the amendment removing the word “separate” which constituted a small victory of the members 
of the National Assembly over the government. 
 The second part of the debate on article 35 concerned the status of working women in 
relationship to their husband and co-wives. The minister suggested that a salaried woman should 
not receive the same clothing allowance that every wife (to this day) is entitled to receive from 
her husband. Aoua Keita intervened twice to defend the right of salaried women to be treated 
equally, that is, to receive from her husband a clothing allowance as non-salaried women do. A 
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very peculiar interaction took place between Aoua Keita and the president of the National 
Assembly, Mahamane Haidara, in the context of this debate: 
[2.8] [French] MP Aoua Keita: I considered necessary to underline my opinion because all 
representatives have spoken as men and not as representatives of the people. 
President of the National Assembly: Ah! Ms. Aoua Keita, I ask you to take your words 
back!  
MP Aoua Keita: I take them back [...] According to the minister, a woman who works 
doesn’t need to be dressed by her husband. I find it odd that all women are no to be treated 
equally with respect to their clothing (P.V., 1962, 2nd part, p.15). 
 
 The accusation of speaking as men and not as representatives of the people was considered 
unacceptable. Political representation was asymmetric; whereas Aoua Keita meant to speak as 
woman and on behalf of women, male legislators have to represent the people as a whole, 
indicating a hierarchical relationship.25 Hierarchy, in Dumont’s classic sense, is defined as “the 
principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole” and ordered by 
relations of “complementarity.” Dumont opposes this holistic ideology to the Western, and 
democratic, ideology of individualism. In the context of democratic individualism, Dumont 
argues, hierarchy has become ungraspable if not as a “ladder of command” or a gradation of 
authority (Dumont, 1970:65-66). This modern understanding of hierarchy as a “ladder of 
command,” proper of armies and bureaucracies, is the one that is often expressed with the 
metaphor of verticality. 
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25 Lomnitz describes a similar case for 19th Century Latin America: “The idea of nation was originally 
tied to that of lineage; members of a nation could be linked by vertical ties of loyalty as much as by 
horizontal ties of equality. This is most obviously relevant when considering the way in which age and 
sex enter the picture of national identity. Women and children could and can very much identify with their 
nations even though usually they are not their nation’s representative subjects (Lomnitz, 2001: 335).
 The argument between the minister and Aoua Keita presupposed a hierarchical relation 
between men and women, understood as two asymmetrical parts of a whole, and it addressed the 
formation of a “vertical” relation between salaried and non-salaried women. The minister argued 
that a woman who receives a salary needs to dress differently, whereas Keita claimed that all 
women of the same man need to be treated equally. In other words, she proposed to prevent the 
class distinction between salaried and non-salaried women from entering the domestic space.  
The situation was particularly ambiguous because here the establishment of a “vertical” class 
distinction—salaried women versus non-salaried ones—entails the loss of a right: being dressed 
by one’s husband, as opposed to the acquisition of a privilege. 
 More than ten representatives participated in the discussion concerning polygamous 
marriages. Kansaye’s oration is worth transcribing here because it reiterated an ideology of unity 
and consensus that the discussion had shaken:  
[2.9] [French] I, like the government, hope that all Malian women shall become one, and that 
we all become one and one for all. We have to be in agreement to find a solution to our daily 
sufferings. Elsewhere as well as in this Assembly, in Mali women cannot go without their 
husbands’ help. Don’t laugh, I only wish that you consider certain images with me. You all 
wish for a Mali that is coherent and resistant to all flows, through time and space. A husband 
is the main component of both monogamous and polygamous families. With good 
understanding, we will have coherent families (1962, p. 13, 2nd part). 
 
  Unity is not egalitarian, but hierarchical. In 1962, legislators did not have much space to 
maneuver, they could have rejected certain amendments or suggested new ones, but not much 
more than that. The debate, however, exceeds the limits of the textual commentary on the 
proposed amendments, it exceeds the goal of adopting new laws. Even though it had few 
consequences, the debate in the parliament was profound and intense. Judging by their orations, 
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participants seemed invested in this collective exercise of bringing governmental reformist 
interventions and social conservatism rhetorically closer.  
Family and Culture in 2009
 In 2009 it was precisely the government’s incapacity to impose a law “contradicting social 
uses and customs” that became evident. The question of to what extent this incapacity was due to 
multi-party democracy remains open. Social rejection of the new Family Law was not channeled 
or orchestrated by parties, which for many people demonstrated the superfluous character of the 
National Assembly as an institution of political representation. 
 The text of the new Family Code submitted to the National Assembly in 2009 had a long 
history and was the result of a long series of discussions incorporating different social groups. 
According to president Touré himself, the need to reform the Code voted in 1962 was first 
expressed as early as 1986, but it was not until 1996, after the transition to multi-party 
democracy, that the project was reconsidered. A “team of experts” including representatives of 
relevant associations, notably the AMUPI (Malian Association for the Unity and Progress of 
Islam) and the CAFO (Coordination of Women’s Associations of Mali), was established.
 Regional conferences and workshops took place in Selingue, Segou and Mopti, which led 
to a concluding national consultation held in Bamako in September 2001. When Touré became 
president in 2002, he put in place new committees to revise the bill attending the demands of the 
High Islamic Council (Fr. Haut conseil islamique) which claimed to have been excluded from 
the elaboration process. After this unusually long process of consultation and revision, the text 
was submitted to the National Assembly in the summer of 2009, close to fifteen years after the 
initial consideration of the project. 
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 On August 3rd 2009, the bill was discussed and approved by the National Assembly with 
117 votes for, 5 votes against, and 4 abstentions. A number of demonstrations organized by the 
High Islamic Council and other associations followed; on August 22nd, 2009, around 50,000 
people attended a massive meeting at the 26 Mars Stadium. On August 26th a delegation formed 
by the most prominent religious figures, leaded by Mahmoud Dicko president of the High 
Islamic Council, visited the presidential palace. That same day, president Touré replied that the 
controversial Code would be sent back to the National Assembly for a second reading and asked 
the religious leaders “to stop pronouncing maledictions and emitting fatwas,” remove the 
religious sanctions against legislators, and “promote peace and national unity.” It took another 
two years for the National Assembly to write and approve another version of the Family Code, 
which accepted most of the requests of the Islamic associations and removed all controversial 
points.  
 The members of the National Assembly who approved the Family Code in 2009 and in 
2011 were elected in 2007, on the fourth legislative election since the 1991 transition to multi-
party democracy. The Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) had the largest representation 
with 35% of the seats, and the Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD)—which split from 
ADEMA in 2007—was the second largest party at the Assembly with 20% of the seats. No 
single party had an absolute majority, but the president of the National Assembly was the 
mathematician Dioncounda Traore, also president of the ADEMA, the party with the largest 
representation in the Assembly. Every time a new prime minister takes office, he or she forms a 
new government. A party belongs to the government if it agrees to place at least one of its 
members in a ministerial post, and it is considered opposition if it has no members in the 
85
government. In 2007, only two parties—PARENA and SADI—out of the sixteen with 
representation at the National Assembly were opposition; all other groups had at least one 
member in the government. 
 Let us look closely at how the parliamentary discussion of the Family Code unfolded in 
2009 with this new party system in place. The commission in charge of elaborating and 
presenting the main report was the Constitutional Laws Commission, which had Ms. Camara 
Saoudatou Dambele of the MPR party as its president. Thus the first person to speak happened 
again to be a woman, this time in a parliament in which ten percent of female members. Ms. 
Camara, who began by recalling the memory of Aoua Keita, “whose book is always by my side,” 
said:
[2.10] [French] You all understand how moving it is for me to take this microphone and 
introduce such a sensitive issue. Any imperative mandate is null, I agree, but how could I 
not speak today as a woman? This bill is the epilogue of a long battle and the beginning 
of a new era. [...] Having said that, Honorable colleagues, the Family Code is not a code 
for the promotion of women; the code is not a law that will consecrate the victory of 
women over men. Far from it. This code is the consecration of the political will to give 
families the necessary juridical foundations to establish cohesion in our society. (PV, 
2009, p. 2). 
 
 The question about the grounds of political representation was present from the very outset. 
Ms. Camara laid out a dilemma: imperative mandate is null, but she cannot help speaking as 
woman. “Imperative mandate” is a legal term that describes a relationship of representation in 
which the representative is bound to act according to the concretely transmitted preferences of 
the electors, and has no independence. The “mandate versus independence” controversy is 
central to modern debates on political representation; nevertheless as an institution, “imperative 
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mandate has been rarely applied and it was proscribed in France since the 1789 National 
Assembly (Pitkin, 1967).
 In this case, however, there is a conflation, claiming that speaking “as woman” is 
tantamount to using an imperative mandate implies that her electorate is composed exclusively 
by women, or that she was elected because she is a woman, which, as far as we know, was not 
the case. Speaking as a woman would depend on a different version of representation that is not 
mediated by the vote but by common belonging to a social category, it would be “descriptive 
representation” as some analysts have call it. What this conflation seems to be pointing at, in any 
case, is a tension between her belonging to a particular category, women, and her duty to 
represent an unmarked whole, the people or the nation. After making explicit this dilemma, she 
leaned towards the second option, and consequently, but somehow contradicting her first 
statement about what the Code means for women, she described the new Code not as women’s 
victory but as an attempt to promote the “cohesion” of Malian families.  
  Whereas Aoua Keita in 1962 openly spoke on behalf of all Malian women, which her mere 
belonging to such a category allowed her to represent, and thanked the government for the new 
law, Ms. Camara does not dare to speak as a woman, evokes the danger of gender antagonism 
and then strives to keep it at bay. She is not the only one. We recurrently find in the 2009 debate 
warnings against interpreting the Code as the victory of one category over another one, as well as 
the exhortation to read it as a consensual step for the improvement for all Malians. Yaya Sangaré
—a member of the ADEMA majority—spoke in the same sense: 
[2.11] [French] So ladies and gentlemen, honorable deputies, these reforms, of which we 
have listed the most important ones, should not be perceived as a victory of one group over 
the other. I notice that many women attended the Assembly today. If this code is approved 
today, it should not be understood by them as a victory of women over men. It is not so, I 
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think, but rather it is an achievement for the benefit of all Malians. If we understand it in 
such way, no single part of society will feel excluded. As representatives of the people, I 
believe that we should not legislate in favor of this or that category, en favor of this or that 
part of the population, of this or that religion, rather we should legislate consciously and 
knowingly for the whole of the Malian people (P.V. 2009, Yaya Sangare, p.41).
 
 It is common for politicians all over the world to claim that they govern and legislate in the 
name of and for the wellbeing of a totality—although there are also cases in which 
representatives have explicitly claimed to defend particular categories and interests. What is 
interesting in the case at hand is that when Ms. Camara and Yaya Sangaré talk about “the victory 
of one group over the other” they are not referring to the victory of one political party versus 
another, not even to the victory of the governmental side versus the opposition. They are talking 
about the victory of women over men. Here, gender appears as a much more relevant classifying 
criterion than political affiliation. Political representation is more easily guaranteed by common 
belonging to a gender category, than through partisan membership. 
 Ms. Camara, for instance, belongs to the MPR party, which was formed by old members of 
the Moussa Traore administration reclaiming the political legacy of the dictator. Amadou 
Toumani Touré, president in 2009 when the Code was discussed, was the young captain that led 
to military coup in 1991 to remove Moussa Traore from power and call for national elections. In 
other circumstances, such political genealogy would be enough to difficult cooperation between 
party and government at the parliament or would prompt “symbolic” actions of rejection in the 
name of the party’s identity. In this case, however, party affiliation is not even traceable from the 
debate. 
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  Not only is the language of party competition not deployed at all, but the possibility for the 
new law to be seen as the result of a struggle of interests between two opposed sectors of the 
population—men and women—is evoked only to be quickly dismissed. Implying that this law 
could be interpreted as a “victory of women” already presupposes a subtle transformation in 
gender relations, because competition is closer to the logic of equivalence and equality, than to 
that of hierarchy and complementarity in the traditional sense. Competition and “victory” 
presuppose a degree of equality. 
 The exhortation of Younoussi Toure—president of the URD and at the time vice-president 
of the National Assembly—indicated a rejection of competition and antagonism. His oration 
restored a hierarchical logic by reminding the audience that women and children are the most 
vulnerable members of society and therefore deserve to be protected:  
[2.12] [French] [...] This project seems to be a clear improvement in the process of taking 
into account the fundamental preoccupations of Malian men and women in terms of freedom, 
in terms of human relationships, and simply in terms of taking into account the conditions of 
the most deprived social strata[Fr. couches], those of women and children. (P.V. 2009, p.47).
 
  Laying out the question in this fashion eliminates the problem of competition or “victory” 
of one element against the other. In 2009, the use of the term “social strata” was still more 
prevalent than that of “class,” which does not figure in the parliamentary debate. Women and 
youth, as categories, occupy a peculiar place in Malian political vocabulary, one that resonates 
with that of classes or professional corporations in other countries. Every political party in Mali 
has Youth and Women Sections, as parallel and subordinate structures.  
 Deputy Lamine Mare, one of the members of the majority party (ADEMA), elected in the 
town of San, was one of the few to criticize the Code openly. He did not say that he would not 
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vote for the bill, but the tone of his speech was notoriously contentious, especially for someone 
in the governmental alliance. He addressed the point that prompted the most debate on the 
streets, which is precisely about hierarchy: does a women owe obedience to her husband? He 
said: 
[2.13] [French] Now, talking about I don’t know which article which says that women don’t 
owe obedience to their husbands anymore, but that we owe each other faithfulness and 
respect and so on. I will confess that I have two wives, and I would be interested in a third 
one. But now I’m afraid that in the future I may become single again because if one of my 
wives does not respect me, she is leaving my house. That much is clear. She must obey me in 
my house. I will ask women to be proud, because given that now it’s all about equity and 
equality and so on, everything now favors women. And the dowry, now, is it men who are 
going to pay it? No. I’m asking women to be proud: women will have to begin to pay the 
dowry now. Or we can pay each other the dowry. Come on! (P.V., 2009, p. 38).
 
 Instead of discrediting his intervention, the casual tone of his speech—forgetting the 
number of the article to which he is referring and misquoting it, for instance—might have had 
the effect of granting his speech the authenticity that technical political speech arguably lacks. 
He abandoned the position of the neutral legislator looking after a totality and spoke as a man in 
a domestic situation familiar to many other members of the National Assembly: “I have two 
wives and would like a third one, but with the new dispositions I might end up single because if 
one of my wives doesn’t obey me, she is leaving my house.” He used irony to appeal to the 
common sense of male and female legislators and pushed gender equality to its absurd 
conclusion: if we are equal now, then women should pay the dowry too. 
 The interventions of these three representatives pointed, from different perspectives, to a 
similar question: how to prevent the establishment of a relationship of competition between men 
and women?  Yaya Sangaré warned against the possibility of the Code being interpreted as a 
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“victory” of one side. Younoussi Touré attempted to restore the idea that women and children 
require protection, which is hierarchical. Lamine Mare suggested that if equality is going to be 
the new paradigm, then the dowry—the emblematic price of male supremacy— should also be 
carried evenly by the spouses. None of these representatives threatened to vote against the bill. 
The first two, Younoussi Touré and Yaya Sangaré, were more concerned with promoting an 
interpretation of the Code in which the relationship between men and women would not 
portrayed as antagonistic. In the same way, they seem to have prioritized the preservation of 
unity and consensus inside the National Assembly, by approving the new law despite their 
personal doubts. 
 It is remarkable that not even Mountaga Tall, a distinguished lawyer who had advocated for 
the legalization of religious marriage since 1994 and became one of the leaders of the opposition 
against the new Family Code, voted against the bill at the Assembly in 2009. He justified himself 
in front of the press by saying that voting for the Code had been his personal choice and that he 
was sure that sooner or later the Code would come back to the Assembly for revision [ref] Even 
the four representatives of the RPM, which at the time was still a party on the opposition, opted 
for abstentions and their leader, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, simply did not attend the parliament 
that day. 
 There were, however, four votes against the code—of which I have only been able to 
attribute one, that of Gossi Dramera, from Bafoulabé. Interestingly, he is a member of the URD, 
a party well established on the government’s side during Touré’s presidency, and one of the 
oldest representatives. He said:  
[2.14][French] We cannot escape from the wind coming from the North; it won’t leave us. 
But that won’t prevent me from saying what I think. [...] Aren’t we today in Mali uprooting 
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all of our history to take that of Europeans or the West instead? [...] I don’t speak only as a 
Muslim. Of course, I have chosen to be a Muslim, but I am speaking now as a Malian from 
the countryside. I am a Malian from the countryside. Eighty percent of Malians....because 
you, the intellectuals that are here present, you are the 20% or even the 10% of the 
population. [...] I know this Code will be passed today, that is sure. But, excuse me, I am not 
going to vote for it, that much I can tell you. (P.V., 2009, p.49).
 
 Dramera’s statement is unique because it lays out an irreducible difference: "you the 
intellectuals" versus "us the Malians of the countryside," and choses to speak as a member of the 
second category.  Other representatives, as we saw, attempted to restore unity and consensus in 
different ways, but Dramera recurred to the antagonistic logic of majority versus minority—
which is to this day quite rare in Malian deliberative spaces. At the parliament, he finds himself 
as part of the tiny minority that will vote against the Code, however, he trusts that his speech 
represents the stance of “the majority,” not because his is a member of the second largest party at 
the parliament, but because he, unlike “the intellectuals,” belongs to that authentic Malian rural 
majority.  Dramera’s statement contained an oblique accusation undermining the legitimacy of 
the National Assembly: legislators belong to an urban, French-speaking minority that has lost its 
connection with the roots of the Malian nation under the influence of the West. On what grounds 
can they represent the people?  
 The accusation that the representatives betrayed the people by contradicting “cultural” and 
religious norms was recurrently stated in the newspapers and public discussions around the 
Code. A newspaper article titled “When the National Assembly dozes,” for instance, stated: “It is 
because of their unawareness of the public opinion, that they [legislators] did not perceive the big 
threat that this bill involved.” However, on repeated occasions during the debate representatives 
expressed their concern about the possible reactions of the population. 
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 One of the most explicit concerns with public opinion came from a member of the 
ADEMA, elected in the northern district of Menaka, in the region of Gao. Deputy Bajan Ag 
Hamatou is a good example of the political continuity linking the “pre” and “post” transition to 
democracy periods. He has been elected representative at the National Assembly six times, he 
was elected for the first time in 1981 as a member of the UDPM, the single party created by 
Moussa Traore, and has been reelected ever since, as a member of the ADEMA since 1991. 
Interestingly, he was one of the few legislators who laid the dilemma about voting for this bill as 
a conflict between at least three forces, party loyalty, the respect of the will of the majority, and 
religious duties: 
 [2.15] [French] However, Mister President, let me come back to the same question: have we 
assessed the reaction of the population regarding this bill? [...] Because what we have found 
everywhere is that the majority of Malians are asking us not to pass this bill, even if we are 
going to pass it. […] I was saying that I’m going to vote this law initiative because it’s my 
country, it’s my party, even if I will have to ask GOD to forgive me. [Laughter in the hall] I 
will have to pray every day and ask GOD to forgive me. This project, President, everyone 
knows, in many respects contradicts the Muslim religion and our culture, thus it is 
problematic for all Malians. [...] I know that somehow there is pressure from women to vote 
this law [...] But is it the majority of Malian women that want to vote this law? Because to my 
knowledge, Malian women have the same culture as Malian men. (PV, 2009, p.44) [My 
emphases]. 
 
 His statement oscillated between pluralist competition (majorities versus minorities) and 
unitary notions such as “the Malian culture” and “the Muslim religion.” He first stated that 
women could be the “pressure group” behind this Code, then he reduced their numerical 
importance by saying that it is only some women who support this Code. Finally Ag Hamatou 
abandoned that logic of competition altogether and restituted national unity by saying that all 
Malian, men and women, share the same culture.
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 Bajan Ag Hamatou's oration laid out with frankness the moral dilemma that legislators 
confronted, the religious predicament might not have been strong enough for him to refuse 
voting the Code, but it was one of his concerns. What prompted laughter in the hall? Was it a 
secular laughter triggered by the exaggeration of his religious predicament? Was it prompted by 
his suggestion that he would have to “fix” his transgression by praying more? I do not know. 
 Bajan Ag Hamatou listed "his party" and "his country" as the reasons justifying the 
transgression of a religious norm, but how exactly was party discipline enforced? 
Representatives siding with the government at the moment of voting seemed to have acted more 
out of respect for an implicit norm to vote unanimously than as a result of party coercion.  
However, such a hypothesis cannot be proved. 
  Journalists and local commentators assumed that the pressure to approve the law had come 
from “international funders,” implying that legislators were more concerned with assuring the 
flux of international aid than respecting the will of the Malian people. Conversely, president 
Touré's subsequent decision to yield to popular pressure and to the requests of the High Islamic 
Council restituted a sense of organic unity between the sovereign and the people. One that does 
not require the mediation of representatives. 
 As some analysts have pointed out, the erratic and contradictory trajectory of the Family 
Code in contemporary Mali is a good example of how democratic institutions have had the 
"unintended" effect of strengthening religious pressure groups.  Leonardo A. Villalón, for 
instance, writes: 
To the surprise of the political class of reform-minded francophone intellectuals who led 
the movements in favor of democratization, the transitions in Mali and Niger very 
quickly empowered religious groups to pursue their agenda in the political sphere. As 
these groups realized the potential benefits of their demographic advantage in electoral 
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contests, the power of popular opinion forced political actors to align themselves more 
with popular (religious) sentiment and away from the secular values of the francophone 
promoters of democracy (Villalón, 2013: 249). 
 Contrasting the parliamentary debates on the Family Code from 1962 and 2009, however, 
suggests something slightly different. The influence of such religious pressure groups was not 
channeled through political parties and thus is not a direct result of the transition from a single-
party to a multi-party regime. The expression of dissent at the parliament did not come from the 
opposition but from members of the parties with the largest presentation, ADEMA and URD. 
 If it were true, as Villalón affirms, that “the power of popular opinion forced political 
actors to align themselves more with popular (religious) sentiment,” the Code would not have 
been voted in unanimously in 2009. Representatives voted the Code not only against what they 
knew was the prevalent sentiment but in some cases against their own religious convictions. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the multi-party, electorally competitive context of 2009 produced a 
greater interest in public opinion among Malian politicians. Representatives in 2009 did not refer 
to “public opinion” more than those of 1962 did. The only clear difference is that those of 2009 
backed their arguments with loose numerical estimations of “majorities” and “minorities.” It can 
hardly be said that “public opinion,” as systematic statistical exegesis of public preferences, 
exists in Malian contemporary politics. To interpret what the popular sentiment about the Code 
was, representatives did not resort to statistics, on the contrary, the derived such “public opinion” 
from unitary notions such as the “culture and religion of Malians.”
 Nevertheless, the link between electoral democracy and the empowerment of religious 
groups that Villalón indicates remains plausible. What is less clear is the exact mechanism of the 
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link. In Mali, religious pressure groups did not use political parties as conduits, but they did 
occupy the “democratic public sphere.” Let me suggest a hypothesis.
 Democracy is not exclusively as series of institutions of political representation—elections, 
multi-party systems, and freedom of speech. It is also the slow denaturalization of social 
hierarchies and the acceptance of egalitarian, universal citizenship. Democracy is not only a 
“negative” process in which the mere removal of obstacles allows previously repressed religious 
and cultural sentiments to emerge into the public. Democracy is also a positive process that 
generates a new need for ideologies of cohesion and unity of different kinds. It is after the de 
facto dissolution of a hierarchical social order that “religion” and “culture” acquire greater 
ideological power. 
 In 1962, legislators spoke about the opposition between “progress,” as defined at the time 
by transnational discourses with socialist inflections, and the everyday life of Malian peasants. 
They asserted the need to “purify” barbaric customs, but asked the government for flexibility in 
the application of the law. Their capacity to represent the Malian people was not dependent on 
identity or cultural authenticity. 
 Conversely, in 2009, it was precisely the legislators’ alleged proximity to the “Western” 
understanding of society and politics, the fact of being “intellectuals,” that discredited them as 
valid representatives. The slow participative process of elaboration of the proposed Family Code 
and of its approval by a parliament composed of sixteen political parties did not suffice to 
authenticate it as a product of the “the Malian people,” because its content was marked by 
“foreignness.”  There is perhaps a link between the decline of the ideology of hierarchy—in 
which cohesion is achieved by assigning a ranked place to each component within a whole—and 
96
the intensification of cultural authenticity as a unifying criteria and the basis of political 
legitimacy.
 The parliamentary discussion about the organization of the family mirrored arguments and 
concerns about political representation. Cohesion and unity were presented as the highest values. 
The threat of competition, division, and conflict was in the horizon of most speeches, and it 
pertained to both the domestic and the political realms. Ms. Camara hesitated between speaking 
“as a woman” and proclaiming social cohesion. Yaya Sangaré observed that whereas he could 
see that “many women attended the Assembly today,” representatives should not legislate “in the 
favor of one category.” Lamine Mare joked about rather being “single” than allow his women to 
disobey him.  Bajan Ag Hamatou stated that Malian men and women are all united by the same 
culture and religion. There were many other examples during these debates that pointed at the 
need to represent a cohesive totality. 
  The struggle to preserve unity and cohesion in a political regime defined by competition is 
not exclusive to Mali. In 1957, Raymond Aron stated that the central conundrum of all Western 
regimes, by which he meant multi-party democracies, was: “how to conciliate national unity 
[entente] and permanent contestation?” (Aron, 1965: 78). Malian representatives were accused of 
passivity and inability to perform the role of “opposition.” Judging by those accusations, one 
would draw a picture of the Malian democracy as an inert apparatus. In the next chapter, we will 
examine the dynamics of political conflict in one county. When Claude Lefort defined 
democracy as “the institutionalization of conflict,” he could have been talking about Kita. 
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Chapter 3.Conflict
Kita is a railroad town, an important stop on the route that connected Bamako to Kayes in 1904 
and Kayes to Dakar in 1924. As the administrative center of a region dominated by the 
production of peanuts and cotton, Kita has been linked to the global economy for many 
decades.26 However, the town retains a very strong sense of locality; Kitans treasure the secrets 
of their venerated mountain and cultivate an aristocratic pride derived from having been one of 
the centers of the Great Mande Empire. This provincial town has also a longstanding reputation 
for being a capital of politics and intrigue. Rivalry between the four original families, frequent 
riots against central state offices, factionalism, strikes at the local high school, and competitive 
elections confirm this reputation. 
 The town of Kita (approximately 50,000 inhabitants) is also the administrative center of the 
cercle of the same name, which comprises thirty-three rural communes and hundreds of villages. 
Kitan political elites have to negotiate with the leaderships of the rural communes under Kita’s 
administrative control, on the one hand, and with the capital elites on the other. Kitan politicians 
brag about their firsthand knowledge of both the villages and the capital, but a good degree of 
mistrust characterizes their relationship with both fronts, as well as with rival factions in the 
town of Kita. In Kitan political meetings, messages and information coming from the villages 
converge with those coming from Bamako. Messages and information, however, do not flow 
smoothly through these personal networks. There are “gates,” “closed circuits,” “leakages,” 
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26 To give an example, in 1925-1926, Kita produced 87 tons of cotton, of which 14 tons, 18%, were 
consumed locally, and 73 exported via Kayes and Dakar to France. The percentage on local consumption 
is one of the lowest; in the same year, Segou consumed 50% of the cotton that it produced and Bafoulable 
57% (Roberts, 1996: 207). 
distortions, and especially rivalry and mistrust, that is, generalized doubts about the truth content 
of most statements and about speakers’ intentions.
 Nicholas S. Hopkins spent 1961 and 1964-1965 in Kita writing an ethnography of local 
politics under the recently established socialist regime of Modibo Keita and the US-RDA party. 
Besides being a highly acute and rigorous analysis of local politics, the book that Hopkins wrote, 
Popular Government in an African Town, is an invaluable historical document. The sets of 
relations and practices that he described—such as the organization of the party, the dynamics of 
factions, the way of running meetings, the modalities of intrigue and agreement, the relationship 
with the central state and the elites from Bamako, the profile of the leaders, among many other—
fascinated me because of their similarity to what I found fifty years later, between 2009 and 
2012. 
 Let me advance one, particularly striking example of these “coincidences.” In this chapter, 
I will examine the conflict between three factions within one of the largest parties in Kita; the 
leader of one of the factions is Sissoko, an ambitious young politician who operates a network of 
regional trade of salt and cereal across West Africa; the leader of one of the other factions is 
Keita, a reticent politician with a notorious vocation for town intrigue, and more importantly, a 
member of the family that has traditionally held the chieftainship of Kita, the Keita. In 1964, 
Nicholas S. Hopkins traced the history of two factions formed within the RDA around 1959, 
after the elimination of the “Canton Chief” post and the RDA’s electoral victory over the PSP in 
the last years of the colonial period. One of the factions was led by Moussa Keita—a member of 
the branch of the Keita family that had lost the chieftainship in 1942 in favor of Fatogoma Keita
—and the other faction was led by Moriké Sissoko, a regional peanut trader (Hopkins, 
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1972:124). Given the importance that family names [Bam. jamuw] have in Malian social 
organization, this recurrence can hardly be understood as a coincidence; however, it also should 
not prevent us from examining the deep transformations that have taken place behind continuity.  
 Hopkins himself was interested in change, but he saw that despite the transformation of the 
formal organization of politics—which were significant between the fifties and sixties—there 
was a parallel stream of local politics. This was centered on prestige and expressed through the 
rivalry of local factions and, as Hopkins wrote, had its own rhythm. The party and state 
institutions, writes Hopkins, “provided the posts that gave or confirmed prestige,” and so they 
somehow enabled and shaped that other stream of local politics, in which the ruptures between 
the late colonial and independent regime of Modibo Keita and the RDA were less evident 
(Hopkins, 1972, 115). Hopkins traced the history of local political rivalry from 1939 to 1966 and 
identified four phases. In the first one, conflict emerged over the election of the last “canton 
chief” in 1942; the second one was structured by the opposition between two parties, the PSP and 
the USRDA; and after the defeat and elimination of the PSP, he recorded two phases marked by 
two consecutive sets of binary factions within the USRDA. According to Hopkins, “the dualistic 
system of opposing factions was always maintained,” as he claims that it was only when the PSP 
was eliminated that the local USRDA split. The main political issue all along, he writes, “was the 
question of the degree of influence non-locals should have in Kita’s politics” (Hopkins, 1972: 
140). Later on, Hopkins suggests that this “binary opposition” was an interpretative habit of 
Kitans themselves, who would always see two factions in what looked more like a proliferation 
of cliques. In any case, two of his observations seem still valid: first, the splitting of parties into 
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factions, and factions into cliques results from their success, and second, the influence of non-
locals in Kitan politics is a central political issue. 
 One of the core arguments of Hopkins’ book is that despite its organic links to the capital 
and the rural communes, most political action in Kita took place in an arena that coincided with 
the town’s social network and its geographical delimitation, which in turn subordinated such 
action to the control of the town’s “public opinion.” Hopkins writes: “...one of the strengths of 
the town as a social unit was that it so frequently formed an arena within which forces worked 
towards the resolution of the crises that arose” (Hopkins, 1972:157). 
 Rivalry, factions, and intrigue were “endemic to Kita,” but for Hopkins these were also part 
of a larger, homeostatic process, that secured not only the cohesion of the town, but a relative 
degree of what he called “self-government” and popular participation.27 That is, the existence of 
such “arena” allowed Kitans to resist, de facto although not in principle, unpopular initiatives of 
the central government, and it also guaranteed the accountability of the faction leaders insofar as 
their leadership required local popular support which was not easy to obtain. The process 
Hopkins describes is a positive feedback loop, in the sense that competition between the factions 
exercised within Kita helped reaffirm the boundaries of the social unit that it presupposed, and 
translated into relative local autonomy and popular accountability. In this regard, Hopkins 
analysis partakes of a long-standing analytical tradition that has seen social conflict as a 
“productive” force (Simmel, 1971). 
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27 “In a sense the system of competitive political relations defined the limits of Kita’s social system, 
which for all practical purposes corresponded on the ground to the town of Kita. Neither the nearby 
villages nor the outlying parts of the circle where included, and citizenship in the town was tantamount to 
participation in the competition for prestige in the arena. People within the system measured their prestige 
against one another, and those outside the system, whether they were form rural areas or from the capital, 
were essentially personal allies of the faction leaders in Kita” (Hopkins, 1972:116).
 Without the background of such a carefully crafted and historically grounded ethnography, 
Popular Government in an African Town, it would have been easy for me to perceive the 
political conflicts that I found as new or at least as particularly critical, and attribute them to the 
institutional framework and normative principles of electoral, multiparty democracy. This would 
have been particularly tempting since that is a common interpretation among certain local actors 
themselves who talk about conflict and division as a novelty related to a broader and recent 
process of social decline.
 In this chapter, I will look closely at a meeting of the largest party in Kita as an entry point 
to examine the ways in which political rivalry and conflict figure in Kitan politics today. My 
analysis will be punctuated by references to Hopkins’ book in an attempt to discern new and old 
patterns of political organization, but also the diverging conclusions that different analytical 
perspectives may induce. 
 I describe two significant transformations partly induced by multiparty, electoral 
democracy and decentralization. The first one is the dissolution of that Kitan political arena to 
which Hopkins attributed so much importance. Contemporary Kitan politics are not contained in 
“the polis,” if they ever were, and barely any local political institution has the capacity to “stand 
for the whole” or to instantiate the town as a unit. Kitan party politics are merging with those of 
the recently created rural communes, as they both remain economically dependent on Bamako. 
 The second transformation has to do with the forms of exchange between the Kitan elites 
and the rural communes; electoral competition fosters campaign expenditure, and it does so in 
limited, predictable, and cyclical ways, which in turn shape social relations. Hopkins talked 
about intrigue in rather benign ways; reading his ethnography, one does not get the same sense of 
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overall suspicion and mendacity accusations that I found, but that might be only because 
meetings were my entry point. Spatially, what I will describe would look as if one big node 
pulling towards its jurisdiction numerous channels of information and resources had exploded 
into dozens of smaller nodes forming a fractal pattern in which each part both participates in the 
regional factions and contains in itself  the seed of a similar conflict.  
The arena 
 The current organizational chart of most political parties in Mali has the same basic form 
that the US-RDA had in the sixties. Parties are composed of four types of units, which are, going 
from the top down: National Headquarters or CE [Fr. Comité Executive], Sections, Subsections 
and Committees. I have not been able to locate the exact origin of this organizational structure, 
which looks like a hybrid of socialist and communist party structures.28 In France, “sections” 
usually correspond to the administrative level of the commune, whereas in Mali they correspond 
to the cercle. Furthermore, in the French Socialist Party, “sections” were not further divided into 
smaller units, or when they were these were not called “comités.” Interestingly the decision of 
the French Socialist Party to keep the “Sections” as the smallest, most direct unit “was a reaction 
provoked by the disputes between small groups which had weakened the earlier socialist 
parties” (Duverger, 1954:24). In any case, what we know is that in Kita the establishment of 
ward comités, under an already existing “Section” of the USRDA, took place around 1960 and 
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28 “Sections” or branches were one of the most revolutionary inventions of Socialist parties, because 
contrary to the organization in “caucuses,” “sections” imply a stronger coordination between the parts of a 
whole, permanent mobilization, and mass adherence. Additionally, the Malian division of Sections into 
comités, especially in the sixties when adherence to the party was mandatory and universal, recalls the 
“cell,” which was an invention of the soviet communist party, even though “cells” were typically rooted 
in the workplace (Duverger, 1954: 24). 
was the result of a series of petitions to the national party by a faction seeking “to gain control 
over the political bureau [BPL] by outflanking the group in power” (Hopkins, 1972:127). 
 With some exceptions, the large majority of the parties registered in Mali today maintain 
this basic organizational structure.29 However, the administrative division of the country changed 
significantly with the decentralization reforms of the nineties, and thus similar nomenclature 
conceals significant differences. Party structures map on to administrative divisions, party 
committees correspond to villages in rural areas and wards in urban ones; party sub-sections 
correspond to urban and rural communes; sections correspond to the cercles, and the CE in 
Bamako corresponds to the Nation. The decentralization reforms of the nineties gave the status 
of rural communes to hundreds of villages in the country. 
  Each one of the thirty-three rural communes in the cercle of Kita elects a mayor and a 
communal council; consequently party comités in those communes are directly engaged in 
electoral competition. The budget and national weight of the Kita Section depends not only on 
the numbers of posts it wins in the town of Kita, but on the number of posts it wins on the entire 
cercle, which means that the Kitan political elite has an incentive to contribute to the electoral 
campaigns in the communes. Moreover, representatives at the National Assembly are elected by 
the entire cercle, so no local politician can aspire to become a deputy without campaigning in the 
rural areas.  If, as Hopkins claimed, it still holds true that posts—whether in the party or in the 
local representative organs—are the target around which factions form, then it is at least 
plausible that the more posts there are, the more factions and intrigue there will be.  
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29 The only two parties that to my knowledge have a different structures are Yelema and SADI. Yelema, 
for instance, was the first part to eliminate the Youth and Women Sections as separate structures, so that 
all party members participate and compete in the same hierarchy. 
 According to Hopkins, in 1964 not only the members of the bureau (BPL) of the Kita 
Section of the US-RDA were all residents of Kita town, but members of the villages or wards 
party committees, once these were established, were rarely allowed into the meetings of the 
Section’s BPL, which “preferred to keep its deliberations secret” (Hopkins, 1972: 84). 
Conversely, nowadays, it is very common for party members to militate at various levels 
simultaneously; members of the wards and sometimes even village committees not only attend 
meetings of the Kita Section but more often than not, they occupy posts in the bureau of both the 
committee and the Section at the same time. The most influential members at one level tend to be 
the ones who have privileged access to both the immediate upper and lower levels, or at least to 
one of the two; this allows them to convey information “top down” and mobilize popular support 
“bottom up.” 
 Moving between administrative levels entails switching between languages and rhetorical 
styles. In the case of the cercle of Kita, this transition is from Malinke, at the village level, to 
Bambara, at the cercle level, to French, at the National level. Moving between the villages 
committees and the Kita Section also implies a significant investment in gasoline or transport 
fees that is far from available to everyone. For most everyday activities, the cost of transportation 
and communication—prepaid cell phone airtime primarily—are covered by party members 
themselves, while parties cover transportation expenses for events. Despite the costs, party 
members from the villages travel long distances to attend meetings in Kita, and politicians from 
Kita, and Bamako, accord great importance to their visits to the villages.
 Some of the most important members of the Kita party Sections live in Bamako, either 
because they are deputies at the National Assembly or because they are public servants. 
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Similarly, and this is a considerable departure from what Hopkins described, there is a relatively 
new class of young, educated politicians who live in Kita but occupy administrative or even 
elected posts in the town-halls of the rural communes. These junior politicians often have a 
college degree and some knowledge of administrative procedures for which there is an important 
demand in these recently formed public offices. Absenteeism in the rural communes is an effect 
of such a structure; one of the first things one notices when touring the villages is that the 
recently built town-halls are empty, since the buildings are mostly unfurnished, the 
administrative staff often prefers to operate from their homes rather than from the office. 
Moreover, many of the elected and administrative functionaries of the communes either live in 
Kita and come only once a week to attend to specific administrative issues, or live in the village 
but spend long seasons in Kita and Bamako where they participate in upper level politics.30  
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30 For instance, one of the first persons I met at the National Assembly in Bamako was a young 
photographer who was greeted by everyone as mayor, “monsieur le maire.” It turned out that he was 
actually adjunct-mayor in a commune in the region of Kayes, but spent all the parliamentary seasons in 
Bamako where he made a living taking the photographs of congressmen during the sessions and selling 
them to them.  
Fig.2 Town-hall of the Souboula commune, cercle of Kita, during a meting with an NGO in 2011. 
 There are intricate networks of personal and official channels connecting these 
administrative and party levels, official visits, formal letters, cell phone calls, delegates, 
representatives, kinship ties, and trade networks.31 Their complexity is multiplied by the number 
of parties operating in the area. Even though some villages are too small to accommodate more 
than one party, rural communes, which are constituted by many villages, often elect multi-party 
councils. In 2011, there were around a dozen active parties holding regular meetings in the town 
of Kita; and in the rural communes, their number ranged from two to five. Suspicion and intrigue 
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31 Nicholas Hopkins describes the existence of a patron-client relationship between Kitans and the 
villagers in the organization of the peanut economy in the late colonial period. This cash crop economy 
gave rise to “a commercial organization involving several tiers of African, Lebanese, and French 
middlemen, which was centered in the town of Kita.” This commercial system, Hopkins argues, was 
based on personal relations “blending into patron-client relations” in which “those who bought 
groundnuts from a particular peasant were frequently those who sold them consumer goods, often on 
credit against the following year’s crop” (Hopkins, 1969: 459). 
abound in the relationship between parties. I heard, for instance, members of one party accuse 
members of another party of spreading false rumors to damage their reputation and hinder the 
recruitment of new members, or even of secretly supporting the choice of a “non-charismatic” 
candidate in a rival party to decrease the party’s chances of electoral success. However, the 
sharpest forms of rivalry and suspicion that I saw were among members of the same party. This 
was particularly true within the largest parties, where these rivalries were usually fueled by the 
competition over candidacies and party posts. 
 Party meetings take place regularly at each one of these administrative levels. The 
frequency, content and enthusiasm of these meetings varies widely, often depending on electoral 
calendars. Large, well-implanted parties maintain permanent activity throughout the electoral 
calendar, but the majority of the small parties go through large periods of latent life, especially in 
small towns and villages. In 2011, as the 2012 presidential elections (which did not take place) 
approached, competition and intrigue were at their peak.
  Large parties such as ADEMA, URD and RPM which had managed to maintain their 
structures in place since the last election were in the process of choosing their presidential 
candidates as they continued with their everyday meetings and activities. Many of the smaller 
ones, such as PARENA, UDD, MPR, PIDS—to cite the examples of those I personally followed
—had lost contact with “their bases” in many localities and were revisiting them to set new 
bureaux in place and encourage members to work hard for the coming elections. Finally, there 
were those newly created parties, such as the PDES, CARE and YELEMA, which were just 
beginning their implantation in the country: making public presentations, visiting local 
personalities, recruiting adherents and establishing local bureaux for the first time.
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   The format of party meetings has not changed a lot since the sixties, but its material 
organization has undergone some discrete but consequential changes. Party meetings reiterate the 
“parliamentary procedure” used at the National Assembly, as well as in Communal Councils, and 
youth associations. The agenda [Fr. ordre du jour] is read, amended and approved at the outset, 
usually in a rather casual way, although sometimes approving the agenda can be an entire process 
in itself.32 The president starts by providing a summary of the points to be discussed and giving 
out recent information, then the floor is open for discussion; sometimes there is also time for 
commissions or individuals who have been tasked to present their accounts, and once all points 
in the agenda have been covered, there is an open section, called "divers," which tends to be 
quite lively. This is if the meeting actually manages to follow the agenda, which I saw happen 
more often in the meetings of youth associations; otherwise it just dissolves into arguments until 
the call for prayer ends it. 
  As for their material organization, meetings take place in the party headquarters or at 
someone’s home if it is a small party; there is usually a table at one end of the room, which 
serves as main podium, where the president and secretary sit facing the rest of members siting in 
rows. Hopkins remarked that in 1964 “meetings of one kind or another were an almost daily 
occurrence in Kita.” That holds true today, especially when looking at meetings of parties, youth 
associations, NGO’s, Councils, women associations and other groups as an ensemble (Hopkins, 
1979: 158). In 1964, however, most party meetings were relatively secret; Hopkins only obtained 
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32 In From Grammar to Politics, Alessandro Duranti analyzes the fono, a type of formal public speech act 
from Western Samoa. These formal speeches usually have a very formulaic beginning, mostly greetings, 
and end, wishing good health to the present. Discretely inserted in the middle there is a short and vague 
articulation of the “agenda.” Since naming the problem to be discussed is already to interpret it, Duranti 
notices that the rule is “to say the least” and “be vague” (Duranti, 1994:117). In Kitan meetings the 
tendency is to start with highly formal, sometimes written, descriptions of the agenda, which dissolve into 
confusion as conflict takes over and its reclaimed as sometimes as a form of ending the argument and 
bringing people back on track.  
permission to attend “information meetings,” which contrary to most party meetings, were totally 
public as they were held at an open-sided market shed where hundreds of people could gather to 
listen. That fact might have influenced his understanding of the meetings as a forum 
corresponding to the “abstract Kita arena”: 
Meetings provided the essential forum where political consensus could form through the 
confrontation of different points of view. They also provided a physical expression of the 
abstract Kita arena where political moves could be made in public to increase one man’s 
prestige or attack another’s, and thus were essential to the continuous processes of 
factionalism. By providing a field for the political processes in the town's social system, 
they helped to sharpen the definition of the limits of that system (Hopkins, 1979: 169). 
 In 2011, meetings were both less secret and more fragmented. They were less secret 
because I easily got permission to attend and record all sorts of meetings and often such 
permission came with the statement “we have nothing to hide.” They were more fragmented 
because, besides the Conference organized by the RECAN that I described in Chapter 1, there 
was no one single meeting in Kita that could be considered a “town meeting,” as Hopkins saw 
them in 1964. Many of the party meetings I attended in the cercle of Kita were public 
ceremonies, often celebrating the appointment of a new local bureau with music and praises. 
However, even in those cases, there were only some special nonaffiliated guests, and the rest of 
the attendants were party members. If interpreting those public party ceremonies as enactments 
of the “town arena” was difficult, it was simply impossible when it came to the internal, 
business-as-usual, party meetings, which I was allowed to attend on a couple of occasions. One 
of those rare opportunities came in April 2011, when I got permission to attend a three-hour 
meeting of one of the largest parties in Kita. 
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The meeting
 The meeting took place in the party headquarters, a large concrete room in a central but 
secluded location. There were around thirty attendants, all male. Party members accused each 
other of intrigue, mendacity, lack of "love for their party," and even of saying hurtful things. As 
Oumou Sidibé and I transcribed the entire recording of the meeting, we managed to partially 
reconstitute the multiple layers of the conflict, which in broad terms had to do with the relations 
between Bamako, Kita and the villages, and the rivalry between two or three factions, or 
"tendenciw” as they called them, within the Section of Kita. As the particulars of the situation 
were discussed, speakers, in various forms, reiterated one theme: the untruthfulness of all 
members and the difficulty of creating lasting peace and agreement [Bam. bqn]. Virtually every 
speaker used two words: “truth” [Bam. tixq] and “agreement” or “peace” [Bam. bqn].33 The two 
most frequent statements were “we are not telling the truth, we need to tell each other the truth” 
and “there is no agreement or peace, we need to bring peace.” However, by the time the sunset 
call for prayer sounded, the attendants left the room still visibly upset, without having established 
a satisfactory truth, and without having "stabilized peace" [Bam. bqn ka sabati].
 The party was at the time starting the internal process to select its presidential candidate, 
the list of official nominees had not been determined yet, but a dozen names were already 
sounding as potential “pre-candidates.” Some of these aspiring candidates had already begun to 
promote themselves in the party Sections. Even though the list of pre-candidates was not official 
yet, party members in Kita had begun to make moves to side with different potential candidates, 
in particular with one, Sekou Diakité, who is originally from the region of Kita and thus has 
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33 Malians usually translate the Bambara term "ben" to French as "peace" or "concord," but some of its 
uses seem closer to "agreement," "cooperation," and "unity." People often illustrate the meaning of ben 
with a gesture of the same name, which consists in clasping one's hands and interlacing fingers. 
special ties to the region. The argument at the meeting broke out because a couple of party 
members had toured some villages without the Section's permission and were accused of secretly 
campaigning for Sekou Diakité in the villages as well as of railing against the other tendenciw of 
the Kita Section. People expressed their disapproval of this type of behavior, but as the argument 
unfolded, it became clear that the conflict which divided the Kita Section was deeper and went 
back at least to the last legislative elections of 2007. Ever since then, the party was divided in 
factions which were suspicious of each other; therefore, as some members pointed out, 
everything that has been said and done since then was “conflict-speech” [Bam. kqlq kuma], 
which means that it is impossible to fully account for all the words and deeds and that many 
otherwise innocent actions become suspicious acts in the context of conflict. 
 The day of the meeting, the Secretary General was absent and the Secretary General 
adjunct presided the meeting. He sat at a table, next to the doyen, facing the rows of attendants 
sitting on chairs. Tounkara is one of the most influential members of the Section; as a Tounkara, 
he is a member of one of the four Kitan founding families. He, however, lives in Bamako, where 
he is a member of the party’s CE, and travels to Kita with regularity; he also mentioned that he 
had recently been in Benin and in France. He has served at different state offices, including the 
CMDT—the Malian textile state enterprise which has a factory in Kita—but he has never 
occupied an electoral post. Tounkara spoke in Bambara with some sentences in French 
intertwined. He divided the agenda into two broad sections, "the situation of the party at the 
national level" and "the situation of the party at the local level." He began by emphasizing the 
importance of unity: “we are asking all the Sections to be united, to be in agreement, so that we 
can attain power.” 
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 Tounkara explained to the local members the formal procedure for the selection of 
presidential candidates. He said that any interested member was allowed to submit his or her 
candidacy. Although the idea of someone from the Section aspiring to be presidential candidate 
triggered laughter. He described in detail the paperwork needed to submit a candidacy, which 
included a "society project," and two oaths. He said: "you have to swear that if you become 
president, you will not waste things that belong to the Nation, you will not take or use this wealth 
because it does not belong to you, it belongs to the country, and you will also swear that if the 
ADEMA chooses another candidate instead of you, you'll support such candidate no matter 
what." He translated these requirements—which were written in French at the Party national 
headquarters in Bamako—into Bambara. 
 As someone living in Bamako, he was also the best qualified among those present to give 
an account of the candidacies that were "sounding" in the capital. The big names that he 
mentioned did not require an introduction, and many of the Kita party members knew already 
who were the potential candidates. Tounkara, however, did not introduce or assess the candidates 
themselves, but rather described his own personal relations with each one of them. He specified 
whether he had read about their candidacy in the newspapers or they had been "presented" to him 
personally. For the latter cases, he gave a very detailed report of the place, time, and content of 
his personal exchanges with each candidate. He said of one of the candidates: "he invited me to 
his place to inform me of his candidacy respectfully. Personally, he wants me to help him, 
because of many things; when I was mentoring the youth in the Section of Kayes, he was my 
first mentor. There are many things that join us, even his house and the house of my older sister 
are next to each other." 
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 It seemed appropriate, and even expected, for him to expose this network of loyalties and 
personal debts; moreover, his description of his personal relations and meetings with these men 
was full of “evidence,” details, such as hours, addresses, number of cell phone calls, exact 
reported speech, etc., which had the overall effect of authenticating the account. 
I interpret Tounkara’s introductory speech in two ways. By making explicit his personal 
position within the party informal networks of trust and loyalty, he indicated his choice of an 
open and “fair play,” rather than intrigue and secrecy. When he was talking about one of the 
candidacies that was “presented” to him, he used direct reported speech to convey to the meeting 
what he had answered to the person attempting to gain his political support: “[Bam.] Me, to 
whom everyone must come and present a candidacy, if I’m not careful at the moment of 
speaking, if I side with someone, that will be the cause of my own destruction. That’s why I say 
to you: ‘you have told me, I have heard you, I’m going to think about it.’” Besides this deliberate 
effort to maintain neutrality, Tounkara’s emphasis on his personal exchanges with prominent 
party members was a form of demonstrating his political importance in front of the Kitan 
members by reaffirming his position as an intermediary between Kita and Bamako. Tounkara’s 
principal political assets were those connections. 
 After describing this network of personal relations and exchanges, he talked in more 
general terms about the need to regain unity and peace [Bam. ben] in the Section in order for the 
party to win the presidential elections. He made references to the existence of conflict and 
division in the party, but attributed it to the interests and intrigues of rival parties. He said: 
 [3.1] [Bam] All the newspapers are saying that there is too much ambition in our party [too 
many people who want to become presidential candidates], and that we are not going to 
survive this problem, that we are going to split into small pieces and explode. They have 
turned the rumors into a truth [Bam. k'o ke tiñe ye], and little by little they have managed to 
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even convince party members that their words are real. The enemies of our party are using 
that, they are writing a lot in the newspapers to say that we are going to explode, that no one 
should invest money in our party, that there is nothing but caimans in this party, that we eat 
money. Shouldn't we reflect about this? We have come a long way, if we do not think about 
this, about that which people want us to become, that is what we will become; and that which 
we want to become, we are not going to achieve it. 
 Tounkara referred to the press multiple times during this meeting, often as a source of 
rumor and intrigue, and more specifically as a forum of political speculation.34 National 
newspapers, however, rarely leave Bamako. There is no single shop in Kita which sells daily 
publications, and the few people in town who enjoy reading them usually get them with some 
delay from people visiting from Bamako. I was therefore surprised by Tounkara’s reliance on the 
press and his indication that the credibility of a party and the trust of its members could be 
affected by what was said in such a restricted forum. He offered a detailed description of the 
process through which rumors become truths and produce real effects in parties. Rumors can act 
as self-fulling prophecies. According to Tounkara, newspapers, and rival parties through them, 
criticized his party, denounced its internal corruption or tendency to “eat money.”35 More 
importantly, rivals made a prediction, “it’s going to split in small pieces and explode,” and they 
urged people not “to invest their money in that party.”
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34 Between 2010 and 2011, I collected and catalogued close to three hundred newspaper articles on 
politics from five different publications. One of patterns that I traced by comparing and tagging these 
articles, was that press accounts of party politics were often centered on identifying whether a party’s or a 
politician’s popularity and power were raising or falling. Even though this was partly the case because 
parties were at the time already getting ready for the presidential elections, I was struck by the extent to 
which the content of political commentary was centered on electoral speculation. 
35 It is very common in Mali to talk about corruption as “eating money.” In French, the most common 
expression is “bouffer l’argent” which conveys lack of restrain more than simply “eating.”
 Tounkara and many other speakers after him  emphasized the strategic importance of 
unity. The only way, he said, for the party to win over the surrounding speculation that seeks to 
divide us and make us disappear, is by achieving internal cohesion, otherwise “nobody will 
obtain anything, we will all lose.” In what seemed a classic “prisoner’s dilemma” situation, he 
said: 
[3.2] [Bam] Because if we arrive to the presidential elections in this state of division, 
even if a member of this party becomes president, he will not know that the Section of 
Kita supported him, all he is going to see is that some people here were against him. [...] 
Even if the majority of us supports someone, and the minority supports someone else, if 
that minority complains and revolts, it is those complaints and insults that people are 
going to hear from far away, so he is going to think that it was the entire Section that was 
against him, not just a minority. And we will obtain nothing out of this whole thing! 
Nothing!
 
 According to Tounkara, only if there is no dissent at all can the Section’s support for a 
presidential candidate effectively translate into benefits for the Section of Kita. In other words, 
information travels and is received differently depending on its content, whether it conveys 
insults or praises. The relationship between adherence and dissent is asymmetrical; dissent even 
if it comes from a minority, will stand for the whole, whereas for adherence to count it has to be 
absolute. Tounkara presents this threat and the promise of possible post-electoral benefits as 
incentives for the members of the party Section to cooperate and suspend conflict. However, 
even though all attendants agreed nominally on the strategic importance of cooperation, they did 
not seem to believe— from what I heard and was told to me afterwards—in the sincerity of each 
other’s engagement, and assumed that no one else was going to respect such words of peace.
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Conflict-speech and Politics-speech 
 After Tounkara finished his introduction, the doyen also provided some moral guidelines 
regarding the importance of unity in the party. He made an interesting commentary about speech:  
"The waters are turbulent right now, we should not speak, let us stay quiet. Once the waters are 
calm, we will see the path clearly." During the meeting, speakers moved between the idea that a 
sufficiently exhaustive account could eventually expose the truth that everyone claimed was 
lacking and needed to bring reconciliation, on the one hand, and the fear that it was precisely the 
abundance of words that was taking them away from truth and agreement, on the other. In 
particular, attendants referred to two types of speech, political-speech [Bam. politiki-kuma], and 
conflict-speech [Bam. kele-kuma], which were partly to blame for the lack of understanding 
among attendants. 
 Robert Sidibe, who was directly involved in the most recent wave of intrigues, was the 
first one to speak after the two members of the presidium finished, and he began by alerting the 
audience that he was going to switch to "local concerns." Robert Sidibe’s speech presupposed, in 
its form and content, a chain of previous conversations and accusations having taken place 
outside the strict space of the meeting the content of which I can only try to infer. He and two 
other party members visited a number of villages without an official authorization from the Kita 
party Section disregarding the "Visits Schedule" [Fr. Plan de sorties] that the Section had 
elaborated during a previous meeting. The rest of the party members condemned strongly this 
unilateral initiative and the lack of party discipline that it reflected, but their concerns and 
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suspicion were mostly centered on the possible content of the message that Robert Sidibé and his 
companions spread in the villages. 
  In his initial speech, Sidibé tried to convince the other members, who had already heard 
of the travels, that the purpose of their visits to the villages was to "talk about the situation of the 
Section and explain to the villagers that defending the party is a good thing, but that they [the 
villagers] should stop defending particular individuals because that brings division." He assured 
the other members that they were acting for the sake of agreement and peace [Bam. ben].  He 
enhanced the veracity of his account against the background of suspicion on his declared 
intentions: 
[3.3] [Bam] I am going to cite the names of the people with whom I have talked about this 
mission to show that the path that we are taking is the path of truth [Bam. tiñe sira]. I talked 
with Sissoko in the evening of the day before yesterday, he called me, I told him where I was, 
he came to meet me and told me: "We hear that certain people are making trips to the 
villages." I said: "No, the rumors need to stop, no one is doing visits, it's me and Kamissoko, 
and we took Adama along.” 
 Robert used various tactics to authenticate his account of the events and especially of his 
own intentions, which he claimed were against factionalism. Appealing to his witnesses seemed 
to be also a form of showing that since his movements were no secret, they were not ill-
intentioned. In his statement, “the path of truth” has also a moral dimension, it does not only 
mean that his account is accurate, it also means that it rightful.36 The other rhetorical tactic he 
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36 The Bambara term tiñe can function as an adjective qualifying a statement, in which case it translates to 
English as "true" or "truthful," or as a noun, in which case it can correspond to the English term "truth," 
but in some cases also "rightfulness" in a moral sense. It can, for instance, appear in a proverb or general 
normative statement, such as "Truth and beautiful words look alike but are not the same." It also appears 
in more context dependent expressions that would translate literally as "truth is not with him," but are 
semantically closer to the English expression "he is not right." This last type of use is very common in 
disputes where people are determining which part is "right" and which part is "wrong." In that sense, tiñe 
has an epistemic dimension, it judges a statement as accurate or inaccurate; but also has a deontic or 
moral dimension, it qualifies an action or statement as right or wrong.
used was to deny the importance of political strategy altogether. Since the rumor was that they 
went to the villages to campaign for one of the presidential candidates, Robert resorted to a 
general principle about political power to remove the doubts of his fellow party members over 
his intentions: 
[3.4] [Bam] No, we are not campaigning for a candidate. He who is going to win…being 
president is part of someone's destiny [Bam. dakan]. One does not become president 
because of money, because of gold or because of knowledge, it is your destiny that makes 
you president. People are born with a particular fate. 
 
 Dictums like this one are very frequent in Kitan political meetings, they are recognizable 
because they appear as general principles, very often have an abstract subject such as “persons” 
or “humans” [Bam. ademadenw, mogow], and they also have a characteristic prosody. They 
imply a shift in “footage,” the speaker is not their source or “author,” but by animating them, he 
partakes of their authority; these dictums “leak” wisdom.37 They also tend to shift attention away 
from personal agency and the particulars of an account, and evacuate topics from the field of the 
arguable.  I identified in Robert’s speech another resource that I heard in similar occasions; it 
consists in asserting one’s independence, understood as not needing someone’s money, help, or 
recognition. Dependency and truth pull in opposite directions, as the idea of “conflict of 
interests” suggests. He said to the audience: 
[3.5] [Bam] We don't look at anyone, we are not afraid of anyone. Because if you are 
afraid of someone, or if you look at someone, that means that you are close to that person. 
No, this is our own move.
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37 I borrowed the term “leakage” in this sense from Jane Hill and Judith Irvine, who use it to describe the 
transference of responsibility from the author of a message to its animator, as the English expression 
“shoot the messenger” illustrates. In my example, the leakage works in the opposite direction, by 
animating a well-known, widely accepted truism, the speaker borrows some of that impersonal wisdom 
(Hill &Irvine, 1992: 12-13).    
 
 His speech, however, was not considered convincing or appropriate, and for the next hour 
or so, members raised their hands to condemn his actions and elucidate the truth. The first one 
was Seydou, an elderly man who spoke in a very slow, clear and imperative way. He started out 
as follows: 
[3.6] [Bam] When ones dies, one finds oneself alone in the tomb. Therefore, everything 
that you say, say it as it happened, everything that happened, tell it exactly as it happened. 
 A couple of speakers in this meeting referred to solitude as the ultimate test of mendacity, 
which is also implicit in another common expression: “It is between you and God.”  Social 
relations are defined by the fact that one can never fully know someone else, let alone 
circumvent deliberate secrecy and deceit (Simmel,1906). However, there are two entities or 
witnesses to whom that rule does not apply: God and oneself. Solitude in the above examples 
appears as the state in which those two “voices” become manifest. Another speaker said: 
[3.7] [Bam] But the truth, when a person is alone, aren’t you going to tell yourself that 
you will be in shame tomorrow for what you just said? Because that is what being human 
means [Bam. mogoya]. 
 
 Even though this statement also refers to solitude as the state in which one confronts 
one’s lies, the most painful consequence of having lied is strictly social: shame. Whereas solitude 
confronts us with our lies, social relations provide the punishment but also the incentive to lie. 
The latter is particularly true of debt— as a type of social relationship—as Robert’s statement 
that they “weren’t looking at anyone and weren’t close to anyone” suggested. The same speaker 
continued: 
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[3.8][Bam.] If you, Tounkara, do something, I’m going to tell you: “Tounkara, I don’t 
agree with you.” You don’t feed me, you don’t know how many kilograms of rice are 
cooked at my home daily, we found each other here in the party. Good morning, Good 
evening. Greetings are already something. You don’t owe me anything, I don’t owe you 
anything. We need to trust each other, everything depends on trust. People will say 
whatever [criticize you] but stay with the truth. As a person, if you live in truth, God will 
honor you, you will never be embarrassed.
! The above passage is revealing because it indicates what the ideal, most conducive 
situation for truth and agreement would look like: two men who are not otherwise related, 
symmetrically independent of each other, meet in the party. Various speakers mentioned that 
members of the party were not related in other ways, and one even complained that they were not 
inviting each other to baptisms and weddings. This point reiterates what Hopkins noted in the 
sixties, that the organization of the party and of the factions was rather open and cut across 
traditional forms of organization and distinction.
  However, even though within each party level, inside the comités or the Section, for 
instance, meetings can take place on a relatively egalitarian basis, such balance is threatened by 
the differentiated access that members have to the upper levels. This translates into differentiated 
information, influence, and resources. Party members do not interact with each other exclusively 
as individuals, but as components of larger factions or networks that do not fully correspond to 
the party. Such is the way in which the following speaker described the singularity of political 
speech, or politiki-kuma: 
[3.9] [Bam.] What we heard is that they are visiting the villages. This is politics, if you 
two go inside a room to say something, the person about whom you talked is going to 
hear what you said. Political speech cannot be hidden, political words are not secret! [...] 
Political speech [Bam. politiki-kuma] is not secret, even if you say “mh, mh” here in Kita 
someone is going to go say that to Tounkara in Bamako over there. In political speech, if 
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you cannot say something in front of a person, don’t say behind his back [...] Too many 
things were said, we need to forget all that.
 According to this statement, what is characteristic of politiki-kuma is not its form, 
content, or temporality.38 Politiki-kuma is defined by its mode of circulation and its 
inextricability from a web of social relations. “If you cannot say in front of the person, don’t say 
it at all,” which means that even when it’s private it’s public, that the entire network is your 
audience. The trouble is that it doesn’t travel just as “information,” it travels encapsulated in 
purposeful actions. These emanate from located individuals who are doing something by 
transmitting the words of another. Thus politiki-kuma accumulates “noise” and can incite conflict 
and antagonism. 
 During this meeting, I was able to locate another significant local category referring to 
speech (a meta-pragmatical category), this one was also composed of two terms “war” or 
“conflict” [Bam. kele] and “speech” [Bam. kuma]. Kele-kuma is conflict speech, not argument 
per se, but the proliferation of words and explanations that a conflict, and the attempts to redress 
it, produce. This is how one of the speakers described it:
[3.10] [Bam.] Everyone has said many things here. But to me, all those things that have 
been said, all that is conflict-speech [Bam. kele kuma] and conflict things. So, instead of 
getting all agitated by conflict words and things, let drop all that. Let’s analyze where 
the source of the conflict is and which are the solutions that we can find to end this 
conflict. The words internal to the conflict, details, there is no end to those. Now, how do 
we end this conflict? 
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38 Interestingly, the distinctiveness of political rhetoric for Aristotle was the fact that it concerned the 
future.
 If we follow this statement closely, kele-kuma, conflict-speech, appears as having exactly 
the opposite direction as politki-kuma; it is driven by the attempt to retrace what was said and 
done, follow the footsteps back to the source, locate the points of distortion, and hold individuals 
accountable for their actions. Many speakers pointed out kele-kuma is endless and fruitless, most 
of the time it does not result in lasting agreement and peace.39 The following is just one example 
of the many variations of this theme in the meeting: 
[3.11] [Bam.] What I want to say is that we always come sit down here to say that we are 
looking for agreement and peace [Bam. ben], it’s been many times already. Everyone 
says: “Yes, we want peace [Bam.ben].” But if we leave this room, peace stays here. If we 
cannot understand each other, then let’s go directly to the core of the conflict [...] Today 
we need a Section’s conference, in this conference people will tell each other the truth, 
and we will find a course of action. 
 He said “conference” in French, and it seemed that these party “conferences” are a 
known practice. Various speakers supported the idea, and even expanded on the details of the 
organization and format of such events. Interestingly, the idea was that in a “conference,” 
attendants would tell each other the truth, reach the source of the conflict, and finally create 
lasting peace and agreement. That is, the ineffectiveness of speech is to be overcome with more 
speech, but of a different kind, of the “conference” kind. Part of this forensic process was done in 
this meeting; in the following section, I will examine some aspects of the dynamics of factions 
and conflict. 
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39 A similar example came from Ndiaye, who said: “All the time we come sit here, we shake hands, hug, 
and say that the conflict is over, but as soon as we leave, peace stays here.”
Regional Publics
 The first person to respond to Robert’s speech was Seydou, the same old man we heard 
introduce his speech with a reference to the solitude of death; from a position of moral authority 
he told Robert off and disclosed his moves:  
[3.12] [Bam.] I know which places you visited. Which one was the first? You went to 
Madina, and from there you went to Koutuba. It’s true that this is politics, but let’s not lie 
to each other here. Lying it’s wrong. You know what you went for and said over there. I 
passed by the villages after you, what you said over there is between you and God, you 
know it. But you didn’t go there to say things that “sew” people together, you said things 
that divide. Keita was with you in Koutouba, and the money that you handed out, you 
know that too.
  Between hints and open accusations, Seydou managed to reconstruct a completely 
different version of what Robert and his clique did in the villages; shortly put, they incited 
conflict and gave out money. He also said that Robert and his partners were not acting 
independently; Keita, identified as the leader of one of the factions and absent in this meeting, 
was with them.  Later on, when the argument reached its most heated part, as members shouted 
to each other in disorder, it became clear that what turned their visits to the villages into such as 
serious matter was the belief that they were operating with money coming from Bamako, from 
Sekou Diakité himself, the pre-presidential candidate that Keita’s faction favored, and such 
money had not come through the Section as it should have: 
[3.13] [Bam.] Seydou: You Robert, the visits that you did, it was Sekou who gave you 
the money!
Robert: Even a cent of Sekou’s money is not in my stomach! 
Seydou: Your are a destroyer, your are the internal enemy of the party! 
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  Seydou’s accusation provides an important clue for understanding the political 
relationship between Bamako, Kita and the villages. The preemptive nature of the alleged 
monetary exchange between the Kitan faction and the villagers, which took place before the list 
of official pre-candidates was even official, exposes the peculiar temporality of electoral 
democracy. Hopkins refers the existence in 1964 of a hierarchical relationship parallel to the 
party, but nevertheless important in the production of political prestige and factionalism, which 
brought together petitioners, brokers, and grantors. “Petitioners” were either peasants or 
townsmen who needed a favor, “brokers” were Kitans with access to someone in a position of 
power, and “grantors” were for the most part people in administrative positions. “Petitioners” 
considered “brokers” as friends but were not reciprocated; according to Hopkins, “brokers” did 
not obtain any benefit from their intermediation other than popularity, and since this was a 
“network for dispensing favors rather than for distributed resources” it was loosely structured. 
Hopkins contrasts the functioning of this triad with the late colonial relationship between 
merchants and peasants, which was based on credit, was longer lasting, and was mutually 
recognized as friendship [Bam. teriya] [Hopkins, p.144-145]. 
 In my example, we see yet a different type of exchange between Kitans and the villagers. 
Rather than petitioners, brokers, and grantors, I will talk about “investors,” “recruiters,” and 
“recipients.” Sekou Diakité would work here as “investor,” the Kitan “conspirators” could be 
considered as “recruiters,” and the villagers were the “recipients.” Insofar as this exchange 
places debt on the side of the villagers—although it is not evident that its understood as such—its 
resembles more the “peasant-merchant” relationship, than to that of “petitioners” and “brokers.” 
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 There are at least three distinct phases in this cycle of exchange. First, the party’s internal 
process of assigning candidacies, then the external or popular campaigns and elections, and 
finally the potential occupation of posts. As we saw with Robert and his clique, top-down 
distribution within the party builds up right before the assignation of candidacies; it reaches its 
highest point and spills over to non-party members during the campaign, and, if the candidate is 
elected, distribution fades out as a generalized form and becomes limited to the “investors,” 
whom at this point need to recover their investments and perhaps make some profit.
 This suggests that there is a mismatch between the temporality of monetary exchanges 
and the temporality of campaign speeches in Malian electoral democracy and perhaps in other 
places too. Before and during campaigns, as a candidate is recruiting support on his way to 
power, the “distributive” logic is at is peak. Once the candidate reaches power, the more certain, 
generalized, and rather inconsequent, form distribution has already taken place; and what takes 
over is “reciprocal exchange,” in the sense that he will now be concerned with returning to the 
“investors” what they spent.40 However, campaign speeches place the reward in the future, they 
request people’s votes by promising something, and those promises are rarely fulfilled, which in 
turn creates a cycle of illusion and disappointment. In other words, electoral democracy is 
cyclical, and it cyclically evokes transcendence.
 This exchange pattern could also indicate that there is a built-in “incentive” for the 
proliferation of parties, factions and even conflict more broadly, since it seems that competition 
among factions fosters the availability and distribution of resources. This is what Tounkara, who 
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40 I am using these terms in the sense that Marshall Sahlins gave to them in his classic comparison of 
“chiefs” and “big-men” (Sahlins, 1963). 
presided over the meeting and made the initial introduction, told party members in his second 
intervention, as a response to the conflict that emerged: 
[3.14][Bam.]  Stirring things up, setting people against each other, don’t you know that 
there are people who gain something from this? Because they’ll ask for something 
[money] to be on your side, you give them something, and then they go to the other side 
ask for something as well. How could this end? 
 So far we have seen that conflict and factionalism, as well as suspicion and lack of 
agreement more broadly, are linked to how political-speech spreads through a myriad of 
purposeful actions and to the temporal cycle of exchange in electoral democracy. Political 
conflict in Kita is also inseparable from the regional configuration of party publics that I 
described at the beginning of this chapter. By regional configuration I mean the spatial mapping 
of relatively overlapping networks formed by the movement of people, words, money, and 
commands, as well as the complex power differential embedded in such distribution. The formal 
organizational chart is only one element among others in the creation of hierarchy. As we will 
see, age, charisma, money, and personal connections are also important generators of difference. 
Moreover, this spatial distribution, and the tendency for the various scales of political activity to 
merge with each other, has not reduced the importance of older ideas about the relationship 
between the town [Bam. dugu] and “the bush” [Bam.wulakono], which anthropologists have 
documented extensively (Bagayoko, 1989). 
  During this meeting, speakers constantly moved the center or the source of the conflict 
from Kita to either the villages or Bamako. Tounkara, for instance, after saying that there are 
people who profit from division, said that villagers were at least partly to blame: 
[3.15] [Bam.] People from the communes, it’s them who are stirring everything up. They 
leave the communes to come here and say that Sissoko visited them, and that he said this 
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and said that. [...] The other day, they came to tell me that when Iba had his event here in 
Kita, only my praises were being played on the sound system, and that the others ran to 
ask them to remove my praises [Laughter in the audience]. 
 People laughed at this comment because it conveyed a slightly condescending image of 
the villagers as ignorant intriguers concerned with matters of supposedly superfluous importance, 
such as genealogical praises. However, aside from this patronizing attitude from a local politician 
settled in Bamako, what is interesting in Tounkara’s point is that the villagers were not only 
passive receptors of Kita’s factionalism but active participants willing to pay the cost of 
transportation to come to Kita and convey someone’s words. In fact, among those present in this 
meeting, there was a party member from one of the rural communes that Robert and his clique 
visited; this is an example of the simultaneous participation at various party levels that I 
mentioned in the first part of this chapter. He said: 
[3.16] [Bam] These trips to the communes are “travail fractionel” [original French] which 
is not allowed. Let’s avoid it. Take the example of my commune, the evening you left the 
commune, people came to see me and give me the full account of everything that was 
said. According to the account they gave me, your words were not words that bring 
peace. Moreover, I am one of the Party leaders at Sinfo, you should have come to see me. 
The people you talked to are not even members of our party. They came to tell me 
everything you said, and if they are telling the truth...then, you are just playing with the 
party! 
 This statement confirms that having access to information is one of the main components 
of a politician’s standing. Party members compete to be “insiders.” Having access to various 
relatively secluded publics, receiving information personally, either in face-to-face interactions 
or through cell phone calls, and knowing as many people as possible are all crucial components 
of the economy of political prestige. Additionally, this statement also suggests a rather cohesive 
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communication at the level of the village, in this case Sinfo, which is not easily disrupted by 
Kitan factionalism. Not only was it embarrassing for the “conspirators” to address the wrong 
people in the village, but to make matters worse, those villagers did not keep the “secrets” of the 
Kitan “conspirators,” but conveyed everything to the leader of the party in the locality when the 
“conspirators” left. Interactions like this one with the villagers prompted another speaker, 
N’diaye, to suggest that in the context of conflict and factionalism, the only safeguard against 
suspicion is traveling together and witnessing each other’s words: 
[3.17] [Bam.] I think that if you go out to visit the communes, you should inform each 
other. You should even mix in people from different factions on purpose, if you are going 
somewhere, take people from the other faction along, that way everyone will know what 
you said. Otherwise, even if people say that you went there to talk about murder, that 
shouldn’t surprise you because you went there alone! 
 
 N’diaye’s suggests a technique of “suspicion management” which relies on direct 
witnessing, left as the only reliable way to circumvent generalized mistrust and reported speech 
distortions.41 No matter how interconnected Kita and the villages might be, being outside the 
physical boundaries of the town, especially in “the bush,” reduces the accountability of Kitans. 
N’diaye almost implies there are no witnesses whatsoever in the communes: if the rumor says 
that you talked about murder, there wouldn’t be a form to prove such a rumor wrong. The 
difficulty in controlling and surveying peoples’ movements and words in the rural areas 
prompted some speakers to suggest that all visits to villages should stop until the conflict among 
the factions of Kita was not solved, because in the context of conflict and division everything 
becomes suspicious. If nothing else, this debate about the trips to the communes proves the 
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41 I found a very similar technique of suspicion management in the organization of drug-trafficking in the 
Mexico-US border.  
importance that politicians in Kita, and even in Bamako, assign to their anchorage in the rural 
areas.  
 Other speakers in this meeting were more concerned with the other end of the rope, and 
blamed the local conflict among factions on the doings of the Bamako party cadres, who were 
using Kitans as their “marionettes.” An older man who has been in the party since the early 
nineties said: 
[3.18] [Bam.] Tendenci, tendenci, tendenci, all these tendenciw are based in Bamako, the 
other tendenci is also based in Bamako.
 Towards the second part of the meeting, Tounkara and other speakers who had access to 
information from the capital, gave new hints that confirmed the involvement of the Bamako 
party cadres, particularly two of the presidential pre-candidates, in the Kitan conflict. Shortly 
put, the larger sums of money come from Bamako, either as part of the official budget to fund 
campaigns, “party money,” or as a candidate’s own contribution to their campaigns, “investors’ 
money.”  An interesting example of how this works came up. One of the presidential pre-
candidates, Sekou Diakité, offered to fund an event in Kita and he asked Moseré, the Secreatry 
General of the Section of Kita, whom he met at a workshop in Bamako, to go back to Kita and 
meet with the Section to prepare a budget for this event. Moseré called for a meeting in Kita to 
prepare the budget; the faction led by Keita, that I identified earlier as “the conspirators,” did not 
attend the meeting. Nevertheless, the budget was written in their absence, and when Moseré went 
to Bamako to give the budget to Sekou Diakité, he responded in the following way, according to 
one account:  
[3.19] [Bam.] Moseré took the budget from here to Bamako. Which was Sekou’s first 
question? “Moseré, were my people present in the meeting that prepared this budget?” 
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Moseré asked: “Who?” Sekou said: “the Keitas.42” He named Keita by name! He said: 
“Were Keita’s people in the meeting?” They weren’t so that’s is why he didn’t release the 
money. 
 This suggests that there are attempts to limit Kitan politics to the town, or as Hopkins 
would say, to make the political arena coincide with the socials boundaries of the town; even so, 
often loyalty, trust, and social ties were stronger within regional networks, linking different 
levels together, than at the interior of each level. Interestingly, it might be the case that Kitan 
identity, defined not by place of residence but by genealogy, was at play in this example, because 
Sekou Diakité, although he lives in Bamako, is considered “a son of Kita” and Keita belongs also 
to one of the four original families, unlike Sissoko, of the opposite faction, who lives in Kita but 
is treated as “newcomer.” It is significant that Sekou’s question is whether his people were 
present in the meeting; since voting is avoided in most local meetings, someone’s presence in a 
meeting is enough to know that he participated in some kind of consensual decision-making 
process. 
 This is another theme common to these examples, the great importance accorded to face-
to-face conversations and meetings, either in the “the bush” or in Bamako. Face-to-face 
discussions are seen as the only way to rebuild mutual trust among the members of the Section of 
Kita, as someone said: “If we all come to the meetings we will understand each other.” This plea 
for attendance to the meetings was a recurrent one during this meeting. It is significant that the 
strategy of one of the factions was to not attend meetings at all, so that even though Keita lives in 
Kita, the relationship with him is also mediated by reported speech, as with the people in the 
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42 Using the leader’s name in plural to name the entire faction is a practice that Hopkins noticed too: “The 
most striking symbol of the existence of a faction was it had a name. Kita’s factions were referred to as if 
they had a single individual at their head. They were called for instance “Mamadou’s people” or “Sylla’s 
people,” after their presumed leaders” (Hopkins, 1972: 145). 
communes and in Bamako. The following statement reveals the environment of generalized 
suspicion:  
[3.20] [Bam.] Let’s tell each other the truth, Keita does not come to the meetings, but 
there are “elements” who come here to obtain information and who would do anything to 
destroy the party. We don’t tell each other the truth in our face.
 
 Keita was absent from this meeting, as he had been from most of the previous ones; 
unsurprisingly, he was also the only person who did not agree to give me an interview. Keita has 
a long political career, one that did not begin with the “transition to democracy,” as he appears in 
the lists of communal Council members from the eighties. Since 1991, he has been a member of 
two parties, he was elected mayor by one, and then moved with his people to another one and 
then managed to get elected as President of the Cercle Council. His participation in party politics 
is clearly driven by the competition for electoral posts, rather than commitment to a party. In the 
next section, we will see how these different interests and political roles figure in Kitan 
democratic politics. 
The feeders and the fed
 There was an older man sitting at the back of the room who stood up to describe the 
genealogy of the conflict; he had been a member of the party since the very beginning and 
donated the first party headquarters. He gave some important clues for the interpretation of 
conflict: 
[3.21] [Bam] If we stopped disrespecting each other here, there would be no need to go 
follow people in other places [Bamako]. We were together during the clandestine 
struggle [original in French] before the party was created. I met many of the people 
present here during the clandestine struggle. [...] Of those who created this party in 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994, there is only five present here: Madou Diarra, Soriba Cisse, Sissoko, 
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Mamadou Kamissoko, and Lasi. That is an incontestable truth [original in French], there 
is no question, it was them who started. 
 He resorted to a form of authority that emanates from the foundational act, in this case 
the foundation of the party, very similar in principle to the authority of Kita’s four original 
families, as we saw in Chapter 1. The dignity of the “founding fathers” is here emphasized by the 
hardships of the clandestine struggle, and the original personal sacrifices that the foundation of 
the party required.43 He went on to explain that there are two “source conflicts” behind all the 
“noise.” The first conflict involves Sissoko and Tounkara, and it was triggered by their 
competition over the presidency of the Kita party Section and a candidacy the National 
Assembly; the other conflict involves Sissoko and Keita, and it emerged over the competition for 
the presidency of the Conseil de Cercle. We will examine these conflicts in more detail at the 
light of the interpretation that this man provided:
[3.22] [Bam.] Let’s be clear, the party exists, it feeds some people, and some people feed 
the party. We need to remember that the person who is here and feeds the party has a 
particular dignity [Bam. horonya]. If he does not receive the respect that he deserves, 
there will be conflict. None of the persons I cited because they are in conflict today could 
promptly solve a 10, 000 CFA problem for the party in 1991-1992. Not even one could 
pay 10,000 CFA, they didn’t have houses nor wives. [Laugther] We need to say it, it’s 
true. 
 
 This is one of the most revealing passages in this meeting, and it brings us back to the 
cycles of exchange in electoral democracy. From the rest of his speech, it became clear that those 
“who feed the party” are those who invest in it, not only for the sake of their own popularity, but 
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43 This mention of the clandestine struggle is interesting because it may point at the existence of a trust 
network in Tilly’s sense during an earlier time. Also, the risks of clandestine political struggle usually 
promote the creation of trust networks of dissidents that protect each other, which did not survive once 
political parties were not only allowed but promoted (Tilly, 2005)
for the party itself, by, for instance, building the party headquarters. Conversely, those “who are 
fed” are those who occupy electoral posts, and specially those who are thought to have become 
rich as a result of their political career; those who had neither “houses nor wives” in 1991 and are 
now rich. The difference between feeding and being fed is not only determined by the amount of 
money each person has given, but by the gap between what he has given and what he has 
received. In other words, the feeders are those to whom “the party” owes something. He says that 
“the feeders” need to be respected, and when they are not, there is conflict.44 Interestingly, both 
of these types, “the feeders” and “the fed,” enjoy a particular form of social prestige but in 
different arenas; the prestige of the feeders is internal to the party, whereas the prestige of the fed 
is popular, external to the party, as electoral success and power. Here is the interesting part: the 
“fed” are constantly trying to assert themselves as “feeders,” and the “feeders” want to be fed but 
cannot say so without loosing merit. As the different personalities present in this meetings spoke, 
and in the interviews I had with some of them, it became that this was the main criterion against 
which they were measuring each other. 
 One of the names the old man mentioned, indeed the name that was mentioned the largest 
number of times during this meeting, was Sissoko, who requires a longer introduction. Sissoko is 
recognized by other members in the Section of Kita as a charismatic figure and a skillful 
politician. He is tall and holds himself with an arrogance that forces people around him to admire 
him; he also likes to brag about his wealth. When the old man said that no one in 1991 could 
give out 10,000 CFA to solve a problem, Sissoko jumped in his seat and shouted: “In 1991, I 
already had a 7 million business! We haven’t reached the point of insulting each other yet!” 
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44 The Bambara word that he used is horonya, which is often translated as “freedom,” “independence,” or 
nobility. It refers to the status of not being slave or member of a caste, but it was also used to talk about 
national independence. It is interesting that the same term is used here to refer to the party sponsors.  
Sissoko was born in Bafoulabé, also in the region of Kayes, and he moved to Kita because his 
father was teacher who came to work in town. He is still considered a “foreigner” and his local 
adversaries, politicians like Tounkara and Keita who are members of the four families, do not let 
his foreign origin pass unnoticed. 
 Besides being charismatic, foreigner, and rich, Sissoko has the self-made, entrepreneurial 
pride of successful traders. He told me that in the 1970s when he finished school, family 
relations offered him a position as a public servant, but he did not like “to wake up every 
morning to go to an office,” and he did not like the UDPM regime either. That is why he decided 
to leave Kita in search of fortune, or aller à l’aventure, as they say in Mali. He travelled all over 
West Africa, and began to trade, first perfumes from Nigeria, and then salt and cereal between 
Senegal and Mali; he bought two trucks and settled back in Kita in the late 1980s. “I was single 
and rich,” he told me, and so “I could give money out to the youth;” and that is how he got 
involved in the clandestine struggle to overthrown Moussa Traore, mobilizing the youth and 
participating in public agitation. He gave me another interesting detail, he had one of the few 
private phone lines in Kita in 1990, and received all the subversive instructions from Bamako 
through that number, which he remembered and dictated to me. After the transition to 
democracy, he built his political career in the Youth Section of the party; he climbed the entire 
ladder of the party hierarchies, reaching the national level, but always in the parallel structure of 
the Youth. Finally, he began to obtain candidacies and occupy posts. He had been communal 
councilor twice, and was President of the Cercle Council from 2004-2009. 
 The fact that he was a regional trader is not trivial, it means that he travelled constantly 
and had clients everywhere; he told me that his political base was in the bush. When the 
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suggestion to cancel all visits to the communes until the conflict was solved came up in the 
meeting, he reacted: 
[3.23] [Bam.] Hey! Hold on, concerning the visits to the communes, I don’t do official 
visits, you shouldn’t mix my own work with the work of the party. I plant fruit trees and 
right now is the season, I have trees in all the corners of the cercle, and every time I go 
see a plantation, I have to go greet the secretary general of the communal party comité. I 
cannot stop my work because of the party, and what do you want? You want me to go to 
the communes and not greet? 
 Whereas Robert received public reprobation for his visits to the communes, Sissoko 
could tour the entire cercle with “diplomatic immunity.” Physical movement is inseparable from 
his political success, which he explained to me in very frank terms: “If I visit someone in the 
bush, I eat from their dirty dishes; if they come see me, I’ll invite them to sit at the table with me; 
if he has an ill kin at the hospital, I pay the bill and keep going my way, if they invite me to a 
baptism, I go and leave something, the same for funerals, and weddings. Serving people is the 
secret of politics.” In the same casual way, he tells me about his work at the party and presents 
himself also as a feeder: “I come to the party with millions, I leave with nothing, this a pleasure 
[hobby] for me.” For him, the difference between him and his rivals is that he does not need 
politics to support himself, he looses money in politics.  
   Of all the politicians I interviewed in Kita and Bamako, it was Sissoko who transmitted 
to me in the most striking way the passion of politics. I do not mean the redemptive passion of 
politics as means to transform social reality that I found among the young radicals from Bamako, 
but the passion of politics as the search for name and glory. Sissoko alluded casually to the joy of 
social popularity, making it sound like a secondary thing, but he talked excitedly and openly 
about the joy of rivalry, the joy of “war,” as he called it; “that is my problem, once I start a 
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combat, I’ll never drop it.” “I have two enemies who have searched my death: Keita and 
Tounkara,” he said. Of these two, it was the conflict with Tounkara that meant the most for him; 
“I have told my son and my wives to never like Tounkara or any of his kins. We are sworn 
enemies, and we shall remain so.” 
 The conflict between Tounkara and Sissoko started around 2007: Sissoko was President 
of the Cercle Council and wanted to run for the National Assembly in the legislative elections of 
that year. Tounkara told him not to run for that post, and supposedly turned the Bamako elites 
against Sissoko. A few years later they confronted each other again over the constitution of the 
Section’s bureau. Sissoko said that the source of the conflict was envy: Tounkara and Keita are 
members of the four Kitan families, “they can’t stand to see a foreigner figure above them on an 
electoral list.” According to Sissoko, it doesn’t matter in which party each faction is, enmity goes 
beyond partisan competition. “For them—he told me—it’s very easy: Sissoko is too strong, 
Sissoko needs to fall, Sissoko needs to fall.” Therefore, Sissoko refuses to drink or eat anything 
his rivals have touched, he notices that they throw little pouches and bundles with “medicine” 
inside his car to kill him, and that they attach thin threads across his house’s gate for him to break 
them as he goes out in the morning and die. When the Section was meeting to set up the new 
bureau, Sissoko told me, Tounkara brought four fetishists from Kolokani: “I saw them at the 
party headquarters—he told me—I shook their hands and kept going. I know how to protect 
myself too.” “You see—he concludes—I’m alive thanks to God and the benedictions of my 
mother.”
 As Hopkins noticed in the sixties, compared to the passion of these personal rivalries, 
parties, State, posts, money, all seem secondary means to attend the ultimate end, which is 
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victory over one’s rivals. This, however, does not prevent anyone from conducting the day to day  
of business-as-usual politics. In the meeting I attended, Keita was absent, but Sissoko was sitting 
in the back rows, and Tounkara, as we saw, presided the meeting, and both talked about the 
importance of loving the party, and loving Kita. 
 After the old man brought up that the source of all conflict and “noise” was the 
competition between those three men, none of which could call himself a real “feeder,” Tounkara 
spoke to make his own apology. He spoke without loosing his calm, as if he did not care. He 
reminded the audience that he had contributed to Sissoko’s campaign:
[3.24] [Bam.] If it is not true that my money completed the party’s money to fund 
Sissoko’s campaign, may God deny me everything that I seek in this life. I wanted your 
happiness [to Sissoko], it was you who decided to humiliate me in my father’s home. 
 He kept going with the same conciliatory tone and even complimented Sissoko’s 
charisma and admitted his own lack of it: 
[3.25] [Bam.] Because the things that Sissoko can get done in politics, no one else can get 
them done. The way in which he can please people, his charisma [Bam. kolandi]...If I 
decide to run for the National Assembly, I will loose...
 Of course his modesty and monetary contributions to Sissoko’s campaign accounted for 
his own prestige. Tounkara, like everyone else, emphasized the fact that the party had not “done 
anything for him,” and “had not giving him anything.” “It’s me—he said—who has contributed 
to the party when I have had something.” His position and engagement with politics is different 
from that of Sissoko; the force of the latter is in “the bush,” where people like him and owe him 
money and favors, Tounkara’s strength resides in the capital, where he has access to the highest 
party cadres. This is how he described his personal situation to the attendants of the meeting: 
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[3.26] [Bam.] I’m satisfied with myself, because I am not looking for a political post, I’m 
not looking for the presidency, I will not be representative at the National Assembly. 
Those who wish to do so, can pull me to their side, me and my followers will vote for 
you, you are going to win. Those who don’t want to do so, those who want to be in 
conflict with me, it’s they who loose. I don’t loose anything! How can someone who is 
not after something loose? 
 
 Of those present in the meeting, he is the one that fits most closely the definition of a 
“broker,” although not exactly in Hopkins’ sense as those who obtain favors for people. Tounkara 
offered to transform money into votes, and votes into money. His main assets were his 
connections which translate into influence and information, by moving between Bamako and 
Kita, he could see a larger picture of the political machinery. He had access to multiple, semi-
secluded circuits, and part of his trade was to keep information expensive, that is, to maintain its 
scarcity. His case illustrated a different aspect of electoral democracy and party politics, the 
question is, if he was not running for an electoral post, what drove his participation in politics? It 
seems that Tounkara benefitted from the party itself, rather than from the State as those who 
occupy posts, through the funds that either “the party” or particular politicians “invest” in 
campaigns. We could say that he charged a sort commission for turning that investment into 
votes. During the meeting, he talked with the same casual tone about how difficult it was to 
account for campaign money with precision, he said: 
[3.27] [Bam.] In politics, you know that someone works very hard, his wife has a 
problem, and you know that he is one of the best party members. If he comes to see you, 
to tell you that his wife is sick, and you give him 30,000 CFA, isn’t it true that you are 
going to give them to him? 
 Tounkara mediated the distribution of money coming from Bamako, and made sure that 
the hard work of party members was rewarded when they most needed it. Benefiting primarily 
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from campaign money means that his main target was to have the party win as many posts as 
possible, because official and personal campaign funds depend on such success. Tounkara, unlike 
Sissoko and those centered on personal social prestige, had an interest in supporting the 
candidates that had the most chances of winning over his own ambition for electoral success. 
This dilemma is not exclusive to Tounkara; the same tension between internal party merit and 
external popularity emerges at each level at the moment of distributing candidacies, the choice is: 
who deserves a candidacy versus who can make the party win.45 The fact that Tounkara was at 
the moment more invested in the party’s electoral success than in his own allowed him to appear 
as neutral. 
 Tounkara turned this position into an indication of his capacity to say the truth. “If you 
see that I can say everything, and that I can say the truth, it’s because I’m not after anyone’s 
vote,” he said; to which someone jokingly replied: “You also are after a post.” To Oumou’s and 
my surprise, and in apparent contradiction with what he had just said, he answered affirmatively: 
“Yes, obviously, if because of the truths that I say, you decide to vote for me, then that will make 
me happy. Because there is nothing wrong with that.” Here the serpent bites its tail: he can say 
the truth because he doesn’t want people’s votes, but if he could change such truth for votes, that 
would make him happy. 
 Unsurprisingly, the meeting ended without a resolution, without truth, and without peace. 
A couple of times during the discussion, speakers mentioned explicitly the relationship between 
those two terms: “If we don’t say the truth, there cannot be peace.” The question then becomes: 
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45 Roughly at the same time this meeting in Kita took place, a similar debate was going on at the national 
level over the possible presidential candidacy of Diouncounda Traore. The argument was that 
Diouncounda deserved to be a presidential candidate as a reward to his work for the party, but that given 
his lack of charisma, which was agreed upon by all commentators, he was a risky choice for the ADEMA 
in electoral terms. 
Who can say the truth? What grounds such truth? If it is by definition impossible to account for 
everything that was said as conflict-speech [Bam. kele-kuma], the only way of establishing the 
truth is performative, and thus it requires a subject capable of emitting the felicitous speech act 
that would establish such truth. From what we saw in this meeting, it seems that such subject 
would have be able to present himself as a genuine and absolute “feeder,” which does not refer to 
the person who has given the most, but to the person who not seeking to be “fed.” While no one 
managed to occupy such position and enunciate the truth, conflict continued. The meeting 
dissolved into shouts and accusations, people left scattered and upset, and the last one to speak 
was the doyen: 
[3.28] [Bam.] Tounkara, I want to say an elder’s word. Why did our elders use to say 
every morning that you should go greet everyone? Because, if you greet someone every 
morning, even if there is conflict between you two, it’s going to end. 
 The doyen’s advice is similar to Pascal’s argument about the search of God in which 
prayer precedes faith. Greet each other and peace will follow, without the need to establish the 
final truth about all past words and deeds. This argument also obviates sincerity, because 
greetings can effectively produce reconciliation regardless of the internal thoughts and emotions 
of the actors.   
 In this chapter conflict and mistrust related to the spatial configuration of democratic 
politics and its cycles of exchange and distribution. Competition for posts and resources led party  
members to accuse each other of lying and conspiring. Stopping the chain of accusations requires 
a subject who can authenticate the claim of “no seeking anything.” Kitan politicians compete to 
give the most and receive the least, at the same time, they pursue their own (economic) interests 
and assume everyone else to do the same. Party meetings are about the past: defining who said 
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what to whom, and how much money has each person given. They are also about the future: 
discerning what are the intentions of factions leaders, and speculating on the potential electoral 
success of members.  
  In the next chapter, I will follow politicians to the National Assembly. There, conflict and 
intrigue are not as visible; no one talks passionately about political rivalry. Parliamentary debates 
do not deviate from the script; the adoption of new national laws is carried out in an environment 
of consensus and agreement. Nevertheless, national representatives confront a similar difficulty 
in authenticating their speech. In this case, it is not their fellow assembly members who accuse 
them of lying and conspiring; but the general, anonymous public which dismisses their words as 
empty and inconsequential. I argue that in Mali the statement that politicians lie refers to 
something very specific: the inconsistency between words and actions. This denunciation of 
political mendacity is only secondarily concerned with other forms of deceit, misrepresentation 




The National Assembly of Mali stands right in the middle of the big market in downtown 
Bamako, facing the central mosque. One must navigate across an ocean of people, stands, 
motorbikes and cars to reach a gate guarded by half a dozen soldiers who open it every time a 
deputy’s 4WD vehicle approaches. They also demand identifications, reasons and registration 
from all non-regular visitors; a written permission to enter the Assembly or a call from someone 
inside are often needed to smooth the admission process. Most administrative staff—close to a 
hundred people working as secretaries, archivists, librarians, escorts, transcribers, legal advisors 
and so on—check in at 9.00 a.m. and leave around 4.00 p.m. Amongst the regulars there are also 
a couple of vendors, a Fulani lady who comes in twice a week to sell fresh and curdled milk to 
the administrative staff, and a child who brings big bowls of rice and peanut sauce from a nearby 
food stand. The contrast between life inside and outside the gates is acute; the parliament stands 
like an island of somnolence, air conditioning, dusty archives, and administrative routines in the 
middle of the noisy and bustling central market.  
 Malian parliamentary debates have a very limited audience. Sessions are by law open to 
the public, but one usually finds only a few journalists sitting on the back rows of the 
parliamentary hall reserved for the general public. Even the press attends only during important 
ceremonies such as the openings and closings of parliamentary seasons, or when the agenda 
includes one of the few issues that attract public attention. ORTM, the national television 
network, sometimes broadcasts parliamentary debates, but during the time I was in Mali I saw 
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very few TVs tuned in to the debates. Even the Assembly staff seems indifferent to parliamentary 
debates. The podium’s microphone is connected to speakers both inside and outside the main 
hall, so that the voices of the national representatives are heard from each corridor and corner of 
the building during the debates. However, no one outside the hall seems to care: “What for? It’s 
only lies. It all stays on paper.” A pun circulates the halls of the assembly which consists of 
changing the French word parlementaire to the neologism parle-menteur—which would translate 
to English as “speaker-liar.” 
 The term “parle-menteur” illustrates a widespread belief in Mali: that politicians lie. This 
belief is common to many different publics all over the world, but the relationship between 
politics and lying takes on diverse forms. It can refer to propaganda, to State secrecy,46 to the 
embezzlement of public funds, or to thorny secrets in politicians’ private lives, to mention just a 
few possibilities. The explanation I received the most often in Mali was that politicians are liars 
because they do not fulfill their promises. Interestingly, this affirmation places the emphasis not 
on the untruthful nature of their words, but in the relationship between present verbal 
engagements or commissions and future actions. 
 I will follow Anscombe’s classic work on the matter to examine this definition of 
mendacity as a question of intentions. Anscombe offers a helpful distinction between 
“expressions of intention for the future,” “intentional action,” and “intentions in acting.” 
Promises are a (binding) type of “expressions of intention” to act in the future. Most of my uses 
of the term “intention” will fall within the category of “expressions of intention,” which, as 
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46 This is, for instance, the kind of lying that Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the Pentagon Papers addresses 
(Arendt, 1972). The argument that issues concerning the survival of a Sate should be kept secret is a 
prominent one in the history of Western political thought, condensed in the term arcana imperii. In fact, 
what stands out as an oddity is the ideology of transparency, or the belief that it is possible for a 
government and its citizens share all information. 
Anscombe argues, are grammatically very close to predictions and commands. However, in the 
last section of this chapter, I will also examine an example in which a deputy and a minister 
engage in an exegesis of governmental “intentions in acting.” I should clarify from the outset that  
the object of my analysis is not intentions per se, which are elusive if not absolutely ungraspable, 
but the production of signs around them, and more specifically, the ways in which different 
political styles secure expressions of intention (Anscombe, 1957).
  The lack of correspondence between words and actions that Malians see in politicians can 
be divided into three theoretical possibilities. First, a politician can make a promise without the 
intention of fulfilling it and with the strict purpose of gaining popular support or of pleasing his 
audience; this possibility is the closest to a lie, understood here as a false representation of one’s 
real intentions.47 Second, a politician can make a “sincere promise” and change his mind 
afterwards; in this case, saying that he is unreliable and untrustworthy would be more precise 
than saying that he is a liar. Third, a politician can make a “sincere promise” and keep it, but be 
incapable of actualizing it, in which case, we can say that he is powerless. These three 
possibilities are present in the ways in which the relationship between politics and lying figures 
in Mali. 
 The first type, false promises, is characteristic of campaign speeches but has come to stand 
for political speech as a whole, partly because multiparty democracy fosters the proliferations of 
electoral promises. Interestingly, journalists and other local commentators in Mali have noticed 
that politicians make campaign promises that have no relation to the faculties of the posts they 
are aspiring to occupy; a candidate for the National Assembly, for example, may promise the 
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47 Anscombe talks about the analytical independence of lying about present intention and the fulfillment 
of those intentions in the future: “I might even be lying in saying I was going to do something, though 
afterwards did it” (G. E. M. Anscombe, 1957: 4). 
electorate to build classrooms in a village.48 This fact tells us that promising to do a good job as 
representative—promising to convey local concerns and opinions to the national government, for 
instance—is not enough for a deputy to gain popular support. Representatives cannot offer the 
results of their work as legislators to their constituents in exchange for their support. False 
expressions of intention are in practice identical to the second analytical type, shifting intentions, 
with the difference that the latter are associated with a different type character flaw: 
opportunism. This flaw is often attributed in Mali to politicians who do not have the financial 
independence that would allow them to keep their engagements in the volatile game of 
interpersonal interests. 
 The third type, that is, the institutional incapacity to fulfill a promise or put a law into 
effect, is the one that is most systematically misrecognized. In democracies sustained by strong 
Sates, the adoption of new legislation sometimes requires intense negotiations and gets defined at  
the end by a small difference in the number of votes at the parliament. The intensity of such 
negotiations, however, is not due to a natural inclination for debate or an essentially “plural 
political culture.” It is at least partly the effect of the administrative capacity of a strong State to 
put the text of legislation into effect, causing benefits and disadvantages for different social 
groups. Accordingly, the debates at the National Assembly of Mali are often uninteresting for 
most of the population, and sometimes even for deputies themselves, not because of some 
ancestral “culture of consensus,” but because their effects are unlikely to be realized or 
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48 Ali Cissé makes a good description of this practice: “Une bizarrerie de ces campagnes c’est que les 
promesses des candidats se ressemblent quel que soit les poste électif convoité. Celles ou ceux qui 
ambitionnent d'être président de la République, député a l’Assemblée Nationale, ou conseiller communal 
jurent tous de promouvoir l’autosuffisance alimentaire, de construire des routes, des écoles, des centres de 
santé, de donner le travail aux jeunes, de garantir la sécurité des villes, de d’améliorer le cadre de vie des 
populations etc..” (Cissé, 2006, p. 68). 
perceived, given the small administrative capacity of the State. That is why the affirmation that 
deputies are liars often comes with the sentence “it all stays in paper.”49
     The difficulty in turning speech into action that has led to representatives’ reputations as 
“parle-menteurs” is partly structural. It is due to the separation of the “executive” and 
“legislative” powers and especially to the reduced administrative capacity of the Malian State. 
However, I argue in this chapter that such structural difficulty is often misrecognized and 
interpreted as politicians’ lack of personal commitment or lack of intention. Malian political 
debates do not pay much attention to the private life and inner feelings of politicians as, for 
instance, American media do.50 Although the Malian press, especially the radio, is critical to the 
point of insulting politicians on their personal ways, it does not ventilate thorny issues about 
politicians’ domestic life.  I did not hear many references to sincerity, understood as a 
correspondence between politician’s emotions or feelings and their words either. However, there 
is a strong emphasis on politicians’ personal worth understood as trustworthiness and reliability, 
and, as I claim above, on the correspondence between present spoken engagements and future 
action. 
 In this chapter I will first describe the material process involved in a parliamentary debate, 
from the elaboration of reports inside the commissions to the transcription and archiving of 
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49 The debate on the Family Code presents an interesting case because its importance seemed to have 
been mostly symbolic. The Malian State does not have the capacity to enforce either female obedience or 
spouses’ mutual respect, whatever the law established in this respect mattered little for the everyday 
organization of domestic life. However, it seemed that beyond the question of its applicability, it was 
ideologically crucial not to affirm gender equality within marriage. Most law projects do not have the 
same symbolic importance, but face a similar difficulty in their applicability.
50 In The Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, and Democratic Judgement, Elizabeth Markovits 
gives an interesting list of examples of this obsession with politicians’ inner feelings in contemporary 
America. She recalls the controversy set off in 2004 over the fact that Donald Rumsfeld “had used an 
‘autopen’ to sign the condolence letters to the families’ of the soldiers died in Iraq” (Markovits, 
2008:169). 
debates. I argue that parliamentary debates’ main addressee, if we can call it so, is bureaucratic 
routine itself, the impersonal continuity of forms; this process is concerned with signs but 
obviates the question of intention. In the second section, I will suggest some elements for an 
idealized typology of political persona present in the Malian parliament. In each on of these ideal 
types— “intellectuals,” “technocrats,” and “big men”—the relationship between political speech 
and personhood is defined in different ways. I argue that each one these types presents a 
particular set of virtues and vices to counteract the generalized assumption of political 
mendacity; broadly speaking the accent shifts from trustworthiness, to authenticity, to 
accountability. Finally, I will examine a verbal exchange that took place in early 2011 at the 
National Assembly, in which deputy Koniba Sidibé questioned the government’s spokesman on 
his exegesis of the governmental intentions in terminating twenty-eight chief financial officers in 
early 2011. 
Life and death of a parliamentary debate 
 During 2010 and 2011, I attended the National Assembly on regular basis during three 
parliamentary seasons to observe mostly one type of social interaction: plenary sessions. The 
National Assembly meets in plenary sessions every two or three weeks during the three-month 
ordinary seasons. By the time the plenary meets to vote on a law proposal, most important 
decisions, debates, and compromises have already taken place at the heart of the concerned 
commissions, which meet in private. I could only get an indirect sense of the work inside the 
commissions, based on my conversations with administrative staff. The first thing that happens 
when a commission receives a “law proposal,” is the organization of closed-door hearings [Fr. 
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écoutes] with experts, civil organizations, and representatives of social groups that would suffer 
or benefit from the approval of the new law. Considering those hearings, commissions elaborate 
Reports, which have a very standard form and often repeat the sentences they use to praise a 
project or advise its approval. 
 Each report has a first section titled “Context and Justification,” then a summary of the 
concerns and opinions expressed during the hearings by relevant actors—usually listed under the 
categories of “political class,” “government,” “civil society” and “experts.” Then come an 
analysis of the project, a list of proposed amendments, and the recommendation to approve the 
project provided the amendments are voted in. The standardization of reports is largely the effect 
of administrative continuity; Malian parliamentary routines, protocols and overall savor-faire is 
maintained by the Assembly staff, rather than by the legislators. The assistant of the Commission 
of Constitutional Laws, for instance, has served for over fifteen years, and has a Report template 
saved on a USB key to which he makes the required adjustments. 
 Around three quarters of the duration of a plenary session are spent reading documents. 
The president of the National Assembly formally opens and closes each plenary session, with a 
few inspirational words and sometimes a short prayer in Arabic. Approving the agenda is the first 
part of the debate; it is done quickly, without much discussion. The president of the National 
Assembly reads the agenda integrally, which has been circulated in advance and usually contains 
five to seven proposed laws. If no one proposes amendments to the agenda, it gets adopted. The 
reading of the Reports and the voting in of the amendments to the proposed law is the second 
part of the debate. The president of the commission in charge of reviewing the project reads a 
short formulaic statement and then calls another member of the commission to the podium who 
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reads the Report integrally, after which representatives of four or five other commissions read 
short Advices or Opinions [Fr. avis].  All this is done ceremoniously and with abundant mentions 
of honorary titles: “Mister president,” Honorable deputies,” “Mister minister,” and so on. 
 The response of the corresponding minister follows the reading of the commissions’ Report 
and Advices. A short debate on the amendments with one speaker “for” and one “against” 
follows; and finally amendments to the proposed law are voted in. After all amendments have 
been discussed, the floor is opened for a general debate on the proposed law in which 
representatives express their concerns on an individual basis. The minister replies to this round of 
general concerns. Ministerial responses alternate spoken explanations with the reading of 
arguments and statistics prepared by a technical team. Sometimes a second round of 
representatives’ speeches follows, to which the minister provides new answers. The last part of 
the process is the voting in of the new law. After counting the votes and enunciating the result, 
the president of the National Assembly strikes the gavel against a wooden sound block to signify 
the adoption of the new law. 
 Plenary sessions have an elaborate mise-en-scène. The president and vice-presidents of the 
National Assembly sit at the dais and two soldiers wearing dark glasses stand behind them for the 
entire session. Government representatives enter the hall once the session has been opened 
escorted by the protocol team, and seat on the right side; the doyen and other respected members 
of the Assembly staff seat on the left side and supervise the session. Representatives take time to 
gain their seats, they wrap up their elegant bazin boubous around their shoulders as they walk in 
and greet their acquaintances, visibly aware of their peers’ gaze. There is always a degree of 
social excitement when the plenary meets that dissolves slowly during the long hours of listening 
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to the readings of reports and other documents. Deputies come in and out the hall during the 
sessions, they read newspapers and pass them around, chat among themselves, give instructions 
to their assistants, and so on. Only a couple of times I saw the Assembly at its full capacity, there 
was always between fifteen and twenty-five percent of absenteeism of deputies, who voted by 
“procuration,” that is, they authorized another representative to represent them in voting. This 
was often the case for senior politicians, who are rarely present in the hall. During the three 
parliamentary seasons I attended, I saw Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Mali’s current president of Mali 
and a deputy at the time, only twice. 
 There is a careful compliance with procedural rules; allocation of speech time, motions, 
interpellations, vote counting, all need to be done according to “the texts.” Procedural errors 
would invalidate the outcome of the session. Parliamentary debates can hardly be linguistically 
understood as examples of a larger category of discussions, arguments, disputes or debates. They 
are closer to theatrical displays; they are an official representation of a debate, a formal 
requirement. They do not allow the deviations from the script characteristic of an open-ended 
discussion in which each person strives to affect the outcome. There are practical reasons for this 
as well: national representatives, unlike local council members, need to speak at the microphone 
to be heard. The President of the National Assembly had the switch to the podium microphone, 
and when representatives exceeded their speech time, he turned off the microphone 
unapologetically.  
 Some parliamentary affaires are dispatched promptly, some may incite two rounds of 
speakers, but the script always retains the same basic form regardless of the urgency or 
importance of the matter at stake. The abrupt transition from “The destiny of our country 
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depends on…” to “Your time is over” is shocking. Furthermore, the views of the participants are 
not visibly affected by the arguments of their peers; there is no resolution, let alone moments of 
resignation of the type: “You have convinced me.” As Marc Abeles noted for the French National 
Assembly, it can hardly be said that deputies are talking to each other. They speak in this forum 
to address the government, party executives, and, to a much lesser extent, to address some 
abstract electorate (Abélès, 2001: 313). The most certain audience of Malian parliamentary 
debates is the bureaucratic process itself, the subsequent official speech acts that presuppose the 
existence of such debate. Such an audience requires the inscription of parliamentary speech into 
documents. 
 The podium microphone connects to a speaker inside a recording room where every word 
is recorded on numerous tapes. There is usually a very animated and completely unrelated 
conversation inside the recording room that is only interrupted whenever the tape needs to be 
changed—a number of times, however, I saw the staff laughing, complaining or reacting 
nonchalantly to the discussion in the main hall. The door contiguous to the recording room opens 
to the transcription room, where the proces verbaux (PV’s)—the copious documents containing 
the exact transcription of parliamentary debates—are produced. A year might elapse before a 
debate acquires its final form as a print document. According to the law, PV’s must be read and 
ratified in plenary sessions, but this is rarely the case. In the archives of the National Assembly 
there is a dusty pile of PV’s waiting to be ratified. All the PV’s produced since Independence are 
stored in the Archives of the National Assembly, and it is there that one senses more poignantly 
the futility of it all.
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 The archivist was the first person I met at the National Assembly; his name is Sidiki Diaby. 
He joined the Assembly administrative staff in 1982 as an archivist and was promoted to chef de 
service in 1995. He has witnessed two military coups, one in 1990 and the other in 2012, and he 
claims to have been sitting at his desk even during those short periods when the National 
Assembly was suspended. “There was a fire—he told me while pointing at the chaotic aisles full 
of boxes—and we have not been able to reorganize the archives ever since.” He waited for the 
arrival of some funding from the Netherlands, which would come soon and allow him to 
catalogue, digitize and organize the archives. In the meantime, he devotes as little time to the 
documents as possible. Instead, he carefully stores the memories of the Assembly’s 
administrative staff; he collects group photographs taken during workshops and other internal 
occasions going back decades, and talks with nostalgia of the deceased colleagues. In rare 
occasions, the archives’ phone rings and someone on the other end, usually the administrative 
secretary of the Assembly, requests the PV of a recent debate, which somehow Sidiki knows 
where to find. 
 The administrative staff of the Assembly deals with all the words uttered in the main hall as 
little more than noise, an excessive stream of signs that bears no importance for anything that 
could matter. They go on with their daily routines ignoring the voices of the national 
representatives inside the hall: they pray, drink tea, listen to the radio and discuss regional 
politics with all the passion lacking from their attention to parliamentary debates. The archives 
office is the gathering point where old members of the administrative staff spend the empty hours 
of public service discussing all sorts of things, from religion to geopolitics. Arguments can go on 
for a long time and be quite serious, especially around issues that produce polarities. The day 
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after the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011 in Ivory Coast, for instance, some usual 
members of this informal assembly were nowhere to be seen: “They are avoiding us—
commented Sidiki—they don’t want to see any pro-Ouattara person today.” These heated 
informal debates are particularly striking against the monotonous background noise of 
parliamentary debates.  
 In plenary sessions questions affecting the lives of all Malians—from international loans to 
the creation of a new institutional structures—are discussed and decided. Yet, these debates are 
notably less animated than discussions in the Communal Councils which turn around topics as 
seemingly irrelevant as the need to move a particular market stand to keep the street free of 
obstructions. This is partly due to the material organization of parliamentary debate—the large 
number of participants, the need to use the microphone to be heard, the strict regimentation of 
speech time, and so on. However, beyond these material reasons there are other aspects that 
contribute to the perceived emptiness of parliamentary debates. 
 In Mali, the separation of “legislative” and “executive” powers means that the parliament 
neither produces initiatives nor is in charge of applying them; its interventions are for the most 
part at the level of amendments. If we gave an anthropomorphic shape to this separation of 
powers, we would see that the work of the parliament is neither at the level of intentions (the 
initiatives) nor of actions (their application), but an odd, reflective pause in the middle. The 
bureaucratic process is concerned with the recording and transcription of verbal signs with a 
legal value. Will and intention might be expressed in conventional forms, but strictly speaking 
they are not signs: one cannot capture them nor invest the debates with more of them 
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(Anscombe, 1957). Therefore, representatives, as politicians, need to find other ways of proving 
to their constituents that they are not parle-menteurs.  
Political Personae 
 The general debate on the proposed legislation is the most animated part of the session. 
Once the floor is open, the president writes down the names of the deputies who wish to 
participate in the debate, and calls each to the podium. A limited number of deputies, around 
twenty, dominated most discussions during the seasons I observed. After a couple of sessions, 
one begins to notice that orations at the plenary fall within certain types. Distinct speech styles 
accompany relatively regular types of political persona; authenticating parliamentary speech 
against the background assumption of political mendacity requires elocution and argumentation, 
but above all it requires the projection of a public persona that embodies prestige, authority and 
trustworthiness. Since parliamentary debates are so systematically ignored, I was not able to 
gather much information on the local categories used to describe and judge parliamentary 
speech. I will then for the most part interpret deputies’ rhetorical and personal styles as I 
perceived them.  
 In 1992, Prof. Ali Nohoun Diallo inaugurated the first multiparty legislature of democratic 
Mali. He took part in the clandestine struggle that overthrew Moussa Traore’s regime; after 
which he became the first president of the National Assembly through the ADEMA party in 
1992.  Diallo does not like to identify himself as a “politician,”51 even though he was elected to 
the National Assembly for two terms. Conversely, he is one of the most emblematic public 
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51 “Portrait de la semaine: Aly Nouhoum Diallo, un grand pionnier du mouvement démocratique” 
Maliactu.net [malfunctioning site]
intellectuals of contemporary Mali, and even though he is a physician by training, the title 
“Prof.” always precedes his name. In 2011, he no longer occupied a political post, even though 
he remained an active member of the ADEMA party and his name figured in most forums of 
public debate—particularly in those organized by youth associations and NGO’s devoted to the 
promotion of democratic values.52 The rejection of the “politician” label by someone who is an 
active party leader echoes the discredit of “partisan politics” and recalls what in French in known 
as “les politiciens,” as opposed to “les hommes politiques.” 
 In his 1992 inaugural speech at the National Assembly, Nouhoun Diallo asked deputies to 
observe a moment of silence in the memory of those who died “for the emergence of a 
democratic society in Mali,” and recalled the names of the “fathers” who contributed to the 
“liberation of the colonized peoples of Africa.” He reminded the deputies of the challenges 
awaiting them, exhorted them to remain true to the spirit of “the transition to democracy,” and to 
find ways to overcome partisan rivalries: “work together in the realization of common, national 
objectives” (Diallo, 1994:12). Diallo also expressed his conviction that the Assembly would 
succeed in these tasks, given “its social and professional composition.” He said:     
[4.1] [French]  The large number of physicians, engineers, lawyers, teachers, liberal 
professionals, and peasants means we can expect a rich and thorough debate. Doubtless, 
such an assembly will not limit itself to playing the unflattering role of recording studio 
or echo chamber [Diallo, p.13]. 
 
 The metaphors of the National Assembly as an “echo chamber” and “recording studio” 
appear frequently in Malian contemporary press. Nouhoun Diallo’s use of them in 1992 suggests 
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52 Some of those NGO’s are of Malian origin, such as Cri2002 and Centre Djoliba; other operate with 
international funds, such as the CMDID. 
that they might have originated during the Moussa Traore regime, when there was no partisan 
opposition at the Assembly. For Diallo, however, what would authenticate the debates as more 
than “echo” is the training of the representatives on the one hand, and their closeness to the 
people, on the other. In his list of professions, the mention of “peasants” looks like a last-minute 
addendum with symbolic character. 
 The alliance between modernity and the symbolic power of the countryside is suggested at 
other places in his speech. The most striking example is his description of himself: “As for me, I 
still haven’t forgotten and I hope never to forget the hard life of the Sahelian herders from whom 
I descend. Today, I’m a doctor faithful to the Hippocratic oath and I can see to what extent health 
is beyond reach for the majority who lives in precarious material conditions” (Diallo, 1994:14). 
This symbolic alliance between liberal professions on the one hand, and the backward but merit-
full peasants and herders on the other, leaves out a crucial component of Malian politics: the 
traders [Fr. commerçants]. 
 Among the members of the legislature that was elected in 2007—the fourth since Ali 
Nouhoun Diallo inaugurated the first pluralist parliament—there were lawyers, academics, 
engineers, and doctors, as well as some peasants and herders. There were also two marabouts 
and two Koranic teachers. However, two professional categories dominated by far in the 
composition of the parliament: teachers and traders. Among the 147 members of the National 
Assembly, there were close to 30 schoolteachers, and close to 50 members of the private sector
—25 traders, 10 accountants, and 12 who called themselves “operateur économique”, which can 
refer to multiple functions within the private sector. 
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 In Mali, the term “intellectual” refers broadly to everyone with a university degree and 
fluent in French, it is used to refer to teachers and professionals, but can also include managers 
and people from the private sector. At the National Assembly, it is possible to perceive a nuanced 
difference between lawyers, teachers and professors on the one hand and what we could call  
“the technocrats,” on the other. The differences between these groups are not as clear as in Latin 
America, where the “technocrats” stand out as a numerous group of politicians and public 
servants trained in Economics and Public Policy in American Universities. The association 
between this group and the “neoliberal” reforms is also less clear in the Malian case. 
Nevertheless, the term “technocrat” is sometimes used by Malian journalists, in particular, to 
refer to Soumaila Cissé, the leader of the URD party. 
 Soumaila Cissé has a masters degree in management and computer sciences from a French 
university, he work for IBM in France before returning to Mali, where he became minister of 
finances, and president of the West African Economic and Monetary Union [Fr. UEMOA], and 
presidential candidate two times. In 2011, he gave up a job offer at the IMF to begin his 
presidential campaign.53 Interestingly, “technocrats” are often presented in opposition to 
“politicians.” In February 11th, for instance, the InfoMatin newspaper published an article 
discussing the big transformation of the cabinet that president Touré carried out at the time. The 
articles argued that “technocrats” had substituted “politicians” in the new governments. Here, 
“technocrats” referred to career public servants as opposed to party members.54
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53 Mamadou Fofana “Soumaila Cissé sollicité para la FMI” L’Independent, [incomplete]
54 Seydina Diarra, “Remaniment ministeriel: Les ministres politiques debarqués?” InfoMatin, February 
11th, 2011, p. 3. 
 Some representatives at the National Assembly share elements of the “technocratic” 
political type. They have degrees from French universities in management, finances, or 
economics; work in the private sector or international organizations, and often phrase their 
interventions at the parliament in technical and quantitative terms. They wear suits and ties more 
often than boubous, and are usually enrolled in the commissions that deal with finances, 
economics, development, mining and natural resources. One of the characteristics of the 
technocratic political stance is that it responds to the generalized assumption of political 
mendacity with an emphasis on transparency and accountability. That is, the central virtue is not 
trustworthiness and reliability, as we will see below, but efficiency and budgetary precision. 
Consequently, financial corruption, and not unreliability, becomes the ultimate political vice. 
 The small minority of opposition representatives and in particular those that claim a leftist 
affiliation could also be considered “intellectuals,” but they cultivate a completely different style. 
Oumar Mariko of the SADI party is the most obvious example, he rarely wears boubous, and is 
one of the few deputies who wears cloths made of hand woven African textiles, of the type that 
became popular among African leftist leaders in the seventies. He is one of the few deputies I 
saw come to a plenary session wearing jeans and a colorful Mao-collar vest. This style seems to 
reflect an attempt to differentiate themselves from “deceitful politicians” and identify with “the 
common man.” One of the core virtues of this type of political persona is authenticity, as an 
imperative to be “part of the people,” defined both in national and class terms. The importance of 
authenticity for this political persona can also be seen in the emphasis on the loyalty to political 
ideals. It is not by distributing benefits and keeping their promises that these politicians can 
aspire to earn the trust of others, but by subordinating their political ambitious to the “higher 
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ends” of politics and adjusting their behavior to fit those principles. As a technique of the self, 
this political persona emphasizes sacrifice, and sharing the suffering of the people you claim to 
represent is considered a merit.   
 Even though the numerical importance of this group is minimal, they are known for being 
very vocal. Their speeches privilege denunciation, describe the injustices and sufferings 
undergone by the “voiceless,” and poor masses, and they seek to move the audience. On various 
occasions I heard staff and journalists react expressing their approval of this orations coming 
from the opposition, usually with the sentence: “He is saying the truth!” I noticed that this 
affirmation usually came as a reward to the display of an audacious, accusatory tone against the 
government, and that “saying the truth” is considered an act that requires courage. These 
ephemeral praises from the audience were often counterbalanced with the affirmation that these 
opposition figures, Mariko in particular, have benefited from the government.  
 Despite the differences and subgroups, one of the commonalities among all the 
“intellectuals” is that they discuss politics from a national and international perspective and in 
rather abstract terms. Most of them have built their political careers in the capital, Bamako, and 
travel sporadically to their electoral districts. This fact differentiates them from the large majority 
of deputies who use their speech time to advocate for improvements in their localities. One of the 
young assistants of SADI, the only opposition party in the Assembly at the time, who would 
sometimes sit in the back rows made me notice the difference. He had no patience for 
representatives interested only on public works and local transactions who overlooked the larger 
questions of social justice and national sovereignty, which for him were real politics. 
Unsurprisingly, representatives who have built their careers in local politics—as mayors, local 
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councilors, and so on—are the most interested in functioning as intermediaries between their 
localities and the government. They come to the parliament to demand things such as the 
construction of roads, hospitals, schools, and so on. 
 A good example of this type of pragmatic and locally grounded deputy is Mamadou 
Tounkara, one of the representatives from Kita at the National Assembly from 2007 to 2014. He 
was born in 1952, and his first political experience was as a member of the Pioneers, one of the 
youth organizations of the socialist era. Ten years later, he joined the youth sector of the UDPM, 
under Moussa Traore’s regime. By 1983, he was Secretary General of the UDPM Youth in Kita 
as well as member of the Kita Section bureau. During the seventies and eighties, he used to split 
his time between Bamako and Kita; he told me that he could not participate directly in the 
struggle for democracy because his host [Bam. jiatigi] in Bamako was a close friend of Moussa 
Traore, and thus it would have been disrespectful. Nevertheless, the political power that he 
amassed during the UDPM regime served him after the transition to democracy; Mamadou 
Tounkara joined the ADEMA and in the first communal elections he became mayor of one of the 
recently created rural communes in the cercle of Kita. 
 The rural commune of Sibikili is only 9 kilometers away from Kita town and its inhabitants 
used to travel to Kita for most affaires before decentralization. When Mamadou Tounkara 
became mayor of Sibikili, the village had three classrooms as sole infrastructure, and there was 
no town-hall building. In our conversation, he listed with precision and pride all he had built 
during his term: the town-hall, twelve classrooms, a small communitarian clinic [Fr. CESCOM], 
a kindergarten, a library, a football field, an aqueduct, and a well. “Go take a look at the village, 
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you will see the work yourself,” he told me. Then he explained me how he had funded the public 
works: 
[4.2] [French] Plan55 helped me build the classrooms... for the clinic it was a...Belgian 
project, which was working all over the country...Donors can help you get the work done, 
but they’ll ask you: what will be your own contribution? For example, for the aqueduct, 
the commune had to pay CFA3,850,000, and then the donor would complete the total 
sum. For the clinic, we had to pay CFA1,444,000. The classrooms for students...well, 
Plan does that, but the commune needs to pay 20%. We agreed to do the physical work 
ourselves, mixing the concrete and things like that. When you calculate the work plus 
some cash, you get to the 20%. That is how you get things done. 
 
 Mamadou Tounkara’s description of his work as a mayor coincides with the accounts that I 
gathered while visiting rural communes around Kita. The primary function of politicians as a 
whole, regardless of the specificities of their posts, is to obtain funds for public works primarily 
from international development projects. This means that for the most part the repertoire of ideas 
for public works and local development projects are rather fixed and predetermined. The role of 
the community and its local political class is to choose from a set of available options, which are 
roughly the items that Tounkara mentioned: classrooms, clinics, offices, energy and water 
supplies, and so on. Another important effect of this logic is the emphasis on building, preferably  
using concrete and other durable materials. It is therefore significant that Tounkara asked me to 
go “see” [Fr. constater] his work in the commune. 
 After serving as mayor of the rural commune of Sibikili, Mamadou Tounkara decided to 
leave the ADEMA with Ibrahim Boubakar Keita to create the RPM in 2001; in 2007 he was 
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55 Plan is a Spanish International Development Organization founded in 1937 during the Spanish Civil 
War. It works in the promotion and protection of the rights of children in more than 50 countries all over 
the world. 
elected as representative to the National Assembly this time by the RPM. I asked him what being 
a deputy was like and he answered: 
[4.3] [French] People haven’t understood yet what the functions of a deputy are, 
especially in the rural areas. A deputy cannot build a school, a deputy can only vote on 
new legislation. However, we do have easy access to donors, because everyone receives 
us. For that reason, people need us to dig wells and build aqueducts, schools, and all that. 
People tell us: “You have to help us, find us a donor to build a clinic, a school...” 
 His answer suggests that in practice there is no big difference between the role of a mayor 
and that of a representative at the National Assembly. Deputies serve all the communes in the 
cercle and are not as present “on the ground,” but what people expect from them is also that they 
obtain funding for public works. Besides mediating with donors, Tounkara explained to me, a 
deputy has to attend countless personal petitions from the constituents: “those never end—he 
said—we receive calls every day, every day.” Indeed, while I interviewed him in the RPM office 
at the National Assembly, he received four calls from people in Kita asking for contributions for 
events like weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on. This genre of events and contributions that in 
Mali are known as “the social” [Fr. le social] are an obligation for all powerful men and women, 
and are the core of political influence. I asked Tounakara whether he had to respond to all those 
petitions positively and he said: “Well, sometimes, to be honest, we can’t, but we must do our 
best, we do our best.” He said that the key for political success in Mali was honesty, and this is 
how he defined that term: 
[4.4] [French] One must be honest with everyone. If you come ask me to do something 
for you, if I can do it, I will say yes, but I can’t, then I should say no. You should not 
create false expectations; that is wrong. Also, people need to feel that you are committed 
to their cause, if they have a problem, you need to be close to them, and even if you 
cannot solve the issue, at least they will see that you share their pain. But everything rests 
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on honesty...not pursuing someone else’s women, someone else’s children, the social side 
is very important. 
 Tounkara used the words honnête and honnêteté, which in French, as in English, condense 
a wide range of related but distinct qualities, such as honorable, upright, incorruptible, frank, and 
sincere. His explanation of an honest behavior, however, did not accentuate either incorruptibility 
or sincerity, which are the meanings that predominate in English and French, but a solid 
correspondence between verbal engagements and future actions: doing what one has agreed to do 
and not agreeing to do things one cannot do. He reiterated the importance of reliability and 
trustworthiness when he described his reasons for leaving the ADEMA party and joining the 
RPM. 
 Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Mali’s current president (2013-) and founder of the RPM party, 
was at the time seen by a part of the public opinion as embodying the political values that 
Tounkara defended. As a prime minister and president of the National Assembly, Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita earned the reputation of being decisive, reliable, and authoritative, which was 
captured in a Bambara epithet. Journalists and other commentators often called him kankelentigi, 
which would translate to English as something like “the holder of the undivided word.” In our 
conversation, Mamadou Tounkara recalled this epithet. He said: 
[4.5] [French] Ibrahim [Boubacar Keita] accords great importance to his word, to the 
extent that he has been called kankelentigi. When he says “black,” it is black, when he says 
“white,” it is white. He has proven it to me a thousand times.
  The literal translation of kankelentigi is “the owner of one word,” but definitions of the 
epithet I heard vary slightly. Kankelentigi is someone whose words do not change across time 
and among audiences, who does not play with the gradients of secrecy and intrigue that we saw 
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in Chapter 3. Kankelentigi is a leader who produces certainty and thus creates trust and 
cooperation, who establishes a solid correspondence between words and actions. Again, the 
emphasis is not on sincerity understood as a faithful representation of inner thoughts and 
feelings, but on clear and steady intentions.  
 The ideal persona for this political stance is a pure “feeder” who keeps his promises, 
distributes benefits, and “doesn't owe anything to anyone.” The fact that Mamadou Tounkara said 
that politicians have to “do their best” to attend the constituents’ monetary requests suggests that 
these political practices are also ethical commitments. Thus, two central virtues of this political 
type are material generosity and trustworthiness; these are projected through a particular style 
that we can call “the big man” style, although it includes many female deputies. They usually 
wear opulent bazin boubous—and sophisticated headdresses in the case of women—are liberal 
with money, and grandiose in their campaigns.  The ideal rhetorical match for this type of 
political persona is intricate and ornamented, with abundant figures, references to the Greek 
antiquity and the Malian epic past. They put particular emphasis on people’s titles, are very good 
at praising important personalities visiting the Assembly, and always call each other “honorable,” 
the formal title of national representatives. 
 One of the most common modes of classifying political persona in the West is to place 
them on an axis that goes from idealism to pragmatism, depending on the proportion of 
principles and interests in the definition of someone’s political behavior. In Mali, I found 
instances of use of a similar criteria which classified politicians by their degree of “conviction,” 
understood as the capacity to subordinate interests and material needs to ideals and principles. 
Among the political youth, I heard multiple times that the “problem of Malian democracy” is that  
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politicians have “no convictions.” This lack of convictions would explain politicians’ erratic 
behavior or their “opportunism.” However, the idea that it is the force of “principles” that can 
stabilize and render predictable political trajectories is itself the product of a very particular 
understanding of politics. Shifting the attention from this opposition of ideals and interests to the 
nuanced “core virtues” of different political persona shows a different picture. These virtues are 
of course not mutually exclusive, nor do these ideal types of political persona exist in any “pure” 
form; as analytical tools, however, they allow us to see a larger repertoire of techniques of the 
self that designed to confront the generalized assumption of mendacity and unreliability. 
 Here I traced some of those core virtues—trustworthiness, authenticity and accountability
—and began to delineate their particularities. Each one links a conception of the politician’s roles 
to a technique of the self, designed to secure the relationship of words and actions.56 I claim that 
political mendacity in Mali is primarily understood as the lack of correspondence between verbal 
engagements and actions, or as the unreliable character of politicians’ expressed intentions to act 
in the future. Each one of these core virtues places the source of stability in of? intention in a 
different place. Trustworthiness derives stability from the force of reciprocity and social 
obligation; authenticity derives it from an identity with the people or the nation, and 
accountability derives it from the public gaze over financial transactions. In the following 
section, I will examine an interaction between deputy Koniba Sidibe and the minister of 
communication and government spokesman at the time, Sidiki N’fa Konaté, in which intentions 
are present not as engagements for future actions but as the retrospective interpretation of the 
meaning and purpose of governmental actions. In the discussion, the distinction between office 
166
56 Lionel Trilling argues that in Western cultural history, sincerity in the way we understand it emerged in 
the sixteenth century, and gave way to authenticity in the nineteenth century. See Lionel Trilling, Sincerity 
and Authenticity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
and incumbent, that is between institutional and personal responsibility, is unstable; at times it is 
affirmed and at times obviated.   
Governmental Intentions   
 There is parliamentary procedure that allows representatives to confront the government on 
a subject of their choice. Individual deputies can address a letter to the head of a government 
office with a set of questions that the governmental representative is required to answer at a 
plenary session in a formal procedure known as “Oral Questions” [Fr. Questions orales] During 
the three parliamentary seasons I observed, I saw Oral Questions take place only four or five 
times, and in all occasions it was the initiative of one of the two opposition parties at the time, 
SADI and PARENA. 
 On April 13th 2011, the Council of Ministers, the highest government body, issued a decree 
terminating the totality of Chief Financial Officers [Fr. Directeurs Administratifs et Financiers or 
DAFs] of all State Departments. In one day more than twenty high public functionaries lost their 
jobs. This unexpected measure was part of a series of abrupt changes in the composition of the 
government that president Toumani Touré carried out in the first months of 2011, the last year of 
his presidential term. Unsurprisingly, the disproportion and seemingly capricious character of 
this measure set off a controversy about the intentions of the president in such action. Sidiki N’fa 
Konaté, Minister of Communication and government spokesman at the time, gave an 
interpretation of this presidential decision on the national news broadcast by calling it “a big step  
in the war against corruption and fraud.” This statement fueled the discussion even further, 
whereas some commentators praised the president’s uncompromising attitude against corruption 
that such measure was meant to reflect, many others resented the form in which it was done: was 
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the government implying that the totality of DAF’s could be assumed to be corrupt without 
conducting individual investigations and without providing any evidence?
 Koniba Sidibé, a member of the PARENA party and the Finances Commission, filed an 
Oral Question requesting an explanation on this issue from the Minister of Communication. 
Sidibe has a PhD in Economics and has worked both in the private and public sectors; he was 
one of the most engaged and outspoken representatives in the 2007 legislature. Interestingly, 
Sidibé’s letter to the minister did not request an explanation of the government’s decision to 
terminate the Financial Officers, but of the intention that the spokesman attributed to the decision 
on the television news, that it was an act against corruption.  Accordingly, the answer of Sidiki 
Konaté, minister and government spokesman, was a hybrid between a personal apology, for 
having offended the public servants, and a new exegesis of the governmental decision to explain 
what he meant by “war against corruption.”  
 Unlike most ministers, Sidiki N’fa Konaté did not read his response to the Assembly. He 
took advantage of the occasion to demonstrate his rhetorical mastery. His speech was 
ornamented and delivered with a very histrionic prosody, marked by pauses and shifts in tonality. 
He used abundant rhetorical figures, in particular repetition and strings of semantic cognates, and 
few technical terms and numbers. His style reminded me more of the enlightened elitism of the 
ancient rhetoricians than the variations of “popular” and “expert” speech common in Western 
democracies nowadays. Here is how his response began: 
[4.6] Mr. President, this democratic exercise, in which I take part for the first time...I submit 
myself to it with added conviction since I’m persuaded that it enables the establishment and 
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consolidation of democratic culture which features information as a key element. Inform to 
know [Fr. connaitre], know to know [Fr. savoir], know [Fr. savoir] to decide, decide to act. 57 
 Abundant and pompous words followed each other with an elegant and well modulated 
prosody; the minister and government spokesman pronounced each one emphatically and let it 
weigh on the audience as if it was enormously significant. Affirming his gentlemanly willingness 
to receive criticism and submit himself to a “democratic exercise” entailed a degree of 
disengagement from the subject matter. What seemed to matter most was not to establish the 
truth about the termination of the DAF’s, but to celebrate information, debate and democratic 
culture per se. To convey the importance of information, he indulged in a peculiar and rather 
obscure rhetorical figure: “Inform to know [Fr. savoir], know to know [Fr. connaitre], know to 
decide, decide to act.” This peculiar string is composed of five verbs, each one of which is 
supposed to depend on the previous one, establishing a neat connection from information to 
action. He continued: 
[4.7] [French] In our capacity as government spokesmen, our role is to enable domestic and 
international public opinion to understand government resolutions. We have to explain major 
government decisions and make sure that major actions taken by the government are known 
and understood by the citizens. This logic of acting and creating understanding has to reach 
the entire public: population, institutions of the republic, trade unions and business owners, 
civil society, international donors, etcetera, etcetera. This abrogation was a major government 
act, it was important to create understanding as quickly as possible among all Malians—men 
and women—to prevent rumor and misunderstanding from spreading [My emphases]. 
 The minister exalted repeatedly the beauties of a sound communication between 
government, citizens, and all major social institutions—trade unions, private sector, international 
donors and so on. According to his argument, the government needs to explain itself. This 
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57 This sentence translates poorly, the original in French was: “Informer pour savoir, savoir pour 
connaitre, connaitre pour décider, décider d’agir.” 
resounds with the notion that governmental decisions are not only supposed to be visible and 
public, they also have to be interpreted and understood. By communicating with the people, he 
claims, the government acts against rumor, which is based on misunderstanding. Konaté’s speech 
resonates with the embrace of public transparency that gained global acceptance in the nineties 
and early 2000s. However, it also differs in one important way, as it is not centered on making 
State information available to the citizens but in providing and diffusing the correct interpretation 
of governmental acts.  
 In the above passages, Konaté switched from the first singular person, “I,” to the royal 
“we” as he began to describe the responsibilities of the office he occupies. Using Goffman’s 
concept of “participant roles,” we could say that ministers, as incumbents of an office, are 
animators of a locution of which they are only partially authors, since there is usually a team 
working to generate the responses that are read in the National Assembly. The principal, or the 
entity in which the responsibility for those decision lies, is the government, an abstract, 
impersonal subject. As a general rule, when government representatives speak at the National 
Assembly, they reinforce this distinction between their role as office incumbents and as private 
individuals through self-effacing linguistic patterns. Conversely, deputies often use self-
enhancing linguistic patters which underline their own agency and project them a cohesive 
persona.  
 In this occasion, however, the response of the government spokesman was peculiar because 
this desegregation in “participant roles” was somewhat erratic. Deputy Koniba Sidibe requested 
from him something between a personal apology for having offended the DAFs on TV and a 
general justification of the governmental decision to terminate these functionaries. Throughout 
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his response, the minister presented himself as occupying different roles and degrees of 
responsibility. He first described how he received a last minute instruction to attend the news 
broadcast and insisted on the fact that he acted only as spokesman of the government (animator), 
and thus diluted his responsibility for the message he delivered. However, right after he made 
this clarification, he provided a technical justification of the government's measure, this time 
speaking as minister, and thus partaking of the authorship and responsibility of the decision. 
Finally, when he got to the core of the issue—the accusation of corruption implicit in his 
statement on television—he delivered an intricate logical game in which a string of tropes on 
transparency and democratic governance were tangled up with a personal apology: 
[4.8] [Bam.] It is true that the other day, when commenting on this abrogation, we said that it 
was inscribed in the general context of the fight against corruption and financial crime; that it 
was aimed at creating trust between the State and the citizens and that its goal was also to 
foster dialogue between the governing and the governed. However, we never said, we never 
thought, that these citizens were financial criminals; we never said, we never thought, we 
never wrote that these honest public servants were corrupt. [My emphases]
 The reference to his thoughts dissolved the distinction between office and incumbent by 
turning his attempt to disambiguate an official declaration into a question of personal sincerity: if 
he was only a spokesman, why should it matter what his thoughts were? In this passage, the 
minister projected a cohesive correspondence between his roles as animator, author and principal 
by presenting himself as the agent of the three actions which we can considered emblematic of 
each one of these roles: to say (animator), to write or compose (author), and to intend (principal).  
Bureaucracy desegregates these functions and underscores forms and formality. 
 Here, however, the spokesmen reconstituted himself as a cohesive subject in which all 
those functions coincided. His statement sought to produce governmental credibility by relying 
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on the linguistic strategies that “private” persons, outside of their roles as office incumbents, 
would use to authenticate their words and intentions. The movement between “personal and 
“impersonal” statements, however, was not exclusive to him. President Touré’s decision to fire 
the DAF’s without an investigation reflected a similar tendency, as it implied that the president 
knew personally who was corrupt. Koniba Sidibe’s question did the same thing by requesting an 
explanation of the words that he heard “coming out of the spokesman’s mouth” on TV.
 Moreover, the words that the spokesmen used to describe the type of relationship that 
should exist between government and citizens in a democracy, one ruled by “trust” and 
“dialogue,” also attribute an anthropomorphic character to the government. The idea of a 
“dialogue” between citizens and government assumes that the two elements of such exchange 
have a relatively symmetrical composition. That is, that they are responsible for their words and 
deeds in relatively the same way. However, linguistic exchanges between deputies and 
representatives of the government at the National Assembly usually show something different. 
Even when deputies interpellate government representatives in an almost personal manner, 
ministers answer without betraying the internal logic of  bureaucracy. That is why this exchange 
between Sidibe and the minister of Communications was so singular. 
 The minister and spokesman continued the exegesis of the words he pronounced on TV and 
embarked in a convoluted rhetorical game to reduce the meaning of the term “war against 
corruption” to a minimum: 
[4.9] [French] [We said..] That it was a political decision inscribed in the general context of 
the restoration of the rule of law, flexibility in the promotion and reassignment of civil 
servants, and improved management of the State’s financial and material resources; all of 
which are intended to foster citizens’ trust in the State, establish an efficient public 
administration, and assure good governance. We will easily understand, ladies and 
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gentlemen, that when we talk about good governance, we can’t help but talk about the fight 
against corruption and financial crime. Such is the unassailable logic that made us speak 
about the fight against corruption and financial crime. 
 
 According to his explanation, all the qualities of a "good governance” present in the 
contemporary democratic canon ultimately lead to the war against corruption. To dissolve the 
accusation implicit in his TV declaration he had to reduce the meaning of “war against 
corruption and fraud” to a minimum: “It was a political decision […] seeking to insure good 
governance […] and you will understand that one cannot speak of good governance without 
speaking of war against corruption and fraud.” There is an implicit analogy between the 
governmental attributes of transparency and corruption and the personal attributes of sincerity 
and deceit. “Trust” bridges these two realms, as “the war against corruption” is supposed to 
foster citizen’s trust in the State. This idea of transparency, however, is not that of the perfect 
bureaucratic machinery that leaves no margin for mismanagement. Here, transparency requires a 
personal exegesis in which governmental decisions are attributed intentions. In other words, what 
the government spokesman offered to the public on TV was not an account of how the DAF’s 
had mismanaged funds, but an explanation of what the government intended to achieve by firing 
them all. 
 When his time to replicate came, Koniba Sidibé provided an interesting commentary on the 
minister’s rhetorical style, which he dismissed as vacuous. He said: 
[4.10] [French] I would like to thank minister Sidiki for this brilliant and very pedagogical 
exposition, which is characteristic of a communications expert. However, I remain 
dissatisfied with the responses offered, and with the fact that he did not address many of my 
original questions. 
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 Interestingly, he attributed the vacuity of the minister’s speech precisely to the fact that he 
is an “expert in communications.” Sidibé, thus, relied on the common opposition between sincere 
spontaneous versus artificial learned speech. He placed himself on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, as someone who does not have the same “eloquence” and therefore is more truthful. 
He continued: 
[4.11] [French] “Abrogation of the appointment decree” all that...I don’t know what that 
could mean if not collective sacking. [...] If it was done as a way of improving management 
of public resources, as you just said, then that is just a different way of saying that the goal 
was to advance the fight against corruption... As a communications expert, you speak 
positively, but I speak otherwise to say that it remains the same thing. 
  For Sidibé, the minister’s strategy was ineffective, as it did not manage to dissolve the 
accusation of corruption implicit in his TV statement.  Koniba Sidibé addressed the minister as 
“person” not as incumbent of an office. He acknowledged that the minister was not entirely 
responsible for the decision, but asserted his full responsibility as interpreter of the decision. He 
continued: 
[4.12] [French] [...] I know that he [the minister] is not the only one making these decisions, 
but it was he who spoke on TV to say that the decision was made in the context of the fight 
against corruption and financial crime.  I did not hear this from anyone else, sir; I heard from 
your mouth on TV, Mr. Minister. So you cannot have said the other day that it was in the 
context of the fight against corruption, then come and say something else today! 
  The words came out of the ministers’ mouth and the responsibility leaked into his person, 
because he animated them and because he committed to the their truth. Sidibé’s mode of 
addressing the minister felt like an interruption of the parliamentary speech register. I would say 
that it felt like a transition from a “mock” debate to a genuine one. Interestingly, such “genuine” 
character required the agglutination of all roles in one person and with it the reconstitution of 
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personal responsibility. Sidibé asserted the first hand nature of his evidence: “I did not hear this 
from anyone else, sir; I heard from your mouth on TV.” His accusation turned the ambiguity and 
obscurity of the government’s decision into a problem concerning the personal discontinuity of 
the minister, who said one thing and then a different one. 
 In the next chapter, I will examine a dispute concerning the payment of a restitution. It took 
place at the Kita town-hall in 2011 and involved a deputy, the mayor, and some council-
members. In this discussion, State’s administrative ineffectiveness and suspicion over personal 
intentions get similarly conflated in the production of a conspiracy narrative or “anti-public.” 
This “anti-public,” which I define as the aggregate effect produced by all the public statements 
that indicate its existence, has the felicity that the world of visible politics lacks. 
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Chapter 5. Infelicity
A few years after the 1991 transition to electoral democracy, an audacious decentralization policy  
began to transform the territorial and administrative structure of Mali. By 2000, seven hundred 
villages and towns had acquired the status of rural communes governed by elected organs and 
enjoying a significant degree of autonomy in the management of local resources, particularly 
land. Electoral democracy and party politics reached most of those communes in the 1998-1999 
communal elections, which brought 12,000 new local representatives into office as mayors, 
adjuncts, and council members all over the country. New elected councils were created at each 
level, from the Communal Councils to the Cercle Councils and Regional Assemblies; the ones 
that already existed gained new faculties. 
 The authority and legitimacy of these new “spaces of deliberation,” as they are called in 
the new governance jargon, are fragile, as is their capacity to affirm themselves as a forum for 
local concerns and significant decision-making. At the local level, elected representatives share 
their authority with State functionaries (prefects in particular), non-governmental organizations, 
and traditional chiefs. Abundant accusations of duplicity and deceit have drained public politics 
of significance by creating the impression that real politics takes place in other forums. This 
displacement of politics towards a real or imagined “anti-public” has had the effect of 
invalidating visible, official politics. I draw on speech act theory to argue that these local 
councils, and democratic politics more broadly, suffer from chronic infelicity, or a recurrent 
ineffectiveness of speech acts. 
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 In this chapter, I will first contrast the neotraditionalist ideology of language of the 
decentralization reforms with the local regimentation of formal talk that I observed in Kita. Then, 
I will briefly examine the history of the Communal Council of Kita as seen through the “Book of  
Minutes” [Fr. Livre de PVs] which extends from 1961 to the present day. Finally, I will analyze a 
meeting of Communal Council of Kita that took place in April 2011. In this meeting, council 
members discussed a regional court ruling which required the mairie of Kita [town-hall] to pay 
restitution to an ex-deputy for the damages caused to his property during a popular riot. Broken 
promises, commitments not kept, and accusations of deceit are ubiquitous in the stories that I 
will recount. There is an ongoing difficulty in producing effective binding force through speech 
acts. I argue that this infelicity points to an underlying conflict between competing regimes of 
language —each one relying on alternative sources of obligation—ranging from written laws, to 
signatures and documents, to the sacred objects in possession of the founding families. I contend 
that the examination of linguistic felicity, and in particular of the production of binding acts, 
eventually leads to the question of sovereignty. Following Schmitt, I understand sovereignty as 
“the capacity to decide on exception,” that is, as a force that only responds to itself or creates its 
own conditions of possibility. 
Authority returns home
 Malian decentralization is not an isolated case by any means, as international 
organizations and governance consultancy firms promoted similar reforms in many African, 
Latin American and European countries around the same time.58 The language of 
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58 For comparative ethnographic analyses of the role of Non-Governmental Organizations and Think 
Tanks in the promotion of local governance and democracy around the since the 1990s see B. Pétric, 
2012.
decentralization, nevertheless, resonated well with a long-lasting mistrust of the central State 
prevalent in some Malian towns (Amselle, 1968; Hopkins,1972).   Furthermore, the Malian team 
of experts that designed the institutional framework of decentralization presented the adoption of 
international models of local governance as the recovery of a long African tradition of local self-
governance. Ousmane Sy, the main architect of Malian decentralization, recounts that his team 
had been looking for a term in Bambara that would convey the meaning of the French word 
décentralisation, which was not always understood by the villagers [Fr. les populations]. 
Specialists in national languages had been unable to provide a translation. One day during a 
meeting in the Malinke village of Kiéniégoué, an old man told Sy and his team that they were 
not suggesting anything new: since the times of Sundiata Keita, the Great Manden had been 
governed in a “decentralized” manner.59 This reform, the old man said, is just “the return of 
administration to the household.” That is how, according to Sy, the expression in Bambara “mara 
ségi sô”—“the administration returns home”—became the official Bambara slogan of the 
reforms (Sy, 2009, 87). 
 Contemporary Malian discussions on local governance frequently portray villages, which 
sometimes come to stand for Africa as a whole, as examples of democracy and self-government 
avant la lettre. The symbol of the “deliberation tree” [Fr. arbre à palabres] under which elders 
gather to discuss matters of public relevance, and the claim that village discussions always reach 
consensus are both emblematic of this “invented tradition.”60 Ousmane Sy relies on this image of 
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60 For another example of how “invented traditions” have been used to ground decentralization see Jean-
Loup Amselle’s analysis of the uses of N’ko writing and of Souleymane Kanté’s account of the Empire of 
Mali in the justification of the reforms (Amselle, 2006). 
traditional deliberation and consensus as a foundation for the new institutions of local 
governance:
In village public meetings, the floor is given first to the youngest and last to the eldest. 
The latter summarizes the opinions expressed by everyone before suggesting a 
consensual decision. If consensus is not possible, another meeting is necessary. This is 
how decisions are still made among the majority of the population. This type of practices 
cannot and should not be ignored as we build the new forms of public management. [My 
translation] (Sy, p.131).  
 
  This passage is an example of a larger discursive formation that I will call the language 
ideology of the “primordial consensus.” By “language ideology” I refer to a set of normative 
assumptions in and about language and their relation to a social context; these assumptions can 
be located at three levels, which we can call: language structure, regimentation of language in 
use or “meta-pragmatics,”61 and “meta-discourses” on language (Schieffelin, Kroskrity, and 
Woolard, 1998). These three “levels” are perhaps more easily understood as degrees of 
explicitness or degrees of reflection. They range from lexical and grammatical patterns, to the 
regimentation of the use of language embedded in interactions, to an ideology of or about 
language. The boundaries between these three levels are not always clear, and in many ways they 
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61 This second part is corresponds to Silverstein’s understanding of language ideologies as “implicit 
metapragmatics” or “the linguistic signaling that is part of the of the stream of language use in process 
and that simultaneously indicates how to interpret that language-in-use.”
overlap. What matters to this argument is that these three levels affect each other, but cannot be 
inferred from each other; that is, they are not coherently organized.62 
 In the above passage, Ousmane Sy turns a description of language use in the rural areas 
into an ideology of language with normative weight. The explicit purpose was to ground the 
sovereignty of the newly created councils in the ways in which “decisions are still made among 
the majority of the population.” This idea of a rural, ancient capacity for deliberation and 
consensus can be understood as a nativist fantasy of the educated elites. However, it is much 
more than that. References to a mythical past of felicitous deliberations and consensual 
agreements are also common in the villages and small towns. Elders resort to the “primordial 
consensus” ideology as they lament the disappearance of respect and agreement in the current 
times; but their meaning and intent are likely to be quite different from Sy’s perspective. 
 The ideology of the “primordial consensus,” as articulated by both intellectuals and local 
elders, presupposes a relatively isolated and self-contained village as the incontestable unit of 
action and accountability and the main arena of discussion (Kockelman, 2007). Whereas the 
elites take the existence of such a unit for granted, the Kitan elders see it as linked to a 
foundational or constitutional speech act that is often mentioned in public discourse. In Kita, for 
the four founding families, the possibility to produce binding, consensual agreements was 
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62 Let me give an example. The existence in Mexican Spanish of a grammatical distinction between 
“tú” (you familiar) and “usted” (you formal) reflects a linguistic ideology that presupposes the existence 
of two types of addressees; that much can be inferred from the grammar and lexicon. My mom telling me 
that I should always use “usted” when talking to a waitress is an example of “meta-pragmatics” or the 
regimentation of language’s use, notice that my mom’s norm and its social implications cannot be derived 
from grammar. Finally, if I wrote an article saying that the distinction between “usted” and “tú” is a 
vestige of an aristocratic past that should not have any place in a democratic republic, such intervention 
would be an example of the third level, a “metadiscourse” or an ideology about language. If I managed to 
eradicate the use of “usted” in Mexico, that would be an example of an ideology of language affecting the 
other two levels: grammar and use.
ideologically secured by the tight association between the foundational agreement [Bam. Kita 
benkan], the ground of the village—both as land and as distinctive landscape features which 
protect the force of the foundation, and the distinction between foreigners and natives.63 The 
force emerging from the foundational speech act is understood to reside in the place itself, and 
can be manipulated by the original families. The foundational agreement is anything but 
egalitarian; in fact, it inaugurates hierarchy, among other things, by establishing a distinction 
between hosts and guests (Amselle, 1996). Seen from the perspective of the “primordial 
consensus” ideology, all subsequent meetings held in the name of Kita take place within the 
“constitutional” frame established by that foundational act. When the notable elders talk about 
the old times it is not to emphasize the egalitarian and public character of “traditional” meetings, 
but to lament the loss of their authority, and with it, the loss of agreement and cooperation [Bam. 
ben].  
 So far we have only looked at the ways in which two groups of people—identified here 
as “intellectuals” and “Kitan elders”—talk about “traditional” meetings and the difference in 
what they value or emphasize. They are both examples of ideologies of language or “meta-
discourses.” Observing meetings as they unfold, that is, looking at the regimentation of language 
use, reveals other things about the ways in which “decisions are still made among the majority of 
the population.” The legendary “deliberation trees” [Fr. arbre à palabres] are indeed part of most 
villages’ design, and it is common to see people hanging out in their shade, but I never heard 
anyone give them too much importance. However, “vestibules” [Bam. bulon]—the small rooms 
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63 The opposition between dùgùden and dunan or “natives” and “foreigners” among the Mandingues has 
been largely discussed by anthropologists, for a recent discussion in relation to decentralization see 
Traore, 2006. 
built at the threshold of a notable house’s inner court and the street in which elders used to sit to 
discuss serious matters— still hold symbolic importance and in some places are still in use. The 
image of the “deliberation tree” is an egalitarian and public one, and even though the right to 
speak is allocated by age and gender, everyone is entitled to it. Conversely, “vestibules” are right 
on the threshold of a house are therefore much more exclusive than trees, as they have an owner 
and a few regular attendants. Beyond trees and vestibules, what I found in Kita and the 
surrounding villages was that serious conversations, other than the meetings of large association 
[Bam. ton], always took place in a room inside a house. Since most domestic activities, including 
cooking, eating and watching TV, take place in the courtyard, it was remarkable that only when 
people needed to discuss serious matters or receive an important guest would they go inside a 
room. 
 Accompanying politicians in their tours of the villages, I confirmed this pattern, as they 
were always received in absolute privacy by the local notables. The procedure was always the 
same: one must visit the chief’s house first, (he might be sitting under a thatch roof by himself, 
while women and children go on with their activities). After the guests have greeted everyone 
and drunk water, the chief stands up and goes by himself into a room, then one of his wives 
comes to let the guests know that he is waiting for them. I was 
excluded from these political conversations. However, I participated in a similar “chamber 
discussion” of a very serious kind concerning the dissolution of a marriage engagement; the old 
aunts travelled hundreds of kilometers from their villages in “the bush” to Kita just to hold this 
conversation. Only the young people directly involved in the issue participated in the meeting 
with elders, and as in Sy’s excerpt, the youths were allowed to speak first. The meeting lasted 
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hours, everyone spoke, and although married women dominated the discussion, the conclusions 
and compromises were articulated by elder men. I would not say that a consensus was reached, 
but the man’s decision to dissolve the engagement was respected despite the fierce opposition of 
most of the elders, who at the end gave up. In contrast with the political meetings I had attended, 
this “private public” meeting was remarkable in its solemnity. It did not occur to any of the 
participants to disqualify the discussion itself, neither because of its format or procedure, nor 
because of the intentions of the speakers. The meeting was secluded and the discussion earnest, 
and insofar as the whole affair was put to rest afterwards, the agreement was also binding or 
felicitous. 
 What I found at the Communal Council was quite different. As we will see in this 
chapter, some aspects of the linguistic regime I call “primordial consensus” figured in the official 
political discussions—in particular, the relevance of age and the dislike for solving issues 
through voting. However, these practices appear in the communal councils as part of a larger 
repertoire of competing ideas concerning public speech and politics. The coexistence of these 
multiple linguistic ideologies is not always peaceful or mutually reinforcing; quite the opposite. 
It is common to hear local commentators emphasize the conflict between this traditional 
linguistic order and the diffusion of liberal principles such as pluralism, “critical debate,” and 
freedom of speech. 
  Every regime of language has its own procedures for the accomplishment of felicitous, 
binding speech acts. Everyday language is full of examples of this regimentation: a check needs 
to be signed, a promise needs to be sincere, a marriage engagement comes with a ring, and so on. 
For Austin, such procedures work because they are based on “convention,” which is to say that 
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every time I sign a check, I “cite” a known procedure. However, in the particular case of the 
check, the felicity of the speech act — that is, my ability to cash the check — is guaranteed by a 
financial institution and ultimately by the State. Both compliance with established procedures 
and the existence of an institutional framework are required for the felicity of the speech act; 
neither condition alone is sufficient. However, if I promise my sister not to lie to her, the felicity 
of that promise does not presuppose the existence of an institutional framework in the same way 
as signing a check does. Therefore, it is possible to classify binding speech acts by looking at (a) 
whether they require an external enforcement or fulfillment mechanism, and (b) which form that 
mechanism takes: the state, the army, the university and so on. These criteria also allow us to see 
different aspects of the relationship between felicity and sovereignty. For example, a communal 
council can agree to impose a sales tax of 5%, but it might need the help of the central state to 
collect such a tax; conversely, a drug cartel might decide to impose a fee and collect it without 
the need of another institution. 
 The idealized version of village deliberations is concerned with legitimizing the process 
through which decisions are locally made, but it takes for granted the ability to implement those 
decisions.  The decentralization reforms that announced the “return of power home” created 
many new institutions for collective decision-making, but they assumed that the binding power 
of such decisions was guaranteed by the legitimacy and validity of the process—from the mode 
of election of council members to the organization of the meeting itself.  However, these reforms 
did not increase the capacity of the municipalities to enforce and administer their decisions 
substantially.  
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The Communal Council of Kita
 The urban Commune of Kita acquired its status of “partly self-governing commune” [Fr. 
commune de moyen exercise] not in 1999, as did many other Malian towns and villages, but in 
1955, during the last years of the French colonial period.64 Ever since then, an appointed or 
elected Local Council has been part of Kita’s political life. Following the decentralization 
reforms, the mairie of Kita, the administrative center of commune, retained some of its old 
functions and acquired some new ones. Mairies are in charge of performing civic marriages, 
keeping the vital records of the commune’s population, collecting local taxes and market fees, 
dividing and assigning communal land, and managing public facilities such as public abattoirs 
and standpipes. The large majority of the people living in Kita only attend the mairie in order to 
obtain an identification or other type of personal document, or to get married; in fact, the mayor-
adjunct who is in charge of performing marriages is known informally as the “popular 
mayor” [Fr. le maire populaire]. 
 Besides these administrative functions, mairies also house a political organ, the 
Communal Council, manned by locally elected representatives and presided over by the mayor. 
The Communal Council approves the yearly communal budget, decides on local public works, 
serves as interlocutor for NGO’s operating in the area, and manages the activities and resources 
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64 The November 19th 1955 Law voted on by the French National Assembly transformed the territorial 
administration of French West Africa (AOF), Equatorial France and Madagascar by establishing fully 
self-governing communes [Fr. communes de plein exercise], and “partly self-governing communes” [Fr. 
communes of moyen exercise]. The few communes that attained such status, such as Kita, Kati, and 
Koulikoro, were governed by a mayor, who had the status of public functionary and was designated by 
the chef de territoire, and a Municipal Council, elected by a college. The differentiated assignment of 
citizenship rights to heterogeneously defined units is characteristic of the redefinition of the relationship 
between the metropole and the colonies that resulted from World War II (Cooper, 2014).
resulting from the Sister Cities program, among other tasks.65 The Council issues 
“deliberations,” which are the main legislative instrument at the communal level. These 
deliberations can take the form of general rules — such as “the tax on alcohol sales should be 
five percent”—or ad hoc decisions regarding a specific matter, such as “Mister Konaté should 
move his market stand because it is obstructing circulation.”  
 The meetings of the Communal Council of Kita take place mostly in Bambara, but 
representatives switch to French frequently: when they have to deploy a legal term, when they 
read documents or cite official letters, when they dictate the written formulation of a 
“deliberation,” and sometimes for no apparent reason.  The General Secretary doubles as a 
simultaneous translator as he writes down in a big, official-looking notebook, in French, a 
summary of each oration and all the “deliberations” issued by the Council. The way of 
conducting meetings and the rhetorical styles deployed by the representatives alternate between 
standard French civic procedures—reading the “order of the day” and approving it, confirming 
that the quorum is attained, raising hands before speaking, asking for motions, and so on—and at  
particular moments, the use of local styles of formal speech. The most distinct example of the 
latter happens when a councilman begins to fulfill the task of word “catcher”, which in other 
venues is usually fulfilled by a griot who interjects an approving sound at the end of every 
sentence uttered by the main speaker.66
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65 Almost every urban and rural commune in Mali has a “sister commune” in Europe. Sister communes 
maintain some communication throughout the year and carry out joint cultural, economic, and social 
projects. The minutes of the meetings of the Communal Council of Kita show that a very significant 
amount of time and resources of the Mairie of Kita have been devoted to manage issues related to the 
sister communes program. Judging by the Council discussions, the expenses of receiving, hosting and 
feeding the French delegates were sometimes perceived as higher than the benefits received from the 
program.
66 This type of genre has a very distinct prosody resulting from the rhythmical combination of statement
+griot’s affirmation+statement.
 I was allowed to look into the archives of the mairie, a couple of old colonial wooden 
cabinets full of large notebooks and dusty bundles of documents. One set of notebooks contained 
the minutes [Fr. PVs] of all the discussions that the Council has had since 1961—first written by 
hand and later on typed in sheets of papers glued to the pages of the big notebook. Another set 
contained all the “Deliberations” issued by the Council since 1955. There was also a “Journal de 
Poste,” a sort of log kept by the Administrative Secretary with a short entry for almost everyday. 
Some of the entries referred to the weather and to phases of the moon. Between February 25th 
and March 12th 1991, all the entries read: “Student Unrest” [Fr. troubles scolaires]. The next 
entry was from March 26th: “Fall of the Moussa Traore regime.” After which, commentaries on 
the weather continued. 
 Reading the minutes of the Council session from the late eighties, one finds other striking 
continuities, but also some subtle changes. In the late eighties, during the last decade of the 
Moussa Traore single-party regime, the sessions of the Communal Council were always attended 
by UDPM party authorities, which were not council members and figure in the minutes as 
“Invited Personalities.” In the last communal elections of the UDPM in 1988, the mayor El-Hadj 
Seydou Mariko Keita and a large number of council members were reelected; the speeches of the 
commandant de cercle and the party authorities are quite critical and make references to 
“unsatisfactory results” of the municipal administration. The mayor began the first session of this 
new council by saying: 
[5.1] [Fr.] I will never cease calling for sincere, frank and loyal cooperation. We are the 
lungs of a single body. Once the elections are over, rivalries should end. Let us work hand 
in hand for the happiness of our town. [December 27th, 1988, Livre de PV, Kita]
187
 Judging by the minutes, it seemed that during the era of the single-party regime, the 
communal council was struggling with rivalry, suspicion and intrigue as much as it was in 2010, 
when I began to attend the sessions. Competition within the UDPM party during election season 
was similar to inter- and intra-party rivalry following the transition to democracy. In 1989, an 
interesting discussion took place, which I will recount briefly because it provides an interesting 
contrast to the 2010 discussion that I analyze later in this chapter. 
 The building that to this day hosts the mairie is a colonial, two story house in rather bad 
shape; the first floor serves as the mairie, and the second floor as the house of the commandant 
de cercle. This “cohabitation,” as they refer to it, has been the source of trouble over the years. In 
June 1989, the mayor called for a council meeting to discuss the situation because the 
commandant had unilaterally built a partition between the entrance to his house and the entrance 
to the mairie. According to the mayor, the commandant told him that the mairie had no rights 
over the building or the land, which, he said, belonged to the state administration. Two 
representatives of the UDPM party, one of them also a deputy at the National Assembly, were 
invited to the meeting. The council discussion must have been heated, since the minutes report 
council members repeatedly urging each other to argue “without passion.” Council members 
accused the mayor of calling them to discuss a “fait accompli,” instead of preventing the 
commandant from building the partition. One of the council members in 1989 was Dabo, who 
was mayor in 2010 when I attended the council session that I describe below. The Secretary 
translated and summarized Dabo’s intervention in the following terms:  
[5.2] [Fr.] I blame the mayor and think he was wrong. When the commandant de cercle 
informed him of his intention, he should have refused right away. People are going to call 
us cowards. [June 17th, 1989, Livre de PVs, Kita]
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 He was not the only one to speak against the mayor or to express concerns about public 
opinion. After harsh speeches from a few council members, the deputy and representative of the 
UDMP in the meeting intervened. He complained for having had to wait so long before speaking, 
then said: 
[5.3] [Fr.]All this commotion doesn’t bring anything concrete. We know the source of the 
problem, and we are not simply standing by with our arms folded. The Secretary General 
of the Party Section has already begun the negotiations needed to reach a desirable and 
definitive result. [June 17th, 1989, Livre de PVs, Kita] 
 The deputy’s speech obviated the need for any further debate; attendants understood that 
the party authorities at the Section level (at the time, the UDPM only had a Sous-Section in Kita) 
were going to take care of the problem. This conviction was reiterated by one of the council 
members, Kabouné Kouyaté, who said: “Too many people have commented on this issue. I think 
that now that politicians are in charge, we should let them act freely.” The relationship between 
elected authorities, the commandant de cercle, and civil servants was tense, and not only because 
of the physical cohabitation in the building; there are other examples of this tension in the 
minutes. This short case suggests that the UDPM provided at the time an alternative, if informal, 
channel for the municipal elected authorities to affect State decisions at a regional or national 
level. With the adoption of multi-party democracy, such capacity to act as intermediary between 
the municipality and the central state was divided into “slices” of different sizes, each one 
constituting the asset of one of the many parties. The transition to democracy, in all its 
dimensions, appears in the books of the marie of Kita as a one page handover speech act, with 
the signatures of the outgoing mayor, the incoming mayor and the commandant de cercle, who 
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acts as witness. The only difference from previous handover documents is that after the 
“transition to democracy,” authority was transferred from a mayor to a “special delegation.”    
Fig. 4. Document of Handover from the last UDPM mayor of Kita to the “special delegation” in July 
1991. 
 The “Special Delegation” met only once, and it was to discuss with the traditional chiefs 
the organization of “awareness campaigns” in each neighborhood. The next page in the book 
contains minutes from April 1992, when the first session of the new multiparty communal 
council took place. The number of council members remained the same, 31, and out of these, 6 
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were outgoing UDPM members who had now been reelected through one of the various parties 
created after the transition to democracy. One of them was the doyen, who on that occasion said: 
[5.4][Fr.] This council is composed by militants of multiple political parties. However, we 
are grouped here for a common cause: the well-being of the commune. That cannot be 
done within diversity. So, let’s forget the past, political fights and factions. The 
management of a commune is not an easy thing, especially in the case of ours. 
 Just as in 1988, the doyen’s inaugural speech reiterated the need to create unity out of 
division; the difference was that now there were multiple political parties. The sentence that the 
secretary used to translate the doyen’s words is striking: “[Securing the well-being of the people] 
cannot be done within diversity.” Besides the ongoing preoccupation with division and conflict, 
another interesting constant over the decades is the argument that Kita is a very “difficult town.”  
In 1992, one of the council members confirmed the doyen’s opinion in this respect: “Indeed, our 
commune is one of the most difficult ones from the point of view of the mentality of its 
inhabitants.” From the discussion, it became clear that one of the more difficult aspects of the 
relationship with Kitans was tax collection; the new multi-party council received a marie that 
had not been able to collect virtually any taxes in years. 
 One unexpected novelty appeared only after the transition to democracy: 
transparency. In the same first council session of 1992, one council member said: “I demand that 
all work should be done with the transparency that democracy demands. All the decisions 
concerning our town should be made in council deliberations.” Another council member echoed 
the sentiment: “Everyone advises transparency, me too, I think that it is only in those conditions 
that we will be able to build the well being of our people.” I do not know whether council 
members used the French term “transparence”, or “kokaje”,  the Bambara expression that 
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became popular during the transition to democracy, which literally means “to clean” or “to 
wash.” In this context, “transparency” primarily referred to the public denunciation of the 
Moussa Traore regime’s financial corruption.
 The 2009 Communal Council, whose sessions I attended, consisted of 31 representatives 
from five political parties. In communal elections, each party presents a list with as many 
candidates as there are council seats; constituents vote for the entire list, not for individual 
candidates. The number of seats that each party obtains is proportional to the number of votes; 
candidates are selected in their order of appearance on the list. Once the relative weight of each 
party in the council is determined, all the posts (mayor, adjuncts, treasurer and so on) are 
distributed among the council members. Usually, the party with the largest representation gets to 
place one of its council members as mayor. However, when the results of elections are close — 
as is often the case — there are intense negotiations to determine who occupies which post; the 
situation is further complicated by the fact that council members, once elected, can switch parties 
and thus shift the entire balance of the election. This phenomenon is sometimes called “political 
nomadism.”
  A couple of weeks go by between the elections and the formal configuration of the 
municipal administration; this is a period full of intensity and intrigue. Someone told me the 
story of a rich marabout who was trying to become mayor in a commune near Douantza and had 
invested a considerable amount of money in the campaign; the results of the election were so 
tight that if only one of his men shifted to the other party it would prevent him from becoming 
mayor. His solution illustrates the undercurrent of suspicion and the scarcity of binding forces 
that I am trying to convey: he locked up in a room the man whose betrayal he most suspected, to 
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prevent him from being tempted by members of the rival parties who would surely come to offer 
him money. 
 Communal elections in Kita are rife with tactics of this sort. One of the council members 
gave me a full account of how the negotiations unfolded after the 2009 elections, which resulted 
in the situation that I found a year later. The two parties with the largest number of votes were 
the ADEMA and its “younger brother” the URD, which split from the ADEMA in 2003. The 
negotiations took place in the house of the youngest ADEMA council member, N’diaye. They 
began early in the morning; all the elected council members attended and discussed the matter 
until sunset. “Keita smoke two packs of cigarettes that day, he almost cried,” N’diaye told me. 
They finally reached a compromise: the ADEMA would choose the president of the Cercle 
Council and the URD would choose the mayor, and they distributed all other posts following the 
same alternating principle. Once the agreement was reached, another question emerged: “how do 
we make sure that everyone respects the agreement if voting is secret?”
  A reliable and shared source of binding force had to be found to prevent council 
members from changing their minds on the day of the internal election, which would finally 
formalize the decision made at N’diaye’s house. The solutions found are significant because they  
incorporated multiple regimes of language; it was almost a “pacte satanique,” N’diaye said. The 
select groups of party leaders met at one of the two hotels in Kita called Le Refuge. After eating, 
they swore over the Quran to respect their engagement. Then they resorted to a second known 
procedure, which consists in drinking a sort of porridge collectively—later on, someone else told 
me that to be effective, the porridge had to be prepared by a virgin woman with a particular type 
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of mill. At that point, a number of council members said that “swearing over the Quran was 
enough for them” and left the group. 
 However, the remaining small group decided to add another lock to the agreement, which 
this time required going to “the bush.” Fifty kilometers away from Kita, there is a small village 
where some people go to make pacts; breaking an engagement made there brings death. I have 
heard multiple and fragmented versions of the story of that place; I was told that a very religious 
man used to live there, and that his son committed a serious transgression against the rules of 
hospitality, by attacking a guest. The son either died or was sacrificed by his father (accounts 
vary), but his spirit is still around and punishes betrayal. One of the three procedures — or some 
combination of the three — must have worked, because the agreement was respected and the 
posts were distributed as planned. However, in the sessions of the council, the same difficulty in 
the production of a binding force was sometimes apparent. 
The Restitution of Baba Oumar Bouré
  In November 2010, the mayor of Kita called for a special session of the Communal 
Council to discuss an unusual affair. Seven years earlier, a number of riots had taken place in 
Kita. During one of those riots, arguably led by the local youth, the house of one of Kita’s 
representatives at the National Assembly, Baba Oumar Bouré, was looted and burned. The 
context of this incident was not explained in the Council meeting, and it was only later that I was 
able to get a full account of the events that took place in 2004. 
 Baba Oumar Bouré had been a prominent political figure in Kitan and national politics 
since the transition to democracy. He was elected representative to the National Assembly in the 
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district of Kita for two consecutive terms running for the ADEMA party. In 2003, he joined the 
faction that split from ADEMA and formed URD; “he took all his people with him and left 
ADEMA because the president of the URD is his kin,” as a local commentator remarked. He was 
elected for a third term as representative to the National Assembly, this time running for URD. At 
this point, people from Kita had begun to resent his “gluttony” or excessive political ambition. 
The fact that he originally came from somewhere else to settle down in Kita became increasingly 
problematic and people began to call him a “foreigner” [dunan in Bambara]. 
The incident that led to the burning of Oumar Bouré's house started with a radio 
broadcast. In early April 2004, the local station of Radio Kayira67 retransmitted a recording of 
Oumar Bouré’s campaign promises. The radio broadcasting exposed the inconsistency between 
Bouré’s electoral promises and his actions. This is the first in a series of broken promises and 
unkept commitments in this story. Someone informed Oumar Bouré, who was not living in Kita 
at the time, of what was going on at the radio station. Bouré called the prosecutor of Kita, who 
immediately went to the radio station and confiscated the cassette. At this point, and possibly 
under the instigation of Radio Kayira, the mobilization began; a crowd filled the streets and 
ended up looting Bouré's house.68
 After the incident, Oumar Bouré opened a judicial process against the mairie of Kita, 
demanding restitution for the damages caused to his property. The Regional Court of Kayes 
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67 Radio Kayira is a station linked to the SADI party, one of the few openly leftist and oppositional 
political parties in Mali. Its headquarters are in Bamako but a few regional affiliates broadcast 
intermittently. It is known for making public the concerns and struggles of poor people all over the 
country, but it is also often criticized for fueling local conflicts.
68 Johanna Siméant has convincingly argued that demonstrations and riots are a far more common 
resource in Malian political life than the overall ideology of consensus would admit. Most demonstrations 
taking place in Bamako have been, according to the author, physically, symbolically and administratively 
closely linked to the State (Siméant, 2011). 
issued a ruling favorable to Oumar Bouré and held the mairie of Kita accountable for the 
payment of 71 million FCFA (approximately 130,000 dollars). Years went by and the restitution 
remained unpaid. In 2011 the issue remerged, as the prefect of Kita sent a letter exhorting the 
mairie to pay the restitution. This letter prompted the special Council meeting which I analyze 
here. The issue was so unusual that not only councilmen but also traditional neighborhood based 
authorities [dugutigis], were invited to attend the meeting. 
 The mayor of Kita at the time was Dabo, a member of the URD party, and thus a fellow 
party member of MP Oumar Bouré.  Mayor Dabo is not an idealist politician by any means. A 
trader by profession, he had a very pragmatic approach and was always interested in the 
commercial aspects of politics: attracting investment to the commune, organizing trips to France 
to purchase machinery, buying office equipment for the mairie, and so on. His use of French 
suggested experience and travel rather than schooling, and he was quite familiar in his bearing 
with others. In a newspaper interview he affirmed: “In two years, Kita will be a modern city, 
with roads, an adequate sewage system, modern bus terminals, and big residential buildings like 
ACI 2000 in Bamako” (Les Echos, April 13th 2011). More importantly for Kitans, mayor Dabo 
is categorized as a “caste man,” because of his last name. Casual and pragmatic, he did not have 
any objections to my presence in the Council meetings and was in fact quite welcoming; “our 
work is transparent,” he said to me. 
 In his opening briefing to the meeting in question, mayor Dabo deployed a number of 
legal notions limiting the range of courses of action available to the Council. It is unimaginable 
for a mairie to disregard or resist a court ruling, because “the State is also subject to the law.” 
Public administration, he said, “is continuous,” therefore the current administration had to 
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assume all debts and issues left behind by the previous one. The only option left to the Council 
was to decide on the payment arrangements and make an offer to settle the issue with less than 
71 million. This is how he opened the session:  
[5.5] [B] Which is the first point in today’s agenda? [F] It is the disposition to take 
regarding the restitution of the damages and interests caused to honorable Oumar Bouré 
in conformity with the ruling number 61 of December 22nd 2005 of the Court d’appel of 
Kayes. To brief you a little bit…the events [B] took place in 2005, youth rose up to go 
and burn Bouré’s house. Bouré was Kita’s representative at the National Assembly at the 
time. [F] So…[B] his house was burnt. He brought the State to the tribunal, by State I 
mean the Mairie of Kita. The first trial took place here, he won it. A second one took 
place in Kayes, he won that one too…The minister sent me a letter, here is his letter, to 
say that we should try to pay the 71 millions to Bouré. Here is the letter, I’ll pass it 
around so you can read it. The ruling of the Court d’appel is also here. Bouré also sent a 
letter to the minister to ask him to help him get his money…so when the letter reached 
the minister, the minister read it, and thus decided to write to the governor, the governor 
wrote to the prefect, and the prefect sent us a letter to say that we should pay this money. 
[“B” at the beginning of a sentence indicates that the original is in Bambara, “F” indicates 
that the original is French]
 
 Since many of the participants in this meeting had already taken part in the efforts of the 
previous administration to solve this question, the mayor needed to explain how the question had 
reemerged. The mayor’s introduction placed Kita within a larger network that extends across 
many geographical locations and administrative scales; the incident began at the local level and 
reached the regional one, only to come back as a command moving from the capital to the 
region, and from there to the commune. Even though he said that the mairie of Kita is “subject to 
the Law” in his introduction, the court ruling itself seemed less important than the series of 
quasi-personal letters asking the mairie to pay the debt. As the discussion unfolded, the source of 
obligation and the types of binding acts kept shifting, including campaign promises, rulings, 
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personal letters, foundational agreements, personal engagements, the manipulation of occult 
forces, and conspiracies. 
  Written documents were brought to the table and read out loud to emphasize the gravity 
of the matter and the enforceability of the judicial decision. The mayor took pains to read each 
letter and pass it around. The councilmen pondered them, explicitly relating their obligatory 
nature to the quality of being written documents. Councilmen were confronted with four 
documents, of which two—the letter Oumar Bouré wrote to the Minister, and the letter the 
Minister wrote to the Prefect—were actually personal letters, though written in a very official 
style. Oumar Bouré’s letter to the minister had as its subject “Request of intervention for 
execution” [Fr. Demande d’intervention pour execution]. When the mayor read this letter to the 
Council, he dwelled on the title: “Notice the term, eh”—he said to the Council in French
—“notice the term: request of intervention for execution.” The letter continued: “Mister Minister, 
I have the honor of appealing to your benevolence to grant me your cooperation in the 
enforcement of ruling number 61 of the Court of Appeals…” After reading these two sentences 
to the Council, the mayor interjected a short translation in Bambara: “He wants the minister to 
help him.”  In other words, this was a personal petition and would have carried less weight if its 
author had not been a representative at the National Assembly and a powerful politician, but its 
bureaucratic style made it sound impersonal and appear as a legal resource equally available to 
any Malian citizen. The letter was simultaneously an instance of personal and impersonal 
mediation, “formal” and “informal” politics.
 Following the mayor’s introduction, the Council’s discussion started in a slow, reflective 
tone. It followed a pattern that I have observed in other meetings of this kind. The first speaker 
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simply rephrased the issue, emphasizing its importance and refraining from adding anything new. 
Then a number of procedural objections were made: there is no quorum, the agenda has too 
many points, the agenda should be voted on before the discussion is opened, and so on. These 
sorts of objections are very common in political meetings, especially in councils and youth 
associations, where half of the time of the meeting might be spent debating procedural matters. It 
might be that overcoming these objections reinforces the legitimacy and formality of the 
meeting, allowing for felicitous speech acts. 
 According to Austin, speech acts can be infelicitous, or ineffective, if they are not 
appropriate to a context; if they, for instance, don’t follow the conventional procedures, are not 
uttered by the appropriate subject, or are not completed. Austin calls “misfires” the speech acts 
that derive their ineffectiveness from flaws in procedure. “Misfires” are different from “abuses” 
which are speech acts that have no procedural flaws but are infelicitous because they are 
insincere (Austin, 1-24). The procedural objections often made at the beginning of political 
meetings serve to reduce the likelihood of “misfires.” If, for example, the Council were to issue a 
deliberation without the necessary quorum, such deliberation would be invalid or void. Once 
procedural objections have been overcome, the risk of “misfires” is contained. However, the risk 
of “abuses” remains. The requirement of sincerity does not have to be exclusively understood as 
the correspondence between an individual’s speech and his or her internal emotions, thoughts, or 
intentions.69 It can be broadly understood as the degree of concurrence between the different 
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69 In a well-known article, Michelle Z. Rosaldo argued that Searle’s choice of promises as the 
paradigmatic example of speech act and his emphasis on individual intentions and sincerity made 
culturally specific categories the basis for a universal taxonomy. Among the Ilongot, she argued, 
commands are the exemplary act of speech and little importance is accorded to the correspondence 
between speech acts and individual internal states. See Michelle Z. Rosaldo, “The things we do with 
words: Ilongot speech acts and speech act theory in philosophy,” Language in Society, 11 (2): 20-237.
arenas or networks in which a politician is moving. The containment and inflation of “abuses” 
are the main concern of what follows. 
 The interventions of the first couple of speakers centered around a common concern: why 
was the question of Bouré’s restitution was being raised again? Many of the participants recalled 
a previous commitment which was supposed to end the quarrel, and which had now proved 
infelicitous since the matter had come up again. Someone suggested looking back into the 
Council book to review the terms of the previous agreement with Bouré. At this point, the oldest 
man in the room, the traditional chief, spoke:
[5.6] [B] I am certain that this is the fourth time that Bouré’s affair has been raised here.  
Another person and myself were sent last time to go to his place and ask him to drop the 
matter. I said: “The relationship that we have built, which made you Member of 
Parliament three times, is not an insignificant relationship. You leave our place to go to 
your place, and this is how you pay us: by leaving us a debt of 71 million! By bringing 
the matter to the courts!”... I said: “Bouré, this is not fitting. Whatever happens to you, it 
is as if it happened to us. We cry with you. We come to beg you. If we made you deputy 
three times, it was because of trust. In the name of that same trust: drop all problems 
between us.” 
 According to the old man, the norms regulating the relationship between natives and 
newcomers—or hosts and guests—in the Manden apply to Bouré’s case, and pre-empt any other 
legal principle. The regional court stated that the mairie of Kita owes a restitution to Bouré, but 
for the old man, it is Bouré who is indebted to Kita for having used its lands and received the 
trust and votes of its people. The other interesting aspect of the old man’s oration is his surprise 
and frustration at seeing that the negotiation he led did not result in a lasting solution to the issue. 
Not only had Bouré broken his promises to the population; he had also failed to respect his 
engagement with the elders. He had pretended to agree while concealing his true intentions; there 
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was no correspondence between what he said and what he did. This is how the old man 
explained it: 
[5.7] [Bam.] Bouré said: “There is no problem, I’m going to withdraw the written 
complaint.” But he didn’t withdraw it, he just gave us false reassurances. He didn’t 
withdraw it! [...] He said: “God willing, we will drop this affair.” That is how we departed 
last. But inside him he did not accept! I wouldn’t believe that people are still talking 
about Bouré in this town if it weren’t for this letter [He points at the letter that was passed 
around]. However, Bouré is gone, but the mountain of Kita is still standing. It hasn’t left 
its usual place! We will show the question of Bouré to the mountain of Kita. It is not a 
question of making sacrifices to the ña. But we will show the mountain this question of 
Bouré. ... Let us leave this affair to the mountain of Kita, let us leave this affair to the 
binding word on which Kita was constituted.  
 
 Bouré’s engagement was an “abuse,” in Austin’s terms. It lacked conviction, it did not 
translate into acts. For this elder, the mountain of Kita —Kita-Kouroun, which contains the force 
of the foundational act — is the appropriate arbiter and enforcer as far as the transgression of the 
original rules goes.70 The mountain of Kita is associated with the power of “the binding 
foundational word” [Bam. Kita sigi benkan]. The power of the mountain is sovereignty. Not just 
anyone can mediate between Kitans and the mountains, it is the prerogative of the founding 
families, which the elder represents in the meeting. 
 As the old man finished speaking, mayor Dabo expressed his approval: “Yes, that’s right, 
dugutigi.” However, the discussion quickly returned to administrative matters and written 
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70 The mountain of Kita is mentioned in most versions of the Sundiata epic. According to D. T. Niane’s 
version, before the arrival of Sundiata, Kita was inhabited by the Camara clan and governed by a 
powerful king who was protected by the “jinns” of the mountain. There was a little pond in the mountain 
and its water would give power to whoever drunk it. When Sundiata and his people arrived to Kita, they 
made a big sacrifice for the mountain: one hundred white ox, one hundred white lambs and one hundred 
white cocks. The jinns of the mountain listened to Sundiata, and he was able to seize the town of Kita 
peacefully, only the king died. That is how the alliance between the Camara and the Keita was founded 
(Niane, 1965).  
responses. The following speaker stated in a pragmatic tone: “The negotiations that took place 
earlier did not succeed. What we need to do now is discuss the modalities of the payment and 
answer this letter.” That is, he indirectly stated the ineffectiveness of the old chief’s methods in 
obtaining Bouré’s commitment to give up the affair, and the need to use written documents 
instead of oral engagements. 
 At this point, the mayor disclosed that he had already written a formal response to Oumar 
Bouré communicating the will of the mairie of Kita to pay the restitution and announcing that a 
council meeting would be held to discuss “the modalities” of the payment. The fact that the 
mayor had written a response before consulting the council provided the perfect excuse for those 
who were interested in calling the whole affair into question. The discussion became heated and 
confrontational. Malian, one of the councilmen who had been interjecting concerns since the 
beginning of the meeting, openly dissociated himself from the mayor: “That letter is your 
personal engagement, you can’t speak in the name of mairie of Kita if the council has not 
deliberated.” Mariam Keita, the only female member of the council, also expressed her 
disapproval: “It is not even worth for the council to meet if you already decided what to do. You 
are inviting us to eat leftovers.” Just as they did in 1989, council members complained that they 
were being asked to discuss a fait accompli. 
 The mayor defended his position: “What did you want me to say? I had to answer like 
that. The State is a subject of law—I’m speaking as an intellectual here—I had to reply like that. 
What do you want me to say? That we are not going to pay?” The mayor’s response is a meta-
pragmatic commentary, he tells Malian that his response was the only acceptable one given the 
legal status of the mairie. He also slips a commentary about the “intellectual” nature of his own 
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speech. The mayor defended the content of his letter, but Malian’s point was not that the letter’s 
content was wrong, but that the letter was invalid  because it had not been preceded by a Council 
deliberation. In Austin’s terms, the letter was a “misfire.” The argument about the response letter 
not only undermined the possibilities of consensus, it also cast doubt and mistrust over the entire 
process. 
 As this incident suggests, defining the conditions of felicity for certain speech acts goes 
far beyond the application of preset procedural norms and becomes part of the deliberation itself. 
Establishing that there is a quorum only requires counting; but in this case, determining whether 
a mayor’s letter engages the council becomes a discussion within the discussion. It needs to meet 
its own requirements of felicity to produce a legitimate outcome and assure the felicity of the 
broader discussion.71 To put it in different terms, sometimes the regimentation of “felicity” looks 
like the application of a rule, but sometimes it looks rather like the outcome of a process.72 
Furthermore, Malian’s contention that the letter involved procedural flaws became an indication 
of potential “abuses” by casting doubt about the mayor’s real intentions. If that were true, it 
would mean that sometimes infelicity spills over from procedural errors (“misfires”) to invalidate 
the presumption of sincerity (“abuses”).   
 The mayor tried to defend his position and made a concrete proposition to solve the 
problem: “The mairie of Kita should make an offer to Oumar Bouré in parcels of land and hope 
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71 This logic recalls Carl Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on exception.” In a 
sense, defining the condition of “felicity” for speech acts is a constitutional act, it requires “rules” to 
locate themselves outside the order that they are creating. (Schmitt, 1988). 
72 Comaroff and Roberts trace two different traditions or paradigms in Legal Anthropology. The authors 
trace the interest in rules or “the positivist orientation” back to Maine’s Ancient Law. Conversely, the 
emphasis on “processes” or the idea that “behavior is constrained primarily by the intrinsic properties of 
social relations and by the exigencies of interactions” goes back to Malinowski’s Crime and Custom in 
Savage Society. (Comaroff & Roberts, 1981).
to settle the affair with less than 71 million.” The council, however, was not willing to discuss 
the technicalities of the payment yet. Speakers kept discussing the premises of the issue and 
more general questions: the fact that the problem had not been successfully solved in the past, 
the need to raise awareness among the youth to prevent similar incidents from happening again 
in the future, and so on. It became clear that there was not going to be an easy, consensual 
solution to the case. 
  At this point, N’diaye—the youngest councilman (38 years old) and a member of the 
ADEMA party—openly addressed a point that seemed to have been avoided by senior council 
members, but that was on the table nonetheless: “71 millions is too much money. There is not a 
house in Kita that is worth that much money.”  This was the first time the justice of the court’s 
ruling was explicitly questioned. A passionate altercation broke out between N’diaye and 
Sangaré— a senior councilman and a fellow party member to the mayor and Oumar Bouré, all 
from the URD party. The dispute almost reached the level of physical violence: N’diaye and 
Sangaré stood up aggressively shouting at each other, chairs were moved, and the mayor and 
other participants tried to calm the two adversaries. In the middle of all the noise and overlapping 
shouts, Sangaré and Younousi shouted back and forth in French: 
[5.8] [Fr]
 N’diaye: 71 million is too much!
Sangaré: Is not too much!
N’diaye: Is too much!
Sangaré: Is not too much!
N’diaye: Is too much. You have something at stake! 
 
 In short, N’diaye was accusing Sangaré—and, by association, the mayor—of having a 
secret deal with Bouré. The implication may have been that the mayor and other URD 
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councilmen wanted the mairie of Kita to pay the restitution because Bouré would share part of 
the gain with his fellow party members. Interestingly, if we overlook for a moment the 
accusation of corruption, we see that the explicit core of the dispute is a disagreement about the 
value of local real estate. Accepting that the deputy’s house is worth that much money entails a 
heavier financial burden for the mairie, but this inflation in the value of local land is not 
necessarily bad for a political class in the habit of trading with that currency.73 Later in a personal 
interview, N’diaye explained the issue to me in the following terms: 
[5.9] [F]We shouldn’t have accepted to pay such an amount in the first place for a house that 
is not worth it. That day, I figured they had agreed among themselves beforehand to come 
and tell us that. Because it seems that Baba Oumar left Kita not long ago74…since the mayor 
is a member of the same party, and Sangaré too, he is the General Secretary. All those people 
are URD. So, it seems that Baba Oumar left Kita not long ago, so maybe he pushed them to 
make that suggestion. And then they come and put this as the first point of the agenda!  
  
 In N’diaye’s rendering of the conspiracy meeting, participants trust each other, reach 
agreements, cooperate, and respect their engagements. Bouré betrayed the ADEMA and joined 
the URD. His house was burnt because he had not kept his promises to the population; he did not 
honor the verbal commitment to drop the matter that he had expressed in front of the chief. There 
were doubts about the mayor’s intentions because he wrote a letter without consulting the 
council. Infelicity is ubiquitous in this story, except in the imagined occult or private meetings. 
The face-to-face meeting that N’diaye imagines took place between Oumar Bouré, the mayor 
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73 The primary development plan of mayor Dabo in 2011 was in fact the construction of a gated 
community for “overseas Malians” and “rich people.” In an interview with L’Independent in April 2011, 
Dabo explained that the Mairie was hoping to generate 300 million FCFA from the cession of the 35 
hectares for this project. L’Independent, April 13th 2011, p.3.
74 Saying that someone “Left not long ago” [Il a quitté ici recement] is a common expression used both in 
French and Bambara to say that someone came from somewhere else to visit and has now left.
and other URD councilmen is assumed to be felicitous, unlike the real council meeting. By 
felicitous, I mean that the participants were bound in an agreement that they respected. This 
brings me back to Kita’s regime of language. 
 The verb “to conspire” in Bambara is composed of two elements “janfa” and “siri.” 
“Janfa” means “betrayal,” and “siri” means “to attach” or “to tie a knot,” but “siri” is more 
broadly used to signify binding acts and contracts. For instance, the performance of a marriage 
by religious or civic authorities [Bam. furu-siri] also has “siri” as part of it. “Siri,” in other 
words, indicates a local category of binding speech acts of which conspiracies are an example. 
When I told a local friend the story of how the chief claimed to have persuaded Bouré to drop the 
matter, she said that certainly the chief had “attached” (siri) Bouré beforehand — by which she 
meant that he had used invisible powers, probably with a marabout’s help, to make him agree to 
everything. This is another example of a speech act, in this case involving invisible forces, which 
is expressed with the verb siri. Interestingly, in Bambara, the word “jùru” means both “debt” and 
“rope,” which suggests that claiming a debt is also, metaphorically, a form of attaching someone. 
According to N’diaye, the URD members—mayor Dabo, deputy Bouré and Secretary General, 
Sangaré—got together in private and “attached the knot of a conspiracy,” to reclaim the marie’s 
debt to Bouré. This explanation was so obvious to N’diaye, so “transparent,” that he did not even 
need the evidence from the visible, public meeting of the council. He told me: 
[5.10] [Fr.]I understood right away what they wanted. Even before they exposed the 
question, I knew they were going to suggest that we should make an offer in parcels of 
land […]. I know them very well. I know their moral standards, we were together in the 
ADEMA long ago, and they are the ones who left.
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 If N’diaye knew so well what to expect, why was he overcome with rage and why did he 
decide to make a public accusation in the meeting itself? “I wasn’t able to control myself that 
day,” he told me. This contrasted with the more cynical attitude he adopted later in our 
conversation.  Younnoussi’s accusation threatened to make the entire frame of the council 
meeting collapse. If he were right in thinking that everything had been arranged behind the 
scenes to benefit the members of the URD party, then the council meeting would be a farce, an 
“abuse” from beginning to end, a “formality” to give official status to a decision made elsewhere, 
in the felicitous conspiracy.   
  The discrediting of public information and official political acts is not a rare 
phenomenon. It has been described as a common trait of official publics with a highly ossified 
ideology that elicits only formal adherence from its citizens, who follow the protocols but do not 
necessarily abide by their truth claims.75 It is also characteristic of publics marked by conspiracy 
theories that read all official public information as lies or “abuses.” In a similar situation, one 
could adopt a cynical stance, take the meeting as a meaningless formality, and attempt to 
advance one’s interest in the political contexts that really matter. 
 However, N’diaye’s choice to make a public accusation in the space of the meeting itself 
points towards a more ambivalent relationship with official political institutions. His accusation 
might have hurt the reputation of other councilmen, and even helped to delegitimize the council 
as an organ, but at the same time it reasserted the norm of transparency and disinterest that this 
“anomaly” violated. The presupposition of a conspiracy did not invalidate council meetings as an 
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75 I am in particular thinking about Alexei Yurchak’s argument that the late soviet period was 
characterized by a “formal” adherence to ideology. See Alexei Yurchak, “Soviet Hegemony of Form: 
Everything Was for Ever, until It Was No More,” Comparative Studies in History and Society, 5 (3): 
480-510. 
effective resource to block or advance initiatives, but it complicated the production of trust 
necessary to contain the accusations of “abuses.” In N’diaye’s intervention, the Communal 
Council retained its ambivalent legitimacy. 
 The Council meeting reached a dead end. The mayor and other Council Members 
managed to de-escalate the conflict and, to a certain extent, discount N’diaye’s accusation. At the 
climax of the altercation, as the mayor was trying to prevent Sangaré from physically attacking 
N’diaye, age-based hierarchies emerged as an organizing principle: “Sangaré, he is your younger 
brother, don’t judge him; N’diaye, there are elders in the room, calm down.” Several speakers 
suggested formulae typical in the treatment of “sensitive” issues: “A commission should be 
formed to discuss the payment” or “Speakers should limit themselves to concrete propositions.” 
At the end, the mayor’s voice took over a silent hall. He spoke in a slow, authoritative tone: “We 
have no personal interest in this. Bouré will be paid. We will offer from 10 to 20 land lots and 
we’ll close this question once and forever. We will write a letter renouncing any further judicial 
action and he will sign it.” “What if he refuses to sign?” someone objected, again concerned with 
binding acts. “We will solve the question on the social level,” was the mayor’s response as he 
moved towards the second point of the agenda.76 To solve something on the “social level” means 
to address the plaintiff personally and find a negotiated solution to the problem. This resolution 
was not formally approved by the Council, nor written down in the book of “Deliberations.”   
   This story contains multiple layers and kinds of infelicity. The whole affair would not 
have emerged if the judiciary system had the capacity to enforce its ruling and collect the 
restitution. The lack of State capacity enabled this story just as much as popular anger against the 
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76 Original in French: “On va gérer ça dans le plan social.”  
empty promises of a national representative did. The traditional chief was commissioned to 
mediate, but only managed to obtain a void verbal commitment from Bouré. His strategy to 
produce obligation failed as well. Years later the issue remerged through a number of semi-
personal letters advocating for Bouré. The mayor brought the question to the council and 
proposed to pay Bouré with parcels of land. The mayor’s personal proximity to Bouré—based on 
party membership—became suspicious. N’diaye’s accusation made the meeting collapse. No 
agreement was reached and the whole thing seemed a farce. 
 The final solution proposed by the mayor has two components: a personal negotiation 
and the signature of a legal document. These are mutually dependent. Bouré had already proved 
that he could change his mind easily and that a verbal commitment would not be enough to bind 
him.  However, getting him to sign the letter required the personal intermediation of the mayor. 
Interestingly, personal relations between the mayor and the deputy were the main source of 
suspicion and official infelicity; but at the end they turned out to be also the only effective 
solution to the issue. Solving the issue “on the social level” was attributed the felicity that the 
official meeting lacked. However, the commitment required a signature. 
 The infelicity of “formal” speech is profitable to the felicity of the “informal” speech. 
These two realms need to be seen as a whole. Perhaps the best outcome for the mayor and Bouré 
was for the official meeting to be infelicitous so that the “social” solution could be felicitous. 
Perhaps there is an investment in official infelicity. This argument echoes the idea of the 
“political instrumentalization of disorder” (Chabal & Daloz). Official infelicity means more 
margin of action in “the social level.” It opens up possibilities for different actors. 
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 In the Epilogue, I will look at how the rumor tha president Touré did not intendt to leave 
the presidency began to spread in 2011. I suggest that rumor and speculation are forms of action 
that emerge in the space opened by official infelicity. 
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 Epilogue
I left Mali in October of 2011 planning to go back in April of 2012 to follow the campaigns for 
the scheduled 2012 presidential elections. The military coup of March 2012 took me completely 
by surprise. I was struck by the speed of the events, not imagining that it would be so easy to 
overthrow Touré’s regime, or any regime, for that matter. I returned to Mali in June 2012, 
revisited the National Assembly, spoke to some of the politicians I had interviewed in 2011 in 
Bamako, and spent some time talking with “pro-coup” organizations in Bamako and Kati—the 
garrison town that became the headquarters of captain Sanogo and the junta. I will discuss those 
conversations elsewhere. Here, I will only address only one theme, because it pertains to the 
relationship between speech, intentions and action.  
 Democratic time is cyclical; it imposes a particular rhythm on politics, punctuated by the 
regularity of elections. Democracy establishes a predictable succession of “dry” and “wet” 
seasons: periods of activity and inactivity (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Electoral democracy is one of 
the few, (if not the only) strictly pro tempore forms of government, in the sense that exceeding 
the constitutional term of a mandate implies the automatic elimination of political legitimacy 
(Linz, 1998). In 2011, the rumor that president Touré did not intend to leave the presidency 
began to spread. The argument is now a historical counterfactual, because the coup ended the 
presidential term before the argument could be proven. The rumor, in fact, was among the 
arguments for the coup. 
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 The military coup led by captain Sanogo against president Touré interrupted constitutional, 
electoral cycles with two main arguments. The central one was that president Touré had proven 
incapable of commanding timely and decisive military actions against “rebel” groups in the north 
of the country. The second argument was that he did not intend to leave the presidency at the end 
of his term. Some commentators went further and suggested that Touré had “a deal with the 
rebels” to stay in power.  
 The junta hardly had a political platform; the coup began as an army riot in the garrison 
town of Kati, which then led to a rather infelicitous constitutional act. It ended with an 
international agreement that granted captain Sanogo the rights and privileges of a retired head of 
state. All this occurred within a couple of months. This interruption of constitutional, electoral 
cycles opened up a space for other, non-electoral, interpretations of political time to come to the 
foreground. Conversations often focused on time and temporal categories: international 
deadlines and ultimatums, constitutional terms, pauses, blockages, predictions, counterfactuals, 
generational conflict, delays, History, revolution, renewal, and backwardness, were some of the 
most common ones. 
  I noticed many people saying that they had vexpected the coup, that they had seen it 
coming. Furthermore, the counterfactual assertion that president Touré would not have left the 
presidency at the end of his term had become almost a certainty. I was surprised to hear one of 
his close collaborators, a member of the team of experts that drafted the constitutional reform, 
say: “Now, I’m not so sure, I think that maybe it was true that president Touré was not planning 
to leave power.” We engaged in long retrospective exegesis of the signs and proofs that could 
have indicated how events would unfold.  
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 As an epilogue, I will look at newspaper articles from early 2011 to show how the debate 
about president Touré’s intentions took form. I do not intend to establish a causal relation 
between the rumor and the coup, but only to delineate some aspects of this other form of public 
discussion. In these commentaries, president Touré figures as an inscrutable center around which 
interpretations proliferated. The aggregate effect of these interpretations was uncertainty and 
unpredictability. The question is: to what extent can such collective production of uncertainty be 
considered a form of political action? 
Speculation
 During the early months of 2011, the rumor that president Touré would not leave the 
presidential office at the end of the constitutional term in June 2012 began to circulate widely in 
the media and in private conversations. There were three main arguments supporting this claim. 
 In 2008, President Touré commissioned ex-minister Daba Diawara and a group of experts 
(CARI) to create a reform project to “strengthen democratic institutions.” The group of experts 
proposed a project with far-reaching institutional changes—which included creating a Senate, 
establishing quotas to increase the political participation of women, adopting proportional 
representation at the National Assembly, requesting a mandatory financial disclosure from all 
civil servants, among others. Since the reforms required constitutional changes, they could only 
be adopted through a popular referendum. President Touré submitted the project to the National 
Assembly in 2011, requesting authorization to organize the referendum. 
 At a time when most parties were concerned with the organization of presidential elections
—which require considerable expenses—the idea of organizing a popular referendum before the 
elections seemed absolutely untimely. However, most people’s worries lay elsewhere: there was a 
213
widespread belief that the reform involved removing the presidential term limits established by 
article 30 of the constitution. In other words, people believed president Touré was proposing to 
reform the constitution in order to get reelected for a third term. Even among deputies and people 
who collaborated closely with the reform project, there were either real doubts about the truth of 
this claim, or a deliberate effort not to disclose any information regarding that aspect of the 
reform. Students, journalists, and politicians in Bamako talked about the reform but very few had 
seen the proposed text. The draft proposal had been ready since 2010; no one, including the team 
of experts that created it, understood why president Touré took so long to send it to the National 
Assembly. At the end of 2010, one of the members of the CARI gave me a Power Point 
presentation by the reform team explaining the main points. Interestingly, the presentation did 
not mention the proposition to allow a second presidential reelection. Most commentators at the 
time, like myself, ignored whether the removal of term limits was really part of the reform. 
 However, I was struck by how the rumor became a certainty. Moreover, it seemed to follow 
the logic of regional contagion: commentators repeatedly evoked the catastrophic case of Niger
—where president Tadja’s attempt to reform the constitution ended up in a coup—as a way of 
alerting the public of the possible dangers of a constitutional reform in Mali.  
 A second major argument supporting the claim that president Toure did not intend to leave 
office was the government’s silence and inactivity regarding the organization of elections. Many 
political parties, and not only the minority in the opposition, expressed concern that the 
government had not taken clear steps to organize elections. Ten months before the expected 
election date, a reliable voter registry [Fr. fichier électoral] had not been created.
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 The validity of elections as speech acts depends on the existence of an up-to-date, accurate 
list of voters. This is particularly crucial in a country like Mali, in which the large majority of 
voters are youth and therefore might not appear on earlier lists. The costs and logistical 
challenges of creating such a registry cannot be taken for granted in a State with limited 
administrative capacities and where a part of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic. Many 
parties and politicians, from the PARENA to the MPR, spoke in 2011 in favor of incurring in 
those expenses for the sake of preventing post-electoral conflicts of the kind that afflicted Ivory 
Coast and Guinee. Furthermore, many demanded the creation of a voter registry with biometric 
scanning to avoid post-electoral conflicts. 
 The third factor grounding the rumor that Touré would not leave, and the one that triggered 
the most commentaries, was that different political actors—from mayors to representatives of the 
private sector—openly expressed their wishes to give president Touré an extra “two-year bonus.” 
The argument was that the president needed time to complete the “major transformations” he had 
started, and that those two years would enable a “harmonization of terms” [Fr. harmonisation des 
mandats]. That is, the extension of the presidential term would allow for all electoral terms to 
start and end at the same time, making all elections—communal, national, legislative and 
presidential—coincide. The idea was that this would reduce campaign expenditures and the 
overall cost of organizing elections. 
 This idea gained momentum in January 2011, when a hundred people signed a petition in 
the city of Sikasso asking president Touré to “extend his presidential term” until 2014 to make 
“communal, legislative and presidential elections coincide and allow him to complete the big 
projects for the development of our dear Mali” [ref]. When the rumors and commentaries 
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triggered by what came to be known as “The Sikasso Letter” were at their peak, a related 
initiative came from the private sector. 
 Jeamille Bittar—a wealthy man of Lebanese origin and head of the Chamber of Commerce 
during Touré’s presidency—collected donations from the “private sector” to offer a gold medal to 
the president. A public ceremony at the Modibo Keita stadium was organized and 30,000 people 
were expected to attend. The newspaper articles published around that time — late January and 
early February of 2011 — show a rising tide of speculation, suspicion, and unanswered questions 
centered around the president’s intentions: was he planning to leave office or not? 
 One of the most controversial points was the price and weight of the medal. Nobody 
seemed to know for sure how much it was worth; numbers varied from 20 to 250 million FCFA
—that is, between forty thousand and half a million dollars. It was also unclear whether it was 
made of one or two kilograms of gold. Speculations concerning the characteristics of the medal 
were tied to the question of what were the real intentions of Bittar and his group in paying tribute 
to the president with this ceremony and how was president Touré going to handle the praises 
coming from this group. A number of journalists and political actors—notably Ibrahim Boubar 
Keita—alerted president Touré against this untrustworthy group. A good example of this type of 
public statement containing an exhortation addressed to the president was published by Les 
Echos on February 4th 2011: 
[6.1] [Fr.]ATT, remember that you have been elected and that your term has a limited duration 
in time. We are not against your decoration, Mister President, but it should be done by 
honorable people, people of proven integrity. Don’t fall into the tramp of those who think 
only about their own interests, those who want to buy you with gold. Give up the recognition 
(of the belly) of Bittar; chose instead the eternal recognition of the Malian people...
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 [My translation] (Alexis Kalambry,“Les 2 kilos d’or de Bittar à ATT: Quand tombent les 
masques.” Les échos, February 4th, 2011). 
 Public statements like this one made of praise and adulation the main threat. They 
presented the president as vulnerable to it and warned him against those who surrounded him. In 
the above passage, the warning is addressed directly at the president, using the second singular 
person. However, as a newspaper article, this letter to the president is meant to be read by a 
larger, anonymous audience. This formal choice produces an interesting effect. The president is 
represented as surrounded by deceitful advisors and intriguers who addressed him for the sake of 
“their own interest.” Kalambry, the article’s author, presented himself also as an advisor, but a 
genuine, well-intentioned one. Using the second person to advise the president suggests that the 
president is influenceable, and the decision still open. It emphasizes uncertainty.  
 For as long as Touré’s intentions remained unknown to the people, interpretation and 
speculation about his plans and thoughts proliferated. According to this logic, the center of the 
system was opaque and unpredictable, and needed to be interpreted. The president did not appear 
here as an almighty will, but as someone at risk of being blinded by the praises and plots of those 
seeking to advance their own interests. There was a very similar pattern in the exhortation of 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the commentary that Falé Coulibaly, a journalist from 
L’Independent, added to it: 
[6.2] [Fr.][Even though] Current national events are marked by rumor and speculation about a 
hypothetical extension of the presidential term, the president of the RPM remained 
untroubled. For him, president ATT can be trusted not to follow bad advisors. IBK stated: “I 
have advised the president of the Republic ATT to beware of those people who pretend to 
help him whereas they only seek to benefit themselves. [My translation] [Falé Coulibaly, 
“Présentation des voeux de nouvel an 2011 au RPM: IBK démande a ATT de se méfier des 
conseils de son entourage, L'Indépendant, February 3 2011]
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 Boubacar Keita (IBK) reported to the general public a private conversation in which he 
advised the president to mistrust other advisors. Again, in so doing, IBK emphasized his own 
proximity to power, but also the president’s vulnerability to bad advisors.  He stated his trust in 
the president’s integrity, but also warned him against the double game of those around him. In 
these warnings, the image of a king in relative isolation and whose relationship with the subjects 
is mediated by mischievous advisors and courtiers comes to mind. The following excerpt from 
another newspaper article published on January 26th, 2011 dwells on these monarchic images: 
[6.3] [Fr.] ATT, nothing but ATT, and then ATT, ATT....and is it really for ATT or for the ATT 
system? But where is ATT in all this? [...] Since he [ATT] didn’t say clearly that he did not 
want [the extension of his term], the clan of courtiers and partisans inferred that he did, and 
the shameless opportunists raced to outdo each other in bowing before the desires of the 
Chief, vying to fulfill the “will” of the Prince before it was even expressed [...] We are of 
those who think that, until proven otherwise, president ATT did not engage anyone to make 
the case for a term extension after a tumultuous match of two five year terms. [My 
translation]  (Sambi Toure, “ATT sera-t-il complice?”, Le Quotidien des sans voix, Mercredi 
26 janvier 2011). 
 Just like Boubacar Keita, this journalist felt compelled to reiterate his trust in president 
Toure’s integrity—his capacity to resist the influence of the courtiers, for example—as well as 
his innocence. The president is not part of the intrigue to make him stay in power, everything 
happens around him. These repeated public expressions of trust in the president seemed look like 
discursive mechanism to bound him by making him responsible to such trust.  
 Most statements portrayed the president as silent. For instance, according to the above 
article, what might have prompted the intriguers to start their praises and petitions was that the 
president did not “say clearly that he didn’t want” to stay in power. The center of power did not 
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speak and expectation built up as people waited for him to provide information about his 
intentions. On January 25th, L’Independent published an article written in a neutral, informative 
tone about the medal ceremony. It emphasized the expectation that the president would clarify 
the issue around the project to extend his term:
[6.4] [Fr.] In this ceremony the president of the republic will receive, on behalf of the national 
private sector, the “Gold medal of the 50th anniversary” worth about 250 million FCFA.  
Certainly, the March 26th 1991 hero will seize the opportunity offered by this big meeting of 
all Malians to further clarify his actual position on the harmonization of electoral terms, a 
concept which is on everyone’s lips today. [My translation] (Mamadou Fofana, “Remise de la 
médaille d’or du cinquantenaire d’une valeur de 250 millions FCFA le 5 février au stade 
Modibo Keita,” L’Independent, January 25th,  2011, p.5) 
 The switch from “the president of the republic” to the epithet of “March 26th 1991 hero” is 
an innocuous rhetorical device to avoid repetition. It is, however, significant because it switches 
from a constitutional role, the president, to one situated outside or beyond the constitution: the 
hero. The “hero” was Toumani Touré as army officer leading a coup against dictator Moussa 
Traore in 1991, renouncing to power and grandiosely granting a democratic constitutional order 
to the Malian people. One of the more interesting ambiguities in the petition to grant the 
president a couple of “bonus years” was that Touré’s capacity to renounce power in 1991 was 
used to argue that he deserved a bonus in 2012. The “Sikasso Letter” referred explicitly to this act 
of political self-restrain. Touré’s proven respect for the constitutional order was used as an 
argument to advocate for an unconstitutional exception. 
 The article cited above is from January 25th, 2011. A couple of days earlier, on January 
21st, president Touré accorded an interview Les Afriques—a weekly financial newspaper based 
in Geneva with broad circulation in Francophone Africa. Touré blunt statements seemed enough 
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the end the debate about the extension, the president committed to leave.  The interviewer was a 
“foreigner” whose identity and nationality remained anonymous. The security crisis in the North 
of the country was the main theme of the interview. However, the interviewer was sufficiently 
informed about the Bamako political scene to inquire about the rumors and petitions concerning 
the extension of the presidential term. This was president Touré’s answer to this question: 
[6.5] [Fr.]I don’t know how they will extend my term. I don’t know what it means to 
extend a term. My term ends on June 8th, 2012 and I have never thought... I’m even 
surprised to see them discuss my fate without me, and without anyone, beside you, 
coming to ask me what I think. I think that these are artifices. These are things that have 
absolutely no sense. [My translation] [ref]
 
 There was no uncertainty after all. The president was completely excluded from the 
discussion of his on fate. Rather, he saw the debate with astonishment and judged it undeserving 
of an intervention: he had not said anything for the simple reason that no one asked him. He 
found the debate absurd and as he interestingly pointed out: he did not understand how it got 
started in the first place. Unsurprisingly, Malian journalists reacted bitterly to these dismissive 
comments and blamed Touré’s preference for foreign journalists for the lack of communication. 
These were the remarks of Sekouba Samaké, a journalist of the InfoMatin, which preceded the 
integral transcription of the famous interview of Les Afriques: 
[6.6] [Fr.]ATT will not have a dauphin [favored successor] in the 2012 elections. He said so 
straightforwardly to our foreign colleagues, who had no trouble eliciting comment from him 
(a local journalist would have spent what is left of the presidential term without obtaining 
from ATT the smallest remark on this issue). As far as interviews go, for local journalists, 
ATT is secluded in a bunker; it would be impossible to be admitted if it were not for the 
traditional June 8th press conference, which takes place only once a year. However, the 
international press, the darling of Koulouba, does not miss any occasion to be the star. This 
time, it succeeded in the feat of making Bamako’s big-man speak out on a very controversial 
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issue that will have interesting repercussions on the rest of the national body politic. [My 
translation]  (Sekouba Samake, “Les héritiers d’ATT: Et maintenant?” InfoMatin, February 
2nd,  2011). 
 
 Discontent with the president’s silence remained after his blunt and straight forward 
answers. Journalists simply added more precision to the original statement: it was not true that 
the president did not speak, he just did not speak to his own people. As far as Malian journalists 
were concerned, Touré was “secluded in a bunker.” The interview with Les Afriques dissipated 
rumors for a short while, and made Bittar's medal ceremony seem more awkward and difficult to 
justify. If the president had already stated that he did not intend to extend his term, what were 
Bittar and his clique seeking with their public praises? Bittar organized a press conference on 
January 31st to clarify that the medal was not worth 250 million but only 20 million FCFA. 
Journalists, however, did not take well this delayed attempt and dismissed it by saying: “If he 
needs to justify himself, it means he is guilty of something.”
 Two months later, the gold medal and the ceremony had been forgotten, but the 
speculations on Touré’s intentions and the concerns about the organization of the elections had 
not faded at all. Many politicians and public figures made public statements about the urgency to 
set the bases for “transparent and reliable” elections to avoid post-electoral crises. A central 
question to this debate was the creation of an accurate electoral census, since the one available 
had not been updated, meaning that the names of deceased people had not been removed and 
those of the younger generation of voters had not be added. The RAVEC, a new electoral list 
secured with biometric data, became for many the only guarantee to a peaceful electoral 
transition even though it would increase the costs of elections significantly. On April 1st, to cite 
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one example, Elhadj Tiégoum from Le Republicain, wrote in his note on the PARENA’s public 
statement concerning the importance of having an accurate electoral list: 
[6.7][Fr.] PARENA worries about the silence surrounding the RAVEC operations and warns 
the authorities against mismanaging the 2012 elections: “If we don’t pay attention, we will 
end up either in Benin’s embarrassing situation or in Ivory Coast’s tragic one” added PPR, the 
General Secretary of the PARENA. Contrary to what happened in 2006, when not a single 
authority lent an ear to PARENA’s concerns regarding the electoral census, this year we have 
heard some responses. First from the President of the Republic, who promised clean 
elections with or without RAVEC (without, most likely). Then from the Prime Minister who 
wrote a letter to PARENA to “assure them that the government would take all measures 
needed for the good organization” of elections. [My translation][My emphases](Elhadj 
Tiégoum, “La sonnets d’alarme et les sourds”, Le Républicain, April 1st, 2011).
 This is a good example of what I call “contagion arguments.” These were common at the 
time in newspapers and at the National Assembly. In Mali, politicians, journalists and students 
follow closely the political events of all Francophone Africa, in particular of the neighboring 
countries. Events in other countries often prompted a domestic parallelisms. Conflicts in other 
countries were used to illustrate the domestic catastrophes that could take place if the proper 
decisions were not made. In this article, the cases of Ivory Coast and Benin were used to 
underscore the importance of a reliable registry. 
 The author again states that the source of worries is government’s silence and inactivity.  
However, it also made an interesting clarification. The government was not silent; governmental 
statement were being dismissed: 
[6.8][Fr.] In a normal country, once the president and Prime Minister had spoken, we would 
end the debate, move on, and get to work. However, Mali is, if not abnormal, at least 
“atypical” as a country. Declarations abound, but often actions are taken belatedly, if at all. It  
is certainly for this reason that political actors have urged each other to sound the alarm and 
pull the government out of its lethargy.
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 [My translation](Elhadj Tiégoum, “La sonnets d’alarme et les sourds”, Le Républicain, April 
1st, 2011).
 Elhadj Tiégoum’s interpretation of Malian political life suggests that dissociating political 
statements from actions is a national habit. In "normal" countries, he writes, “public promises 
would be enough to put everyone at ease.” The Malian anomaly, according to Tiégoum, is that 
even though these politicians received a formal answer, no one was reassured. He calls the 
problem: “atypical country.” I call it infelicity and suspect that it is more widespread in 
“atypical” and “normal” countries than Elhadj Tiégoum thinks. 
 The decisions of president Touré only became more opaque. In April 2011, he appointed a 
new government with Ms. Cissé Mariam Kaidama Sidibe as prime minister; that was the first 
time a woman led the Malian government. She had two missions: accomplishing the ambitious 
constitutional reform projected by CARI and organizing “transparent and credible presidential 
elections.” However, the new government took three months only to submit its political platform
—Politique générale de gouvernement (PGG)—to the National Assembly. 
 An extraordinary plenary sessions was called on June 27th to discuss the platform of the 
recently appointed government. The Assembly hall was at its full capacity. All ministers were 
sitting on the right side of the plenary hall facing the central podium. Representatives also came 
numerous, even the seats that had remained empty for most of the ordinary season were occupied 
by men and women wearing their most exuberant outfits. The prime minister had thirty minutes 
to explain the central guidelines and goals of her government. Deputies had a chance to express 
their concerns. There were only a couple critics of the government’s guidelines. One of the 
harshest ones came from Boubacar Keita and it concerned time. He said: 
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[6.9] [Fr.] I have no doubts about your qualities. But is that what matters here? No! Here 
and now we are discussing priorities and timing. All the Olympian gods seem to have 
been consulted. It seems, however, that the most important one has been ignored. Yes, 
madam, Chronos! The god of time is particularly cruel against those who shall forget his 
omnipotence. And, alas, his wrath begets awful surprises. So let us protect ourselves 
against them. [Short prayer in Arabic] God forbid. 
 Boubacar Keita invoked Chronos’ wrath. He directed the minds of the audience towards 
“awful surprises.” Then he called to strive for their avoidance, and uttered a short prayer to 
dissipate the possibility opened by his own words and closed the statement with “God Forbid.” 
This is a well-established rhetorical formula, which I call “God Forbid.” The prime minister 
visited the National Assembly to present her vision of the future and her strategy to actualize 
such vision. Boubacar Keita’s statement carved out an exception in the government’s vision. He 
did not even define the threats, he left them up to the audience’s imagination.  
  Competition between two possible futures is politics in the most classical way. In the 
Aristotelian definition, political oratory differs from forensic and laudatory types because it is 
centered on deciding future collective action. In the "God forbid" formula two future scenarios 
compete. One is considered fortunate, the other unfortunate. The visions of disaster urge the 
audience to act. However, the depiction of disaster is performative and is attributed some degree 
efficacy. Otherwise, the prayer and the statement “God forbid” would not be necessary. The 
evocation of disaster always comes coupled with its antidote. There is a leakage of responsibility 
in the sense that the mere enunciation of future misfortunes entails a degree of responsibility for 
the speaker. “God Forbid” is the exact opposite of “Insh’allah.” Both are examples of 
performative speech. 
224
 All the examples I have referred show different people—journalists, politicians, and “the 
private sector”—speculating about presidential intentions and the future more broadly. On one 
end of the spectrum, Bittar and his group offered the president a “2 year bonus” and a gold medal 
of controversial value. On the other end, journalists and politicians warned the audience against 
political catastrophes. The aggregate effect of these statements was uncertainty and 
unpredictability. Speculating on the president’s intentions is admitting that they have a bearing on 
the duration of his term and thus admitting that the near political future is ultimately uncertain. 
 Uncertainty was partly justified by the government’s inactivity concerning elections and by 
the president’s abrupt decisions. However, looking at this collection of statements suggests that 
the government was only partially responsible for uncertainty. Other actors—journalists, 
politicians, “the private sector”—seemed to have contributed to establish doubts about the future. 
In other words, they speculated. Speculation is a form of political action.
 Uncertainty multiplies conceivable future scenarios. It enables new courses of action to 
some actors, and forecloses some other. It widens the range of the politically possible by 
removing institutional constrains, it also narrows it by making the long-term outcomes more 
difficult to calculate. Emphasizing the opaque and unpredictable nature of presidential intentions 
enabled courses of action. 
 In the summer of 2012, when I returned to Mali after the coup, I had a conversation with a 
high-school teacher. He supported Sanogo and the coup. He was sure that Touré did not intend to 
leave power. He, however, wished the captain had waited until the rumor was proven right, in 
which case the coup would have been a legitimate move against a “dictator.” 
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Le Républicain, Bamako. 
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Appendix 1:
Transcriptions in the original languages
Chapter 1. Authority
1.1 
L’épanouissement d’une culture de la paix est lié de façon intrinsèque à: a) La promotion du 
règlement pacifique des conflits, du respect et de l’entente mutuels et de la coopération 
internationale; b) Le respect des obligations internationales en vertu de la Charte des Nations 
Unies et du droit international; c) La promotion de la démocratie, du développement et du 
respect universel de tous les droits de l’homme et de toutes les libertés fondamentales; d) La 
formation, à tous les niveaux de responsabilité, de personnes qui sachent favoriser le dialogue, la 
médiation, la recherche du consensus et le règlement pacifique des différends; e) Le 
renforcement des institutions démocratiques et la possibilité de participer pleinement au 
processus de développement; f) L’élimination de la pauvreté et de l’analphabétisme et la 
réduction des inégalités au sein des nations et entre celles-ci; g) La promotion d’un 
développement économique et social durable; h) L’élimination de toutes les formes de 
discrimination à l’égard des femmes grâce à leur autonomisation et une représentation équitable 
à tous les niveaux de la prise de décisions; i) Le respect, la promotion et la protection des droits 
de l’enfant; j) La promotion de la libre circulation de l’information à tous les niveaux et de 
l’accès à l’information; k) Une gestion des affaires publiques plus transparente et une 
responsabilité accrue en la matière...
1.2
Quelles sont ces valeurs traditionnelles positives? J’insiste beaucoup sur le terme “positive” 
parce qu’il peut y avoir de valeurs traditionnelles négatives...Mais ces valeurs traditionnelles 
positives, vous le connaissez, c’est le partage du bonheur, la bonne entente, et du bien vivre 
ensemble, c’est la tolérance c’est le respect de la parole donnée et de la décision prise sous 
l’arbre a palabres, n’est-ce pas? C’est l’hospitalité, c’est l’humanise solidement ancré dans nos 
sociétés...
1.3
A kuma kuma ba, bqn bq lasabati ni sira jumqn ye? Fo hadamaden yqrq ka dilan. 
Hadamaden bq dilan cogo jumqn? A bq daminq gwa k\n\. Cq n’a muso, u ka gwa k\n\; 
lu k\n\, lu denw bqq lajqlen. Den mana b\ b\lon na, b\lon k\n\ m\g\ bqq ka jq ala k’a 
ladamu. N’a taara kalan ta fqn o fqn na, Morikalan ta, Tubabu kalan ta, a mana taa nin 
kalan ta fen o fqn na, ka d\ fara ladamu kan. 
1.4 
Ko bq ka kan fanga la, démocratie fanga ko, ko voter in bq dama ka kan a la. Bqq: c’est 
universel, bqq de b’a la, bqq de bq voter, m\g\ si tq b’\ a la, bqq. Awa bq da ma ka kan a 
vote fana la, d\ ka vote man fisa d\ te yq...cq ka vote man fisa muso ta ye, h\r\n ka vote  
man fisa j\n ta ye, bq ka vote ye kelen ye. 
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1.5
Bqq k’a kq. Voter in fana n’i b’a kq, i b’a kq gundo so de k\n\. M\g\ t’i n’i lajq a kq f\, 
min ka d’i ye i b’o kq. Ka d’a kan m\g\ t’i ni lajq ka f\: “Ah!, ne bq siran karisa xq!” O t’a 
la. N’a ya s\r\ a f\ra ko i n’i bolo k\r\ ta kqnq kan, m\g\w bq xigin x\g\n na, m\g\w bq 
maloya x\g\n na, m\g\w bq siran x\g\n xq yqrq. O bq se ka to m\g\ d\ bq se k’a bolo 
k\r\ta d\ ye ka s\r\ o tq a sago ye. Mais nin bq kq gundo so de k\n\ o de ye xuman 
ye. 
1.6 
N bq n’ka kuma daminq ka foli kq k\r\ Nare Famakan ye. E ka k\r\ ni ne ye wo k\r\, i 
ye deputé ye kq ne xa. Mais nka n’i ya bila ko ne ka kuma i t\g\ la, o bq danaya de 
don. N’bq s\n a ma, n’tq boli a xq. Nb’i fo. Ka n’ka kuma boxq da dugutigiw k\r\. Nq 
b\ra aw de la koyi, ne te se ka kq fosi ye ka taga ka aw dan. 
1.7
Ka n’ka kuma boxa da présidium k\r\, kqrqn kqrenlqnya la, k’a da députew kan. Aw ye 
jama ka kuma f\ bagaw de ye, aw ye jama hamin f\ bagaw de ye. N’i mana ta députeya 
la y\r\ min, i k’a d\n ko Bamananw bq min f\ o de bq k’i la dq! Ko sodenin tq s\g\n s\r\ 
a woloy\r\. 
1.8
Kita ye Manden dugukole de ye, Manden jamana, depuis 1237. Depuis kurukan fuga fe 
k’a se bi ma, reglement fqn fqn fqra ya o de bq ka Kita gerer. Min bq ademayan sira wo, 
min b’a nafoloko sira la wo, min b’a marako sira la wo, o de bq ka Kita gerer. Fo ni m\g\ 
min y’o sira bila n’o tq n’i m’o bila, i ni kitakaw tq bila x\g\n na. Aw nali diyara an ye 
députew. Allah k’aw sara. Allah k’aw xuman segin aw ka so. Aw nin min kq, aw ye boxa 
min da anw kan Allah k’a x\g\n da aw fana kan. 
1.9
N’o b\ra yen, anw kana tqmq kow kqrqfe, n’i y’aw nalen ye Kita yan, min kqra Kita yan, 
aw nal’o de la...Aw nana de kana fqnw yir’an na, aw hakili la, minnun d\mbaliya y’a to, 
nin kqlq wilila Kita. Aw vye caman f\ yan, an b’a caman d\n...Nka mun ye kqlq wili Kita 
yan? J\nbaya don de! J\onbaya don de! Ko kq m\g\ la, k’a k’a la, k’a k’a la, n’a sera 
y\r\ d\la, i bolo t’a bqn de! 
1.10
Parce que ne ma d’a la ko ko bq kq Kita yan, n’a ba dugutigi ninnun bolodqsq, o 
teyin...Nka n’i ya ye fqnmin y’u bolo dqsq, kuma d\w Bamananw bq kuma d\ fana f\: 
“wulu n’a tigi jq tq s\njuguya ye!” Wulu n’a tigi jq tq s\njuguya ye de! Awa, fqn o fqn 
tigintan, bagan yqrq tigintan o manjugun, nka adamaden tigintan ka jugu de! 
Hadamaden tigintanw de donna nin kola, k’a tixe. 
1.11 
Aw k’a lajq bqq o bqq, m\g\ o m\g\ bq yan bi, ka ta prefet ma ka ta se eaux-et-forets la 
k’e ka se douanes na, e bq se ke fqn fqn sigilan bq yan bi, u b\\ra du d\ de k\n\, et mara 
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b’o du bqq k\n\...Nka n’tqna kuma jaxa, nin min kqra, a y’an bqq maloya. A ye Kitaka 
bqq maloya...Nka nbq segin a kan dq: “wulu n’a tigi jq te sonjuguya ye.” ...Nye 
dqmisqnin ye, y’u senkor\ d\w m\\den ye n ye, d\w m\...u kuloma sina yqrq ye nye. 
Nka an k’an jija, t\g\ min bq Kita la, hali bi, a ka to a n\la. Aw bi taa, aw k’aw hakili sigi, 
a x\g\n tq kq tugun, ne fana, nb’o layidu d’aw ma.  Ny’a d\n a x\g\n wqrq tena kq nin 
k\. 
1.12
N’baden alisilamew, aw salame alekum, ne balu fo, ka segi, kalu fo dugutigi t\g\la. 
Assemblée min ye nin kuma yin baju ye, an bq assemblée fo, ka duwawu k’i xe, Allah 
ka y’i bamba. 
1.13
I nara kuma minna nin ye, a diyara an ye kosobq. Ka da kan, n’i y’a mqn ko Kita 
m\g\wlu bq s\n caman la Kita la k’a soro a s\n tq. M\g\ de bqna bin an kan, n’o tq an 
tq bin m\g\ kan. Kita sigira kan mi n\, an dugulenw, an tq dunan lakasi, an tq dunan 
t\x\n. Dunan,n’i nara an ma, an bq b\ an la yoro, i b’i laye. 
1.14 
Nka sisan sa, dixq laban nin r\, fqn fqn y’a r\ tixa o le ye naafigiya ye. Naafigiya ye 
diiya bila x\g\n na dq!
1.15
Geleya min bq Kita bi...Kamara, Tungara, Magasqrq, ani an ka m\riw Sise, nin senkuru 
naani le bq Kita. Ni nilu ma f\ x\g\n k\, foyi tq tixa Kita. Ba ni ninnun f\ra x\gon k\, 
foyi tq bqn o k\. Ole dun bq Kita bi. Alu ka kuma faamuya dq! Gqlqya min bq yan bi, o ye 
Kamara ni Tungara ni Magasere ni Sisew, bqn t’olu cq. Dugu sigi baga dun, ni bqn t’olu 
cq, bqn bq kq dugudenlu cq xa di? O gqlqya le bq Kita yan bi. Alu yo faamu, alu ka 
sqbqn dq! 
1.16
Aw b’a fe k’an labqn yan, a ya na bqn, n’\tq bqn tq yan dq! Olq Allah sago alu sago. An 
y’a xinin an ka jelilu fq... , i b’a l\n Kita k\nin, an tq se ka taa m\g\ xinin x\r\ wqrq, k’o 
ka na an ka kuma f\. An fan bqq jeli, kuma so bq yan len. An y’a xinin jelilu fq u ka kuma 
an cq, k’a an na bqn. Jelilu siranna, naata. Jelilu kuntigi bq yan de! Jelilu siran na ala ni 
naata ma. u ma se ka an na bqn. |, n’i un y’a ma fqlq fqn fqn n\ni nin m\g\ saba, m\g\ 
naani dun ma bqn Kita yan, Kita tq bqn de! N’olu ma bqn Kita tq soumaya han! Alu n’o 
faamuya han! Nb’a falu yem f’olu ka kq kqlqn ye, F\l\, I le tun ye kqlqn yq. Bi, n’olu tila 
la, ole tile liye. Alu ka fqrq kq ali k’olu la bqn. 
1.17 
O fila nan bq min la o kan, alu ka ko tq, a kuma tq fana, kuma mankan ka b\ nin fq. Bari 
m\g\lu la kuma lo, ko “fqn o fqn , a bq n’a tqmqn sira la.” Sisan, dugutigilu la sara ko! 
Kabiri salon an bq xama nqn-nqn la la, fqn ma f’an ye dq! An le dun...sarako, sarako, 
saroko, sarako, u ka xq xinin ala. 
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1.18 
Eh! Presidium m\g\w, aw ni ce, aw ni baraji, ala ka si ni kqnqya d’a ma! Dugutigiw ka 
xem\g\ min bana kuma na nin ye, a donna lakole la 1921. Ala si filq aw k’a d\n m\g\ 
ba de tun bq kumana sisan. A donna lakole la 1921, a san bi-k\n\t\n ni k\ le ye bi ye. 
Donc...a na na ka na min f\ aw ye sisan, aw k’o faamuya. Aw nana mission min na 
sisan, bila k\ dow bila l’a bolo, m\g\ ba ya le o ye ayi kana jigi an na dq...N’otq 
problema t’a ni x\g\n cq yan dq! Problema tq Magasere ni Tounkara cq yan, a t’an ni 
Camara cq, a t’an ni Sise cq. An na ko bqq kqlqn. 
Voice from the audience: A y’a la sara ko xanab\ d\r\n! 
1.19 
Head Griot: N’balimaw bi ma dixq dan, bi tq dixq ban. Dunia dan fo ka taa dixa ban, 
ninun dqsqlen xogon n\ cogomin, hadamadenw dqsq ne xogon na ten. Kuma min be 
n’bolo, a n’a k\r\ bq x\g\n na. 
Nin ye bqn so le ye yan bi, nin ye hina so le yan bi, nin ye kelenya so le ye yan bi, nin ye 
furu so le ye yan bi, nin ye jigi so le ye yan bi. N’o jigi ni o tixa le jqnin fqrqrq, k’a ta diina 
m\g\w ma, ka n’a bila nansaraw la, ka n’a bila anw ko tigiw la, n’o le gqlqn don, Allah ka 
tixa dqmq fen d\ f\ra bi, o gqlqyara an ma. Mais n’a geleya r’i ma, i b’a s\r\ i s\n b’a r\. 
Kita jeli, Kita jeli! Ka b\ Manden! Ka Naani kq, ka Jenikuru kqyan! Tounkara ni Camara, 
so tigi Dangaran Tuma, ka kuru in sigi. M\g\ o m\g\ y’i yqrq woloden nun bq 
k\. Ka na x\g\n fq, ka sigi x\g\n fq, laada ma tixa anw bolo dq! Maninka s\n kan d\ le, 
ko wulu la jqla mana siran fqn fqn xa, ko wulu tigi t’o mina. 
Anw, an Kita jeli, m\g\ o m\g\ man’a f\ ka f\ ko anw siran na ka h\r\nw bila x\g\n na, 
ala! 
Senior master of ceremony: Kana bila x\g\n na ko kuma fo, ayi ma bila x\g\n na sa. 
Head Griot: O gqlqyara an ma dq! Anw y’a bqq ka correspondence s\r\, an ma m\g\ ta 
jaa bi. An ye kota s\r\, an ma m\g\ta jaabi, an ye sabri de xinin aw ni x\g\n cq, an b’a 
xinin fana fo k’an sa an kana kq sababu ye ka Kita jamana goya. An jiatigi Kita yan ka 
jixa. [...] Kita xuman ya la, an bq Allah dei, Kita h\r\n ya la, an bq Allah deli. [...] An jeliw 
an ka Allah deli lo o ye, an jatigiw da fq. Kita jeli, Kita jeli tq nanfigi ye dq! Soli ala 
Mohamed. 
1.20
Namakq da sqra kuma min ma, à l’intention surtout de la presse, ne tun bq fq ka kuma ka 
se a y\r\ma. En réalité, Kita yan bi, franchement problem te yin. Probleme foyi te Kita bi. 
E, Namakq tun bq fq ka y\r\ min f\, entre les Keita, les Tounkara, mais, o bq Mali 
duguba bqq la, minun ye tu tikq, minun nana k\ fq...Ne ye Sikasso ka de yq, 
Diamantqnqw de ye Sikasso tu tikq. Mais bi, Sikasso ye, n’a f\ra lu ka lu Tara so ba u tq 
Diamantqnqw wele yqrq. C’est l'évolution, be fq, ça va passer. 
1.21 
Et je félicite l’ensemble de conférenciers pour leurs brillantes exposées. Je suis membre de la 
société civile, parce que que suis là en tant que responsable d’association et à ce titre j’ai une 
question à l’endroit du docteur Diakité, par rapport au rôle des organisations de la société civile. 
J’ai noté que nous avons un rôle pertinent dans l'encadrement, dans la sensibilisation et dans la 
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défense des droits des populations. Je souhaite que docteur nous précise les axes de cette 
sensibilisation, de cet encadrement.
1.22
Aw ni tile ! Ne ka kuma jubaju bq an politikiw de kan. Pratiquement depuis 2007, a jirala 
anw denmisqnw na Kita yan k’a f\ ko stade municipale k’a bq jo an Kitakaw ye. Cercli o 
cercli n’a ka bo komi Kita stade municipale xuman a jolen bq a bqq la. Hali sa an 
Kitakaw o laxini o ma sabati
1.23
Ne ye Abdoulaye Sissoko ye Kita. Camara la xem\g\ le ye ne ye. Ka b\ Kayi la kataka 
bila f\ S\l\la, n’k\r\ kelen pe le a r\ bi, n’o ye Bankoremana yqrq Jankun k\fq. Salle yin 
k\n\ yan bi, m\g\ kelen pe le yan min ka k\r\ ni ne ye, n’o ye Namakq ye. Ne ka foli bq 
se délégation ma ka fo ko ko d\ ye hadamaden ya la, bqq da tq se k’a f\, bqq da hakq tq 
o di kelen ye, minun ta hakq y’a ya ye, olu da ma se a hakq ma. Masakq o masakq n’i 
nana ko dila na Kita yan, n’i nana wulafq, ni sanji nara, e nana min dilan Allah b’o xa e 
yqrq nana min xinin, Allah b’o d’i ma. O tq wili few, o lada ye Kita yan. 
1.24
Mara tixqna a menna. Ne bq san bi k\n\t\n ani san naanin na. Ny’o la bi Allah n’i nfa ni 
nba barika ani Allah ni kira barika. Mara tixq la a mqnna, an ye mara tixa le bolo. K\n\l\ 
fili o k\n\l\fili ye Mali kan. [...] Den lu bara an k\n\l\fili, k’a sabu kq, an ye 
independence di den lu ma kojugu. N’an ye independence di den lu ma kosobq, min 
kadi alu xe alu y’o kq dq! I mana i den gosi kadala la, i mana wa polisi la, k’a man kan la 
gosi. 
1.25 
Anw ye personnes agées m\g\w de ye, anw ye anciens combattantw de ye. [...] K’o foli 
f\ aw ye. N’aw bq y\r\ wo y\r\, a ka anw wqlq an k’a ka kuma dafa. Anw de bq se k’aw 
ka kuma kanw sere ya yan. Chef de cabinet bq yan, n’bq se k’a ka kuma sqbqntiya, kq 
wale d\ beyin bi, an bqq bq jigi x\g\nna, laam\ n’a bulu de don. Parce que aw ye loi d\ 
k’an na Mali k\n\, an minun bq  lam\ na bi, a y’an ka baara gqlq y’an bolo d\\ni. N’o ye 
democratie ye. 
1.26  
Democratie m\g\ minun y’a faamuya kojugu, olu ko ko m\g\ kan’i fa d\n tugun, i kan’i 
ba d\n tugun. C’est pas vrai. A y’an ka baara gqlqya d\\nin. I muso ko k’a f\ i ye ne l\n 
furu j\nya la, nt’i d\n nfuru cq tugunin, an bqq ka kan. A y’an ka baara gqlqya. O tuma, 
tenue tigi fana bq yani. Ni s\r\dai cq tun bq ta folo, a bq ta cogoya minna n’o ni bi ta n’o 




L’une des différences fondamentales entre les démocraties occidentales et les nôtres que certains 
analystes, dont une minorité vient de chez nous-mêmes, qualifient tantôt de bananiers, tantôt 
d’arachidières, réside dans le fait que nos versions de la démocratie n’accordent aucune place 
officielle aux partis politiques de l’opposition. 
2.2
Au bout de quelques années d’opposition et d’exclusion, nos hommes politiques, quelles que 
soient leurs convictions politiques et idéologiques, en viennent de façon absurde à se convaincre 
de l'inutilité des combats politiques et développent de idées de collaboration avec les autorités en 
place que l’on se met alors a courtiser, oubliant qu’hier encore on les traitait de fantoches. Les 
grandes idées politiques et philosophiques qui fondent l’action politiques sont aussi abandonnées 
au profit de la recherche du confort personnel et de l'élévation sociales des siens. 
2.3
L’opposition parlementaire a-t-elle une existence affirmée? Si elle existe, certains ne l’accordent 
qu’un rôle de figuration, n'arrivant pas le plus souvent à jouer convenablement son rôle de 
catalyseur dans l’animation du débat démocratique. Personne ne doute du rôle d’une opposition 
politique véritable dans une démocratie. Ce qui se passe sous nos cieux frise la farce. [...] C’est 
comme si, ici, on craint de jouer son rôle sous peine d’encourir des malédictions du tout puissant 
exécutif.[...] Peut être que les députes, pour un grand nombre d’entre eux, et dans de nombreuses 
localités du pays, tiennent leur mandat non du peuple, mais de la générosité du régime en place. 
[...] Pour tout ce que s’en suit, on le voit, c’est le règne de la pensée unique qui s’installe dans 
notre pays. L'indépendant de président de la république qu’est ATT ne se reconnaît aucune 
opposition, ni dans son propre camps, ni dans  l’entourage des opposants déclarés. Pour un réel 
encrage démocratique dans notre pays, tout est donc a refaire... 
2.4 
Tous ces faits démontrent votre haute compréhension, et tout le prix que vous attachez à 
l’émancipation de vos soeurs. Les femmes du Mali se réjouissent de tant de réalisations positives 
et vous prient de croire a leur sincère reconnaissance [...] Monsieur le président, mes chers 
collègues, je suis convaincue que vous êtes tous d’accord avec moi pour convenir avec moi que 
ce Code qui réhabilite la femme malienne est profondément humain. 
2.5
Afin d'atteindre ces objectifs, l’effort de rénovation doit s’inspirer des traditions, du droit 
musulman, du droit occidental car évoluer n’est pas nécessairement s’occidentaliser ni 
s’orientaliser, c’est surtout épurer les coutumes, les débarrasser de leur contenu barbare, les 
mettre en harmonie avec le développement social des populations. 
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2.6 
Jamais projet de loi ne suscita autant de commentaires divers dans les villes comme dans les 
villages, jamais projet de loi ne fut examiné avec autant d'intérêt et de minutie à la fois par les 
hommes et les femmes du Mali; jamais projet de loi, avant son vote, par l’Assemblée Nationale, 
ne fut aussi connu de l’homme de la rue. Il faut bien le dire, certains de nos compatriotes, 
inquiets du train de l’évolution actuelle, jaloux à juste raison peut -être des bonnes moeurs 
africaines et ayant la nostalgie des bonnes pratiques du temps de leur jeunesse, certain de nos 
vieux aînés, dis-je, parlent avec beaucoup d’appréhension de ce code. Les jeunes et les femmes, 
eux, soupirent, et se demandent avec anxiété si quelque mauvais génie ne va pas encore 
empêcher ou retarder l’adoption de cette loi qui concrétise à leurs yeux l’égalité de l’homme et 
de la femme.
2.7 
C’est pour quoi, Monsieur le président, je souhaiterais avec la Commission que, dans une 
première étape, le Gouvernement exige de ses agents d'exécution beaucoup de souplesse pour 
prévenir heurts possibles, car, à mon avis, cette loi que nous votons doit être une arme de 
progrès, de justice, et, je le souhaite, de paix sociale, et non de troubles. 
2.8 
Deputy Aoua Keita: J’ai jugé nécessaire de préciser mon point de vue car tous les députés on 
parlé en tant qu’homme et non comme représentant du peuple. 
President of the National Assembly: Ah! Mme. Aoua Keita, je vous demande de retirer ce que 
vous venez de dire. 
Deputy Aoua Keita: Je retire. [...] D'après M. le Ministre la femme que travaille ne doit pas être 
habillée par son mari. Je trouve anormal que toutes les femmes ne soient pas mises sur le même 
pied d’égalité au point de vu vestimentaire. 
2.9 
Je souhaite, comme le gouvernement, que toutes les femmes du Mali ne forment qu’une, et que 
nous formions tous un et un pour tous. Il faut que nous soyons d’accord pour trouver une 
solution aux souffrances que nous subissons quotidiennement. Ailleurs, et dans cette assemblée, 
au Mali, les femmes ne peuvent par aller sans l’aide de leur mari. Ne riez pas, je voudrais 
seulement que vous goutiez certaines images avec moi. Vous souhaitez tous que nous ayons un 
Mali cohérent, résistant, a tous les effluves, a travers le temps et l’espace. Le mari est la cellule 
fondamentale de la famille qu’elle soit polygame ou monogame. Avec la bonne entente nous 
aurons des familles cohérentes. 
2.10 
Vous comprenez tous mon émotion face à ce micro pour introduire un sujet aussi sensible. Tout 
mandat impératif est nul, j’en conviens, mais comment pourrais-je ne pas parler aujourd’hui en 
tant que femme ? Le projet de loi portant Code des personnes et de la famille est l’épilogue d’une 
longue bataille et l’aube d’une ère nouvelle. [...] Cela dit, Honorable Collègues, le Code des 
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personnes et de la famille n’est pas un code pour la promotion de la femme ; le code n’est pas 
une loi qui consacre la victoire de la femme sur l’homme. Loin de là. Le code est la consécration 
d’une volonté politique, celle de donner à la famille les bases juridiques nécessaires pour asseoir 
la cohésion de notre société. 
2.11 
Donc Mesdames et messieurs les honorables parlementaires, ces réformes dont nous venons 
d’énoncer quelques-unes les plus importantes ne doivent pas être perçues comme une victoire 
d’un camp sur un autre. Je pense bien que les femmes sont venues en grand nombre à 
l’Assemblée. Il ne faudrait pas, si ce Code était voté, que les femmes comprennent par exemple 
que c’est une victoire des femmes sur les hommes. Je ne pense pas que ce soit ça, c’est plutôt des 
acquis au bénéfice de tous le Maliens. Si c’est compris comme ça, aucune composante de la 
société ne va se sentir exclue. [...] Elus du peuple, je crois que nous ne devrons pas légiférer en 
faveur de telle ou telle catégorie, en faveur de telle ou telle partie de la population, de telle ou 
telle religion, mais nous devrons le faire en toute conscience, en toute connaissance de cause 
pour l'ensemble du peuple malien. 
2.12
[...] Il apparaît nettement que ce projet est une avancée dans la prise en compte des 
préoccupations fondamentales de l’homme et de la femme malienne en matière de liberté, en 
matière de rapports humains et en matière tout simplement de prise en compte des conditions des 
couches les plus démunies de nos populations, et ces coches se situent au niveau des femmes et 
des enfants. 
2.13
Maintenant en parlant de je ne sais quel article qui dit que la femme ne doit plus obéissance à son 
mari mais on se doit mutuelle fidélité et respect et autres. J’avoue que j’ai deux femmes, j’étais 
amateur pour une troisième si jamais il y avait une prétendante mais cette disposition-là...je ne 
suis plus prétendant pour un troisième. Je crains même dans un proche futur je ne sois 
célibataire, parce que ma femme qui ne va pas me respecter va au dehors, ça c’est clair. Elle est 
obligé de m'obéir chez moi. Je demande aux femmes un sursaut d’orgueil, parce que étant donné 
que l'égalité, la parité, l’équité, tout est prôné en faveur de la femme. Et la dot, maintenant, c’est 
l’homme qui va payer? Non. Moi je demande un sursaut d’orgueil aux femmes: il faudra que les 
femmes commencent a nous payer la dot. Ou bien qu’on se paie mutuellement la dot. Vraiment. 
2.14
Le vent venu du Nord, on ne peut pas y échapper, ça ne peut pas nous laisser. Mais cela ne 
m'empêche pas de dire ce que je pense. [...] Mais est-ce que aujourd’hui au Mali on n’est pas en 
train d’enlever toute notre histoire pour prendre celle des Européens ou bien de l’Occident? [...] 
Moi je ne parle pas seulement en tant que musulman. Bien sur, j’ai opté pour être musulman, 
mais je parle en tant que Malien de terroir. Je suis un Malien de terroir. 80% de Maliens..., 
puisque vous les intellectuels qui êtes ici, vous êtes peut-être a 20 ou bien 10% même je veux 
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dire.[...] Je sais que ça va être voté aujourd’hui , ça c’est sur. Mais excusez-moi, je ne voterai pas, 
ça il faut le dire. 
2.15. 
Mais monsieur le Président, je reviens sur la même question: est-ce qu’on mesure un peu la 
réaction de nos populations face a ce projet? Si le Gouvernement l’a déjà fait, nous, on n’a pas eu 
le temps de nous renseigner. Mais ce que nous, nous rencontrons partout, c’est que la plupart des 
Maliens nous demandent de ne pas voter la loi bien que nous, nous allons la voter.  
2.16 
Moi je disait que je vais voter ce projet de loi parce que c’est mon pays, c’est mon parti, bien que 
je serai obligé de demander à DIEU de me le pardonner (rires dans la salle.) Je serai dans 
l’obligation de prier chaque jour et demander à DIEU de me le pardonner. Le projet, M. le 
Président, tout le mode sait qu’il est souvent à l’encontre de la religion musulmane et même de 
notre culture, donc il pose problème à tous les Maliens. Je sais qu’il y a quelque part aussi une 
pression des femmes. J’ai vu une lettre de femmes qui demandent de voter le projet. Mais moi, 
ma question: est-ce que si on soumettait ce projet à un référendum, ou seules les femmes vont 
voter, est-ce que c’est la majorité des femmes maliennes qui vont le voter ou non? Parce qu’à ma 
connaissance les femmes maliennes aussi ont la même culture que les hommes maliens, qu’il soit 




Journalw bqq bi kan k'a f\ ko ADEMA k\nin, komin an ka ambition ka bon, ko ADEMA k
\nin nin kelen yin na, ko ADEMA bqna fara-fara, ko ADEMA bqna ci. O kuma, k'o kq 
tixq ye, k'o t\k\t\-t\k\t\ k'o kq tixq ye ADEMA denw yqrq tulo la. ADEMA opposantw 
fana bq k'u wasa don o la. Olu fana bq k'u ka journow sqbq k\sqbq! Ko ADEMA bq ci, 
parti nin, m\g\ kan'i ka wari don a la. Ayiwa, bamba daman de b'a k\n\, wari dun y\r\ 
ni den jugu y\r\w, o gansan-gansan de b'a k\n\ sisan. Ayiwa, an tq jateminq kq, an b
\ra y\r\ jan dq! ADEMA b\ra y\r\ jan fo kan'a se bi ma. Donc, ni an ma jateminq kq, m
\g\w b'a fq an ka kq min ye, an bq k'o ye. Sani an yqrq b'a fq an ka kq min ye, an tq k'o 
ye dq!
3.2 
Wa n'an fara-faralen tagara, President min mana sigi ni ADEMA don, hali a t'a d\n k'a f\ 
Kita y'a,…sabu m\g\w bqna s\r\ yan minun b'a contre la. Donc, o de bq k'a k\n\! 
Halini majorité kqra d\ fq, majorité ka kq d\ fq, o minorité ka kqlq, qh! Tixqnin de ka n\g
\ ni xqnin ye wo! Tixqnin, kuma kuntan f\ b'o la, fa nqnin ni ba nqnin b'o la, donc fqn 
bqq b'o la. O de bq mqn y\r\ jan. Donc, a b'o de mqn, a b'a f\ ko Kita section b'a contre 
la k'a s\r\ minorité d\r\n de don. Donc, an tq fqn s\r\ a ko la. An tq fqn s\r\ koyi! 
3.3
Donc a kuma tqmq na ne ni m\g\ minun cq, n’b'a tigiw t\g\ f\. Pour dire que anw bq ka 
taa sira min kan, an bq ka taa tixq démarche de kan. Kuma tqmq na ne ni Sissoko de cq 
kununasinin su. N’k'a ma, il m'a téléphoné, n’ye n’y\r\ f\ a ye, il est venu me joindre, il 
m'a dit que d\w bq s\rties la,… J'ai dit: “non, il faut arrêter, m\g\ tq sorties la dq, ne ni 
Kamissoko de don. On s'est fait accompagner par Adama.” 
3.4
Donc, je crois que d\ tun y'ale wele k'a f\ a ye ko anw bq ka candidat d\ lafasa n ko 
non! Anw tq candidat lafasa la dq! Ni min y'a s\r\, presidentya bq dakan de r\. Wari t'a 
di m\g\ ma, sanu t'a di m\g\ ma, i ka l\nin t'a d'i ma. Adamaden bq dan’a kama de. 
M\g\ o m\g\ ni min y'a xinin parti la, a bqq y'an ka m\g\ de ye, ni min y'a s\r\, an bq 
tugu o de n\fq. Nka, an tq ka m\g\ soutenu dq!
3.5
An tq m\g\ lajq, an tq siran m\g\ xa. Parce que i man'a mqn i bq siran m\g\ xq ou 
bien ka m\g\ lamqn o y'a ye i n'a ka surun de. Donc, anw b'o bolo de kan.
3.6
Ni m\g\ saara, i bq da i sibiri de k\n\. O la n'i bq fqn o fqn f\ i k'a f\ a kq cogola. Par 
conséquent, fqn o fqn ma na kq, i k'a lakale a kq cogola, o de bq bqn. 
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3.7
Mais, tixq, m\g\ n'i b\ra i kelen,… est ce que ne ye min f\, est ce que n’ye min f\, n’tq 
maloya a la sinin wa? Parce que an bq hadamadenya de la.
3.8
Moi aujourd'hui, n'e Macoumba ye ko kq, ne b'a f\ i ye "Macoumba, je ne suis pas 
d'accord avec toi". E tq ne balo, i tq ne ka barama kilo da d\n wo! An ye x\g\n s\r\ parti 
in de k\n\ yan. On n'est pas de la même famille! Parce que an bq hadama den y'a de 
la. “Bonjour,” “bonsoir,” o ye bele-bele ye koyi! Tu ne me dois rien, je ne te dois rien, le 
bonjour là, c'est quelque chose! O ka to an ni x\g\n cq, bqn k\n\ la la. An ka da x\g\n 
na. N'an daara x\g\n na, fqn bqq b'a k\n\. E yqrq y'a f\, ADEMA ye parti bele-bele ye 
wo, an kan'a to a ka fara. Hadamaden, n'i bq tixq la, ala de b'i la wasa, i tq malo wo.
3.9
Apres, an ye min mqn? K'u bq sortie la. Politiki de don wo, i mana don sok\n\ aw 
m\g\ fila ka min f\, a bq lase a tigi ma. Politiki-kuma tq dogola koyi! Parce que an tq 
se k'a bqq dogo. An y'a kuma mqn, anw ko k'o ye kuma fu de ye. [...] N y'o de f\, n’ko 
politiki-kuma a tq dogo, hali i man'a f\ yan ko “um-um,” a bq taga f\ e Macoumba ye. 
Politiki-kuma, n'i tq se ka min f\ a tigi xqna, i kan'a f\ a k\fq n'o tq, a bq lase a tigi ma. 
Fqn caaman f\ra yen, an k'o bqq toyin, mais an k\nin n'u ma kuma
3.10
Bqq ye kuma caaman f\ yan. Mais, ne yqrq bolo, nin kuma fqn o fqn f\ len filq nin yan, 
nin bqq ye kqlq k\n\ kow de ye. Yan'an k'an girin-girin kqlq k\n\ kumaw ni kqlq k\n\ 
kow kan, an k'olu ye k'u toyin. An kan k'a lajq, solution jumqn beyin ka kqlq nin ban de? 
An k'o xinin sisan bani. Kqlq k\n\ kuma, o détail, dan t'o la wo. Maintenant, a bq ban 
cogo di?
3.11
Voila ne bq min f\, a bq sixq caaman b\, an bq sigi nin y\r\ kelen in na yan, an b'a f\ ko 
ka bqn xinin. Bqq b'a f\: “Oui, an ka bqn xinin.” Mais n 'an b\ra yan d\r\n, bqn danna 
yan[...] N'a ma xa min k\, ni bqn tq kq, an k'a kq bqnbaliya kun kelen ye. C'est  ce que moi 
je dis, hein! An tq se ka na an sigi yan don o don k'a f\ k'an ka bqn, an bq b\ yan, d\w bq 
taa ko wqrq kq k\fq[...] Aujourd'hui, on a besoin d'une Conference de section. Et c'est  au cours 
de cette conference de section que les gens vont se dire la vérité et avoir une ligne de conduite. 
N'o ma kq a tq bqn dq!
3.12
Aw tara y\r\ minun na, ne b'a d\n wo. A y\r\ f\l\ f\l\ ye y\r\ jumqn ye? Aw tagara 
Madina, aw taara Kotuba. Politique ye tixq ye, nka an kana vallon da x\g\n na, c'est 
très mauvais. Aw ye min f\ yen, aw ni membres cq, aw b'o d\n. Moi je suis passé sur le 
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terrain après vous, aw ye min f\ yen, aw ni Allah cq aw b'o d\n. Aw ma fqn f\ min bq 
m\g\w kala, aw ye fqn f\ de ko ka an jqnsqn, aw ka bila xqfq. Aw n'o kuma de sera yen. 
A Kotuba, en compagnie de Keita, aw ye wari minun di, aw b'a d\n.
3.13
Seydou: E Robert ye sortie minnun kq n’ko Sekou de y’o wari d’i ma. 
Robert: Sekou ka d\r\mq kelen tq anw k\n\. 
Seydou: E de ye destructeur ye, tu es l‘ennemi interne du parti. 
3.14
Xagamin-xagamin y\r\w xqfq d\r\n, ka m\g\w bila x\g\n na, vous ne savez pas que 
m\g\ d\w fana beyin, olu bq fqn s\r\ nin de la? Parceque u ka kq e fanfq, u k'a f\ e ka 
d\ d'u ma, u bq d\ d'u ma, d\ in fana fanfq, o bq d\ di. O bq ban cogo di?
3.15
Commune k\n\ m\g\w la, olu de bq k'a xagamin aw ni x\g\n cq koyi. Olu bq b\, u bq 
n'a f\, Sissoko b\r'an fq yan, a nana nin f\ yan, a nana nin f\ yan… Commune d\w b\ra 
yan ko Sissoko taar'a f\ olu ye ko ni section ka papier tq, k'olu tq ka m\g\ recoit, ko 
parce que k'olu bq campagne na IBA ye. U taar'a f\ ne yqrq ye ko don min na IBA nana 
yan, ko Radio d\ tun bq donkilidala yan, ko ne fasa b'a la d\r\n ko bqq bolila ka taa ko 
ka ne fasa b\ a la. Aw tq x\g\n ye koyi!
3.16
Sorti ko min ni petit frère y'a f\ sisan, travail fractionnel de don wo, o man kan. C'est le 
travail fractionnel. An k'o éviter. N'i ye exemple ta ne bara kan, aw b\ra yen don min 
wula fq, compte rendu bqq taara kq ne ye wo. Compte rendu min taara kq yen, bqn 
compte rendu t'o ye wo. N'o tq, n'aw taara yen, ne ye ADEMA xq m\g\ d\ ye Sinfo, aw 
kan ka se ne ma! Ne ye aw k\r\ de fana ye! Politique sira yqrq ka boyin. Hadamaden 
y'a an ni x\g\n cq yqrq, aw kan ka se ne ma! Mais aw ma se ne ma wo! Aw sera minun 
ma, u tq hali an ka ADEMA m\g\w ye. Olu ye min f\ aw ye ani aw taara min f\ olu ye, u 
taar'a bqq xqf\ ne xqna. Bqn kuma tq. Fo n'o y'a s\r\ u ye valon da aw la dq! An bq ka 
tulon kq parti la dq!
3.17
Ne hakilila, n'aw bq b\li kq, a y'aw sara x\g\n na. Hali n'aw b'a xagamin, aw ka taa 
x\g\n fq yqrq. Comme ca, bqq b'a d\n min bq f\ la. Mais n'a f\ra aw taara 
m\g\ faga ko de f\ yen, a man ka dig'i la, parce que i kelen de taara. Donc, n'aw bq 
b\liw kq, aw ye taa x\g\n fq!
3.18
Tendance, tendance, tendence; tendance in k\sqmq len Bamako, tendance d\ in 
k\sqmq len Bamako. 
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3.19
Mosere ye dévis ta yan fo Bamako. Sekou ka xininkali f\l\ kqra mun ye? Moséré est-
que aw ye réunion min kq ne ka m\g\w tun bq yen? Mosere ko jon? Ko Keita ninnun? Il 
a nommé nominalement Keita. Est-ce que Keita ka m\g\w tun bq reunion na wa? 
Raison pour laquelle il n’a pas financé. 
3.20 
Cq, an ka tixq f\ x\g\n ye quoi. Keita tqna réunion na, mais, il y a des éléments qui 
viennent s'informer et qui ne font que détruire. Eh! An tq tixq f\ x\g\n xqnq!
3.21
N'an d\g\ya r'an yqrq ma Kita yan, an ma taga koloso m\g\ la… C'est ce que j'ai dit, la 
lutte clandestine la, anw y'o kq de, avant que l'ADEMA soit crée. Nin fqn o fqn filq nin 
ye, je les ai connu dans la lutte clandestine [...] En 91-92-93-94, minun y'a xanaman 
ya, o maa duuru d\r\n de bq jama la yan. Madou Diarra, Soriba Cisse, Mose Moussa 
Sissoko, Mamadou Kamissoko ani Lassi. Ca c'est wilibali! Xininkali t'o la, olu de y'a 
latigq, olu de y'a xanaman ya. 
3.22
Parti be in n\, a bq d\ balo, d\ yqrq bq parti balo. Mais min bqyin n'o bq parti balo, i k'a 
d\n ko h\r\nya d\ de b'o bolo, o ni boxa min ka kan, n'o ma di o ma, o de bq na ni kqlq 
ye. En ‘91, ‘92, maa naani min f\len filq, a kelen si tun tq se ka waafila mago xq parti ye 
y\r\ nin kelen. O don tun y'a s\r\ so tun t'olu yqrq bolo, muso t'u bolo yqrq. O kqra.
3.23
Eh! Attendez la, par rapport aux missions, moi je ne fais pas de mission. Il ne faut pas 
que vous confondez mon travail avec le parti. Moi je plante des arbres et maintenant 
c'est la saison. Moi je plante dans tous les coins du cercle et chaque fois que je pars 
sur un chantier, il faut que j'aille dire bonjour a un SG, parti ko kama, ko n k'o dabila, 
n’tq se k'o kq. Et vous voulez que j'aille dans les communes sans dire bonjour a un SG 
ou a un militant?  N’tq se k'o fana kq. Hali ni section ko n’k'a dabila, n’tq se k'o kq.
3.24
A don ni ne ka wari tq ka parti ka wari dafa ka campagne kq Sissoko ye, n’bq fqn o fqn 
xinin dixq la tikqla, Allah fq, ala kan'a n\g\ ya n’ye. Ne y'e ka hqrq de xinin, e de 
j\len b'a kan ko f'i ka ne malo, n faso k\n\ yan.
3.25
Parce que a bq se ka ko min xanab\, m\g\ tq se k'a xanab\. A ko landi min bq a la...Ni 
ne ko ne bq campagne kq bi, députation na n b'a jq...
3.26
Ne yqrq de bq n diyara, n’tq politique place xinin na, n’tq President y'a xinin na, n’tq kq 
deputé ye… N'a kadi m\g\ min ye, i bq’n sama ka don i ka da fq, ne ni n’n\fq m\g\w, 
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an bq voter i ye, i bq gagner, n'a mandi min ye, i bq n’kqlq. Qh! E de bq perdu, ne tq 
perdu dq! M\g\ min tq ko n\ fq est ce que o bq perdu?
3.27 
Politiki la, i b’a d\n nin bq baara kq kosobq, probleme d\ ka nin muso s\r\ sisan, e dun 
b’a d\n c’est un des meilleures militants. A mana n’i fqyen k’a f\ a muso mankqnq i ka 
waaw\r\ d’ama, i y’a d\n i b’a di?
3.28
Tounkara, nq bq fq ka maa k\r\ kuma d\ de f\ aw ye. Pourquoi nos vieux disent a 
chaque matin, ko bqq ka taa karisa fo. Ko n’i taara m\g\ fo don o don, hali ni kqlq b’aw 




La présence en grand nombre de médecins, d’ingénieurs, d’hommes de droit, d'enseignants, de 
membres des professions Libérales, de paysans laisse augurer des débats très enrichissants et 
surtout très approfondis. A n’en pas douter, une telle Assemblée ne pourra se résoudre a jouer le 
rôle peu flatteur de chambre d’enregistrement ou de Caisse de résonance. 
4.2
Plan m’a aidé pour le classes...pour le CESCOM c’était un projet belge...qui était dans tout le 
Mali. Les bailleurs peuvent t’aider à faire les choses, mais ils vont te dire: toi même ton apport 
c’est quoi? Par exemple, a la réalisation de l'adduction d’eau, le village et la commune devaient 
payer 3,850,000 CFA. Maintenant les bailleurs complètent. Le CESCOM, il fallait payer 
1,444,000 CFA. Maintenant, les classes, pour les élèves, Plan aussi fait ça, mais on paye le 20%, 
c’est à dire, on accepte nous mêmes de faire les travaux physiques, par exemple, mélanger le 
ciment, apporter ça au maçon etc. Nous mêmes on faisant ça. Bon quand tu évalue ça, ça va te 
faire le 20%. C’est comme ça que tu fais les choses. 
4.3
Jusqu’à présent on n’a pas compris ce qu’un député doit faire, dans le milieu rural là. Sinon un  
député ne peut pas construire une école, nous on ne peut que voter les lois. Mais, on a des 
facilités quand même pour avoir les bailleurs, tout le monde peut nous recevoir. Donc à partir de 
là, généralement on a besoin de nous pour faire les adductions d’eau, les forages, les écoles...Les 
gens viennent te dire: “Il faut nous aider, trouvez nous un bailleur pour construire un CESCOM, 
ou bien une école, un bien un forage...” 
4.4
Il faut être honnête d’abord avec tout le monde. Si tu viens me demander de faire quelque chose, 
si je peut le faire, que je te dis oui, si je ne peut pas, que je te dis non. Et puis, que les gens sent 
en toi que tu est engage pour leur cause, s’il a un problème que tu viens auprès d’eux, même si tu 
n’arrive pas a résoudre, qu’ils savent au moins que tu est prêt a partager la douleur avec eux, 
mais tout ça repose sur l'honnêteté, ne pas fréquenter les femmes d’autrui.. 
4.5
Il tient vraiment a ça parole, jusqu’a ce qu’on la surnommé kankelentigui, quand il dit que c’est 
noir, c’est que c’est noir, quand il dit que c’est blanc, c’est que c’est blanc. Ja’i confiance a ça. il 
m’a prouvé ça mille et une fois...
4.6
Monsieur le président, cet exercice démocratique auquel je participe pour la première fois...je me 
plie avec d’autant plus de conviction que je suis persuadé qu’il permet d’assoir et de consolider 
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la culture démocratique dont l’un des items essentiels demeure l’information. Informer pour 
connaitre, connaitre pour savoir, savoir pour décider, décider d’agir… 
4.7
En notre qualité de porte-parole du gouvernement nous avons comme rôle de permettre à 
l’opinion publique nationale et internationale de comprendre les prises de position du 
gouvernement, les grandes décisions du gouvernement nous devons de les expliquer, de faire en 
sorte que les actes majeurs posés par le gouvernement soient connus, compris des citoyens. Cette 
logique de faire et de faire savoir doit être amenée à destination de tous les publics: population, 
toutes les autres institutions de la république, partenaires sociaux, société civile, partenaires au 
développement, etcétera, etcetera.[…] L'abrogation était un acte majeur posé par le 
gouvernement, il était important qu’on le fasse comprendre le plus rapidement possible aux 
maliennes et aux maliens pour éviter la rumeur, pour éviter la mauvaise interprétation.
4.8 
Il est vrai qu’en commentant ce jour la cette mesure d’abrogation nous avons dit que cela 
s’inscrit dans le cadre général de la lutte contre la corruption et la délinquance financière et que 
cela consistait à faire en sorte qu’il s'établisse une confiance entre l'état et les citoyens et que cela 
avait pour but aussi de favoriser le dialogue entre gouvernants et gouvernés. Pour autant, nous 
n’avons jamais dit, nous n’avons jamais pensé, que ces citoyens étaient des délinquants 
financiers, pour autant nous n’avons jamais dit, nous n’avons jamais pensé, nous n’avons jamais 
écrit que ces cadres honnêtes étaient des corrompus. […]
4.9
Qu’il s’agit d’une décision politique qui s’inscrit dans le cadre général du renouveau de l’action 
publique, de la mobilité des cadres, de l'amélioration de la gestion des ressources financiers et 
matériels de l'état, toute chose que contribue à renforcer la confiance des citoyens à l'état, à 
assoir une administration performante et assurer une bonne gouvernance. Vous comprendrez 
aisément mesdames et messieurs que lorsqu’on parle de bonne gouvernance on ne peut pas parler 
de lutte contre la corruption et la délinquance financière. Voilà la logique implacable qui nous a 
amené à parler de lutte contre la corruption et la délinquance financière.
4.10
Je remercie monsieur le ministre Sidiki pour cette communication brillante très pédagogique de 
l’expert en communication, mais je reste largement sur ma faim quant aux réponses apportées, et 
surtout le fait qu’il ne se soit pas prononcé sur beaucoup de questions que j’ai posées.  [...] 
4.11
Abrogation de décret de nomination” tout ça... je ne sais pas si ça peut être autre si ce n’est pas 
un limogeage collectif.[...] Si c’est dans le cadre de l'amélioration de la gestion des ressources 
publiques, comme vous l’avez dit tout a l’heure dans votre intervention, c’est une autre façon de 
dire que c’est dans le cadre de lutter contre la corruption... en expert en communication vous 
parlez de manière plus positive, moi je parle autrement en disant ça revient a la même chose.
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4.12 
Je sais qu’il n’est pas le seul à prendre ces décisions, mais c’est lui qui a intervenu dans la télé 
pour dire que c’est dans le cadre de la lutte contre la délinquance financière, monsieur je ne l’ai 
pas entendue de quelqu'un ni de personnes d’autre, je l’ai écouté de votre bouche monsieur le 
ministre à la télé, alors vous ne pouvez avoir dit ce jour que c’est dans le cadre de la lutte contre 




Je ne lasserais jamais de lancer des appels à tous pour une collaboration sincère, franche et 
loyale. Nous formons tous les mêmes poumons d’un seul corps. Je pense q’une fois les élections 
municipales passées, les rivalités doivent cesser. Travaillons le main dans la la main pour le 
bonheur de notre cité. 
5.2
J’accuse le Maire et lui donne tord. Quand le commandant de cercle l’a informé de son intention, 
il devait refuser sur le champ. La population va nous traiter de lâches.
5.3
Tout ces brouhaha ne mènent a rien de positif. Le fond du problème est la. Nous le connaissons 
et nous n’avons pas les bras croisées. Le Secrétaire General de la Section, Mr. Niomby, a déjà 
entamé les démarches nécessaires a fin d’aboutir a un résultat souhaitable et définitif. 
5.4
Ce conseil est composé de militants de plusieurs Partis Politiques. Nous sommes ici regroupés 
pour la même cause, le bien être des habitants de la commune. Cela ne peut se faire dans la 
diversité. Alors, oublions le passé, les luttes politiques est le tendances. La gestion d’une 
commune n’est pas chose facile surtout quand il s’agit de la notre.”
5.5
Bore ka kuma nin, ne y’a l\n nin kuma f\ra yan a sixq naani nan le ye nin ye. N’ye ne ni 
d\ le délégué ka ta Bore ma k’a k’a bila. “An jqra cogomin na, k’a kq deputé ye an bolo 
sixa saba, o tq jq r\ kolon ye dq. | n’e b\ra an fq i bq taa l’i fa bara, e taga t\ ye an sara 
nin de la, ka million biwolonfila ni kelen donin da an kun. Ah Boré an jq wo jq, fara 
koxuman xogon tq. Bar’i ye fara kojugu ya k’an na dq! N’ko Boré nin ma bqn dq! An b’a 
miiri ni nin kq r’e la, a kqr’an de le la. A bq kasi i fq. Bari an m’a l\n k’i bq an wele sariya 
la nin na. An nar’i ma sa, sisan, lanaya le y’a to an y’i kq deputé ye an bara sixan joli. O 
lanaya kelen in na, an b’a xinin i fq i ka nin bila an ni xogon cq. 
5.6
A k’an ma, a ko: “Baasi tq, k’a be sqbqn nin k\ sagin.” A m’a ko sagin, a y’an nqgqn de, 
a m’a ko segin! Kuma bilara nin le ma. Ne yqrq hakili t’a ma yqrq ko Boré ko kuma yqrq 
bq Kita k\n\ halibi, ni nin sqbqn in tq. [...] Boré, ale k\nin tagara, ah, bari, Kita Kuru bq 
yan dq! | ma taga dq, o b’a n\r\. An k\nin bq Boré la ko yira Kita Kuru le la. O ti “xa” la 
s\n ye dq! Bari an b’a yira o la. Bari so nin, a bangu, Kita bangu le nafan o nafan n’a ya 
k\n\ a bqq b\ra Kita yan le. N’o kqra, n’ale yan sara ninna, um an ka nin to allah ma, an 
k’a to Kita Kuru ma, Kita sigi kan, an k’a to o ma. N’Allah sona, a jaabi be yan de, Allah 
sago alu sago. 
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5.7
N’diaye: 71 millions c’est trop!
Sangaré: Ce n’est pas trop!
N’diaye: C’est trop! 
Sangaré: Ce n’est pas trop!
N’diaye: C’est trop! Il y’a parti pris!
5.8
On ne devait pas accepter de payer telle somme pour une maison qui ne vaut pas cette valeur. 
Mais moi je trouvais  ce jour la qu’ils se sont mis d’accord pour venir nous raconter ça.  Parce 
qu’il parait que Baba Oumar a quitté ici... comme le maire lui même il est de son parti, ils sont 
du même parti, Sangaré aussi, c’est lui le Secrétaire General.  Tous ces gens la c’est URD. Donc, 
il parait que Baba Oumar a quitté ici il n’y a pas longtemps, donc peut être qu’il les a poussé a 
proposer ça. Et puis ils mettent ça au premier point de notre session. 
5.9
J’avais compris toute de suite ce qu’ils voulaient. Depuis qu’ils n’ont pas exposé le problème, 
j’avais tout compris, je savais qu’ils aller dire “il faut compenser ça avec de parcelles, parce qu’il 
n’y a pas d’autres moyens.” Moi je trouvais que c’est des magouilles qu’ils préparaient. Moi je 
sait très bien. Je connais leur moralité, on a cohabité ensemble dans l’ADEMA y il a longtemps  




ATT, souvenez-vous que vous êtes un élu avec un mandat à durée limitée dans le temps. Nous ne 
sommes pas contre votre décoration, monsieur le président, mais cela doit être l’œuvre de gens 
d’honneur, des gens à la probité établie. Ne vous laissez pas piéger par ceux qui ne pensent qu’à 
leurs affaires, qui veulent vous acheter avec de l’or. Laissez tomber “la reconnaissance” (du 
ventre) de Bittar; optez pour celle éternelle du peuple malien…”
6.2
L’actualité nationale étant marquée par des rumeurs et autres supputations sur une hypothétique 
prorogation de mandat du président de la République, le président du RPM n’a pas manqué de 
dire toute sa sérénité. Pour lui, le président ATT est suffisamment crédible pour ne pas suivre 
certains mauvais conseillers. Et IBK de déclarer : “J’ai conseillé au président de la République, 
ATT de faire attention aux personnes qui font semblant de l’aider, alors qu’elles ne cherchent 
qu’à se servir”. 
6.3
ATT, rien qu’ATT, après ATT, ATT…Est-ce vraiment pour ATT ou le système ATT? Mais et ATT, 
dans tout ça ? […] Alors, pour n’avoir pas dit clairement qu’il ne voulait pas, la coterie de 
courtisans et de zélateurs en a déduit qu’il en voulait, et les plus affidés de l’opportunisme sans 
vergogne ont engagé une course à qui mieux-mieux pour se courber au “bon vouloir” du Chef et 
satisfaire la “volonté” du Prince avant même qu’elle ne s’exprime. […] Nous sommes de ceux 
qui pensent, jusqu’à preuve de contraire, que le Président ATT n’a mis personne en mission pour 
lui faire jouer une prolongation après un palpitant match de deux quinquennats.”
6.4
Au cours de cette cérémonie le président de la république recevra la “Médaille d’or du 
cinquantenaire” d’un cout de quelque 250 million de FCFA au nom du secteur privé national. 
Certainement que le héros du 26 mars 1991 saisira l’opportunité de ce grand rendez-vous des 
Maliennes et des Maliens pour éclairer davantage la lanterne des uns et des autres sur sa position 
réelle sur l’harmonisation des mandats qui est aujourd’hui sur toutes les lèvres. 
6.5
Je ne sais pas comment ils vont prolonger mon mandat. Je ne sais pas ce que cela veut dire de 
prolonger un mandat. Mon mandat finit le 8 juin 2012 et je n’ai jamais pensé… Je suis même 
étonné de voir discuter de mon sort sans moi, sans que personne, sauf vous, ne vienne me 




ATT n’aura pas de dauphin pour sa succession en 2012. Il l’a dit sans détour à des confrères 
étrangers qui n’ont d’ailleurs eu aucune peine à le faire réagir (un journaliste de la place aurait 
passé le reste du temps qui lui reste au pouvoir sans jamais parvenir à obtenir d’ATT le moindre 
entretien sur la question). Des qu’il s’agit d’interview, pour les journalistes locaux, ATT est 
comme retranché dans un bunker, impossible d’être reçu, sauf s’il s’agit de la traditionnelle 
conférence de 8 juin que ne se défile qu’une fois dans l’an. Mais voila la presse étrangère, la 
coqueluche de Koulouba elle ne rate aucune occasion pour se mettre en vedette. Cette fois-ci 
encontre, elle réussit la prouesse de faire parler l’homme fort de Bamako sur un terrain bien 
polémique qui ne manquera pas d’avoir des répercutions intéressantes sur le reste du corps 
politique national.   
6.7
Parena s’inquiétait du silence qui entoure désormais les opérations du RAVEC et mettait en 
garde les autorités contre des élections bâclées en 2012 “Si on ne fait pas attention, on tombera 
soit dans le ridicule du Bénin soit dans la tragédie de la Cote d’Ivoire”, devait ajouter PPR, le 
secrétaire général du PARENA. Contrairement à 2006, déjà, ou aucune autorité n’avait prêté une 
oreille attentive aux craintes exprimées par le Parena concernant le fichier électoral, cette année 
il y a eu droit à des réponses. Celle du président de la République d’abord qui s’est engagé, avec 
ou sans le RAVEC (plutôt sans), a organiser des élections propres avant de laisser le tablier en 
2012; puis celle du Premier ministre qui a adressé une lettre au Parena pour lui “donner 
l’assurance que le gouvernement prendra toutes les mesures pour la bonne organisation” des 
élections. 
6.8
 Dans un pays normal, après que le Président et son Premier ministre se soient exprimés, on clôt 
le débat et on passe à autre chose en se mettant au travail par exemple. Sauf que le Mali est un 
pays sinon anormal du mois “atypique.” Très souvent on proclame, mais souvent les actes tardent 
à suivre ou ne suivent même pas. C’est certainement pour cette raison que tous les acteurs 
politiques se sont passés le mot pour tirer la sonnette d’alarme dans l’objectif avoué de tirer le 
gouvernement de sa torpeur. 
6.9
Apres avoir dit mon mot d’entrée, je ne doute certes pas de vos qualités. Mais s’agit-t-il de cela? 
Que non! Il s’agit ici et maintenant de priorisation et d’opportunité. Tous les Dieux de l’Olympe 
ont semble-t-il été consultés. Pourtant, il semble que le plus important ait été ignoré. Oui, 
Madame, CHRONOS, ce dieu du temps se montre particulièrement cruel avec ceux qui 
oublieraient sa toute puissance. Et la, hélas, son courroux réserve de très mauvaises surprises. 
Gardons-nous en donc. [Expression in Arab] Dieu nous en préserve! 
252
